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This dissertation, “Design of Social Insurance Programs: Theory and Evidence”, studies the
optimal design of old-age pension and disability insurance programs. These are large and important
social insurance programs. In 2015 OECD countries spent on average seven percent of GDP on old-
age pensions (15.8 percent of total government expenditure) and one percent of GDP on disability
pensions (2.2 percent of total government expenditure).1 Aging societies and rising disability rates
pose serious challenges for the financial stability of these programs and reforming these programs
is on the political agenda in many countries. This dissertation aims to shed light on optimal
policy design and reforms by connecting economic theory with empirical evidence. Chapter 2
studies welfare effects of old-age pension reforms and Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the effectiveness
of different policy instruments in disability insurance programs.
In the theoretical parts of my dissertation I want to understand the key trade-offs in the
design of these transfer programs and how these trade-offs can be quantified. In particular, the
main goal of the theoretical sections is to relate these trade-offs to well identified reduced form
estimates. In the empirical parts, I study how transfer programs affect individual behavior and
government spending by exploiting rich administrative data and quasi-experimental variation in
program rules. Based on the theoretical framework and the empirical estimates I then assess
the welfare implications of different policy reforms. In designing any social insurance program,
policy makers face a trade-off. A more generous social insurance program reduces the exposure
to risk (insurance value) but might increase the distortionary costs of the program. To study and
quantify this trade-off, I follow a “sufficient statistics” approach in all three chapters. The idea
of this approach is to link formulas of optimal policy to empirically estimable quantities. The
sufficient statistics approach is popular in the optimal unemployment insurance and optimal tax
literature. A major contribution of this dissertation is to extend this approach to old-age pension
and disability insurance programs. While there exists a rich literature that evaluates the labor
supply and fiscal effects of reforms in disability insurance and old-age pension programs, the link
between these empirical estimates to welfare consequences is missing so far.2 This dissertation
aims to provide this link.
Chapter 2 studies old-age pension reforms and is titled “Welfare Effects of Pension Reforms”.
In almost all developed countries, policy makers have implemented pension reforms by increasing
statutory retirement ages, lowering pension levels and/or adjusting pension formulas to address
demographic change. The basic idea of pension reforms is to incentivize workers to delay their
retirement, thus increasing the ratio of workers to pensioners and easing the demographic burden
on pay-as-you-go social security systems. While many reforms have already been implemented,
1Numbers are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). As a comparison spending on unemploy-
ment insurance is 0.7 percent of GDP (1.5 percent of total government expenditure) across OECD countries in
2015.
2Examples for the empirical program evaluation literature in the retirement context are Mastrobuoni (2009);
Behaghel and Blau (2012); Staubli and Zweimüller (2013); Manoli and Weber (2016a); Cribb et al. (2016) and
in the disability insurance context Autor and Duggan (2003); de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011);
Staubli (2011); Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013); Moore (2015); Gelber, Moore, and Strand (2017).
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future reforms are inevitable to avoid the financial collapse of pay-as-you-go pension systems. The
key question is: How should we reform pension systems? To answer this question Chapter 2
provides a novel, unifying framework to evaluate the welfare effects of pension reforms.
I show that the welfare effects of any reform rest crucially on the “fiscal multiplier”–the total
fiscal effect relative to the mechanical fiscal effect. When reforming the pension rules, for example
reducing pension levels, there are two effects on fiscal costs. First, lower pension levels mechanically
reduce program costs (the mechanical fiscal effect). Second, individuals might respond to the new
rules by delaying retirement, working longer and as a consequence paying more social security
contributions. These changes in behavior create additional fiscal revenue (the behavioral fiscal
effect). The total fiscal effect is the sum of the mechanical and behavioral fiscal effect. The total
effect divided by the mechanical effect is what I refer to as the fiscal multiplier of a reform. The
fiscal multiplier therefore measures by how much public funds increase for a one dollar reduction
in pensions. We can think of any pension reform as a transfer of one dollar from the hands of
a retiree to public funds. On the benefit side, public funds increase by the fiscal multiplier. On
the cost side, retirees loose one dollar. I refer to this loss as the social value of the dollar. The
social value of the dollar is the money metric of how valuable that one dollar is in the hands of the
affected retirees. Hence, to assess the welfare effects of a pension reform we need to compare the
benefits against the costs: A pension reform is welfare-improving if the multiplier is larger than
the social value of the dollar.
Fiscal multipliers can be estimated with reduced-form methods using data on contributions to
and transfers from the entire welfare state system. However, previous literature has not estimated
fiscal multipliers of pension reforms. In the empirical part of Chapter 2, I exploit a series of
pension reforms in Austria and estimate fiscal multipliers of increasing the early retirement age
and reducing pension levels. I find that increasing the early retirement age has a fiscal multiplier
of 1. This is surprising. Since individuals can no longer retire early, we expect them to work
longer and pay more taxes, leading to additional fiscal revenue and hence a multiplier larger than
1. In response to the reform workers spend more time in employment, which generates additional
social security contributions, but some individuals also spend more time in unemployment, which
generates additional expenditures on unemployment insurance benefits. These two effects cancel,
leading to a net-zero fiscal effect of behavioral responses. This finding implies that increasing the
Austrian early retirement age is not welfare-enhancing–unless one thinks that $1 in the hands of
an early retiree has a lower social value than $1 in public funds.
By contrast, reducing pension levels generates a multiplier of 1.5. This policy induces some
workers to delay their retirement and stay longer in employment without triggering substitution
to other welfare benefits. As a result, reducing pension levels is welfare improving, provided that
taking $1 away from a retiree is associated with a social loss smaller than $1.5. In a standard
calibration of the model, the social loss is smaller than $1.5 for reasonable values of risk aversion
suggesting that reducing pension levels was welfare-improving. The theoretical framework also
allows to rank the welfare effects of the two reforms which answers whether we should rather
increase the early retirement age or reduce pension levels. Based on my estimates, a social planner
with preferences for redistribution clearly favors reducing pension levels over increasing the early
retirement age. Reducing pension levels has a higher multiplier (1.5 vs. 1 of increasing the early
retirement age) and plausibly has a lower social value of the dollar.3 Hence, the ranking is clear as
the pension level reform has higher social benefits (fiscal multiplier) and lower social costs (social
value of the dollar).
Chapters 3 and 4 study disability insurance programs. In many countries the share of indi-
viduals receiving Disability Insurance (DI) has increased significantly over the past 50 years. For
example, in the United States less than 1 percent of individuals in the age group of 20 to 64
were receiving DI benefits in 1960, but by 2012 this fraction had risen to 5.3 percent. Some Eu-
ropean countries, like Norway and the United Kingdom, have experienced even stronger growth.
3The pension level reform mostly affected high-income individuals, while increasing the early retirement age
affected everyone across the income distribution. If the costs of reducing transfers to high income individuals are
lower than the costs of reducing transfers to everyone across the income distribution, then the pension level reform
has lower social costs (social value of the dollar).
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The rapid expansion of the DI beneficiary population has generated substantial interest by policy
makers and economists in measures that reduce growth in program caseloads and expenditures.
Autor and Duggan (2006) discuss three ways to limit the expansion of DI programs: (i) reduce
incentives to seek DI benefits, (ii) adopt more rigorous eligibility standards and (iii) provide incen-
tives to return to work. Chapter 3 studies the welfare effects of instruments (i) and (ii). Chapter
4 provides a framework to analyze policy (iii).
Chapter 3 is joint work with Stefan Staubli and Josef Zweimüller and titled “Designing Dis-
ability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?”. This Chapter
provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare effects of stricter DI eligibility rules ver-
sus lower DI benefits. We derive sufficient statistics formulas to quantify the trade-offs of these
policy instruments and also show how these two instruments can be optimally combined. As in
Chapter 2, the fiscal multiplier is of central importance. Estimating the fiscal multiplier of stricter
DI eligibility rules, however, is not straightforward. Stricter eligibility rules lead mechanically to
lower DI award rates but at the same time change application behavior. To directly estimate the
mechanical effect of stricter eligibility rules one would need to know the hypothetical change in
the award rates of individuals. This is a counterfactual we cannot observe.4 Therefore, one of the
empirical contributions of this Chapter is to develop an approach to construct this counterfactual.
The empirical analysis exploits exogenous variation in DI eligibility rules and benefit levels
arising from several reforms in Austria. We find that stricter DI eligibility rules significantly
reduces DI inflow through both a mechanical effect, capturing that fewer applicants qualify for
benefits under the stricter rules, and a behavioral effect, capturing that less people apply for
benefits. Moreover, a decrease in DI benefits is also associated with a significant reduction in DI
inflow. We estimate fiscal multipliers of around 2-2.5 for stricter eligibility rules and around 1.4
for lower DI benefits.
Interestingly, the fiscal multiplier of reducing DI benefits is similar in magnitude to the fiscal
multiplier of reducing old-age pension levels. The fiscal multiplier of stricter DI eligibility criteria
is substantially higher than the multipliers I find for pension reforms. However, the population
at risk is also very different across these programs implying differences in the social value of the
dollar and making a comparison of reforms across programs difficult.5
Chapter 4 studies optimal work incentives in DI programs. It is joint work with Giacomin
Favre and Stefan Staubli and is titled “Offsetting the Cliff? A Sufficient Statistics Approach to
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Work Incentives in Disability Insurance”. Most DI programs
feature strong work disincentives, so called “cash cliffs”. If DI beneficiaries have labor earnings
beyond a certain income threshold, they loose their entire cash benefits. Instead, a benefit offset
program reduces DI cash benefits gradually for individuals with an income above the threshold.
Hence, there is an active policy discussion to replace these cash cliffs with a benefit offset. The
hope is to reduce program costs by abolishing the strong work disincentives of a cash cliff.
Replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset scheme has two opposing effects. On the one hand,
the most able DI beneficiaries are incentivized to increase their labor supply (labor supply effect).
This reduces program costs without reducing the insurance value of DI. On the other hand, DI
becomes more attractive for potential applicants, which might cause more DI take-up (induced
entry effect) and increased program costs. Our theoretical analysis formalizes this trade-off and
shows that the welfare effects crucially depend on two sufficient statistics: (i) the earnings elasticity
of DI recipients and (ii) the DI benefit take-up elasticity. The earnings elasticity captures the labor
supply effect, and the DI benefit take-up elasticity is a sufficient statistic for induced entry in a
broad class of models. Moreover, our theoretical analysis shows that the introduction of a benefit
offset is unlikely to reduce program costs. A cost reduction requires at least an earnings elasticity
above one, i.e. a disproportionately strong labor supply response of DI recipients to financial
incentives. Nevertheless introducing a benefit offset can be welfare-improving because it increases
4Estimating the mechanical fiscal effect of a benefit level reform is straightforward as we can directly calculate
by how much individual benefits change due to the reform. It is (usually) not possible to directly calculate the
effect of a change in DI eligibility rules on DI award rates at the individual level.
5Potentially, a transfer to affected DI applicants might be socially more valuable than a transfer to the average
retiree. This would imply a higher social value of the dollar for DI reforms compared to old-age pension reforms.
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the insurance value. As an illustration, we implement our sufficient statistics formula for the
U.S. based on estimates from previous studies. For the lowest estimates of the benefit take-up
elasticity in the literature the introduction of a benefit offset is welfare-improving while for the
highest estimates the introduction is welfare-reducing. In ongoing empirical work we exploit two
policy reforms in Canada to estimate the labor supply and DI benefit take-up elasticity. This will
provide more evidence on the effectiveness of benefit offset programs.
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Chapter 2
Welfare Effects of Pension Reforms
Abstract. In almost all developed countries, policy makers have implemented pension reforms by
increasing statutory retirement ages, lowering pension levels and/or adjusting pension formulas
to address demographic change. This paper provides a novel, unifying framework to evaluate the
welfare effects of such pension reforms. I show that the welfare effects of any reform rest crucially on
the “behavioral fiscal multiplier”–the total fiscal effect relative to the mechanical fiscal effect (the
mechanical effect is the fiscal effect absent any behavioral responses). Behavioral fiscal multipliers
can be readily estimated with reduced-form methods using data on contributions to and transfers
from the entire welfare state system. To illustrate my framework, I exploit a series of pension
reforms in Austria. I find that increasing the early retirement age has a behavioral multiplier of
1. This means that the total fiscal effect is purely mechanical and there is no fiscal effect from
behavioral adjustments. In response to the reform workers spend more time in employment, which
generates additional social security contributions. However, individuals also spend more time in
unemployment, which generates additional expenditures on unemployment insurance benefits.
These two effects cancel, leading to a net-zero fiscal effect of behavioral responses. This finding
implies that increasing the Austrian early retirement age is not welfare-enhancing–unless one
thinks that $1 in the hands of an early retiree has a lower social value than $1 in public funds. By
contrast, reducing pension levels generates a multiplier of 1.5. This policy induces some workers
to stay longer in employment without triggering substitution to other welfare benefits. As a
result, reducing pension levels is welfare improving, provided that taking $1 away from a retiree is
associated with a social loss smaller than $1.5. In a standard calibration of the model, the social
loss is smaller than $1.5 for reasonable values of risk aversion suggesting that reducing pension
levels was welfare-improving. My framework can also rank the welfare effects of the two reforms.
Based on my estimates, a social planner with preferences for redistribution clearly favors reducing
pension levels over increasing the early retirement age.
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2.1 Introduction
Due to dramatically aging populations throughout the world, pension reforms are on the polit-
ical agenda everywhere. The basic idea of pension reforms is to incentivize workers to delay their
retirement, thus increasing the ratio of workers to pensioners and easing the demographic burden
on pay-as-you-go social security systems.1 Many countries have implemented pension reforms in
the recent past. For instance, the U.S. has started to gradually increase the full retirement age
from 65 to 67 and almost all European countries have implemented increases in the statutory
retirement ages. Many countries have increased work incentives by reducing pension levels and/or
by increasing the actuarial fairness of pensions. The hope is that these measures induce workers
to postpone their retirement. While many reforms have already been implemented, future reforms
are inevitable to avoid the financial collapse of pay-as-you-go pension systems. The key question
is: How should we reform pension systems?
To answer this question we need to understand the welfare effects of pension reforms. While
there exists a rich literature that evaluates the labor supply and fiscal effects of pension reforms
(e.g. Mastrobuoni 2009; Behaghel and Blau 2012; Staubli and Zweimüller 2013; Manoli and Weber
2016a; Cribb et al. 2016), the link between the empirical estimates from the program evaluation
literature to welfare consequences is missing so far. This paper aims to provide this link. I show
that the welfare effect of a pension reform crucially depends on the “behavioral fiscal multiplier”
and that behavioral fiscal multipliers can be credibly estimated with reduced-form methods. The
behavioral multiplier of a reform is defined as the total fiscal effect divided by the mechanical
fiscal effect. The mechanical fiscal effect measures the hypothetical effect of a reform on fiscal
revenue if individual behavior did not respond to the reform. The mechanical fiscal effect can be
directly calculated holding pre-reform behavior fixed. The total fiscal effect of a pension reform
can be estimated with program evaluation methods. The existing literature estimates the total
fiscal effects of pension reforms but usually does not identify the mechanical fiscal effect. However,
this extra step of relating the total effect to the mechanical effect (i.e. the behavioral multiplier)
is crucial for welfare evaluation.
Why is the behavioral multiplier key for welfare evaluation? One can think of a pension reform
as taking away one dollar from a retiree and transferring it to public funds. Different pension
reforms simply target different groups of retirees. For example, an increase in the early retirement
age takes away one dollar from early retirees, a cut in pension levels takes away one dollar from all
retirees. A reform then mechanically increases public funds by one dollar. Additionally, a reform
induces behavioral responses. Individuals adjust to the new rules, e.g. by delaying retirement
and working longer, which further increases public funds. In total, taking away one dollar from a
retiree increases public funds by the behavioral multiplier. However, taking away one dollar from
a retiree comes at a social cost. This social cost depends on the relative social valuation of one
dollar in the hands of a retiree versus one dollar in public funds. I refer to this cost as “the social
value of the dollar.” If one dollar is socially more valuable in the hands of a retiree, the social
value of the dollar is above one. If one dollar is socially more valuable in public funds, the social
value of the dollar is below one. The social value of the dollar, therefore, measures the social cost
of transferring one dollar from retirees to public funds in dollar terms. More specifically, the social
value of the dollar depends on three things. First, it depends on how valuable this dollar is to the
affected retirees (measured by their marginal utility of consumption). Second, it depends on the
welfare weights the social planner attaches to the group of affected retirees. Third, it depends on
the social value of public funds, i.e. the social value of whatever else the planner would use this
dollar for, or put differently, the social cost of raising public funds.2
In summary, taking away one dollar from retirees (a pension reform) has a social benefit of
increasing public funds by the behavioral multiplier, but comes at the cost of the social value of
the dollar. Hence, to evaluate the welfare effect of a reform, we need to compare the behavioral
1In pay-as-you-go pension systems, working-age individuals pay for the pensions of the currently old generation.
2Importantly, economic theory tells us that behavioral adjustments to small reforms do not have direct welfare
effects (by the envelope theorem) and hence do not enter in the social value of the dollar.
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multiplier to the social value of the dollar (social benefits vs. social costs). If the behavioral
multiplier is larger than the social value of the dollar, the reform is welfare improving (social
benefits exceed social costs) and vice versa. The social value of the dollar does not directly relate
to moments in the data.3 After all, the social value of the dollar depends on the value that
society as whole puts on a marginal increase of public funds relative to a decrease in pension
generosity. This is a judgment call but under reasonable assumptions on the efficiency of the
tax system and social preferences the social value of the dollar is larger than one, i.e. one dollar
in the hands of a retiree has at least a social value of one dollar. In contrast, the behavioral
multiplier can be readily estimated from data on fiscal costs and revenues that are generated by
individuals’ behavioral responses to the reform. The behavioral multiplier is essential, because it is
the benchmark against which to judge the social value of the dollar. Under certain circumstances,
knowing only the behavioral multiplier (but not the social value of the dollar) suffices to assess
whether a pension reform was welfare improving or not. In my empirical analysis, the size of
the estimated multipliers (and the characteristics of the affected workers) imply that only mild
assumptions on social preferences are needed to make clear-cut statements about the welfare effects
of these reforms.
In the empirical analysis of the paper, I estimate the behavioral multiplier of increasing the
early retirement age and the behavioral multiplier of reducing pension levels by exploiting a series
of pension reforms in Austria. Austria provides an ideal set up for three main reasons. First,
seven pension reforms changed the early retirement age, pension levels and actuarial fairness of
the pension formula at least once. Austrian policy makers phased in most policy changes yielding
vast quasi-experimental variation. Second, the Austrian pension formula is very similar to other
developed countries’ pay-as-you-go formulas and the Austrian pension reforms changed margins
that relate to current policy discussions. Third, the Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD) is
an ideal data source to estimate behavioral multipliers of pension reforms. The ASSD does not
only include information on the complete labor market and earnings history of workers since
1972 but also the history of take-up of welfare state programs (such as unemployment insurance,
disability insurance and sickness benefits). As I will demonstrate below, changes in take-up of
social insurance programs crucially affect the size of the behavioral multiplier.
To estimate the behavioral multiplier of increasing the early retirement age (ERA), I exploit
two pension reforms in 2000 and 2003 that increased the ERA in steps from 55 to 60 for women
and from 60 to 65 for men. The increase in the ERA is phased in by quarters of birth. With
a difference-in-difference strategy, I find large and positive fiscal revenue effects of increasing
the ERA. However, this fiscal revenue effect is purely mechanical, implying that the behavioral
multiplier of this reform is one and in some cases as low as 0.9. This is surprising. Since individuals
can no longer retire early, we expect them to work longer and pay more taxes, leading to additional
fiscal revenue and hence a large behavioral multiplier. While there is a positive fiscal effect through
additional payroll tax revenue, there are also additional expenditures from individuals substituting
to unemployment benefits. It turns out that these two effects cancel out each other. The net fiscal
effect from behavioral adjustments is therefore zero, leading to a behavioral multiplier of one.
Interestingly, this finding implies that increasing the Austrian early retirement age is not welfare-
enhancing – unless one thinks that $1 in the hands of an early retiree has a lower social value
than $1 in public funds. As I show in the theoretical part of the paper, a natural lower bound for
the social value of the dollar is one. Hence, the ERA reform with a behavioral multiplier of one is
unlikely to be welfare-enhancing.
To estimate the behavioral multiplier of reducing pension levels, I exploit a 1988 reform using
a regression discontinuity design. The reform changed the pension formula by date of birth in a
particular way that made pensions by about 1.25% less generous on average.4 For this reform, I find
3I am not aware of other papers that have related the social value of a dollar to empirical estimates in the
retirement context. In the unemployment insurance literature, there are exciting new approaches on this frontier
(e.g. Hendren (2017) and Landais and Spinnewijn (2019)). These approaches might also be applied in the retirement
context but require data on consumption and saving decisions of individuals.
4An individual’s pension is determined by her assessment basis multiplied with her pension coefficient. The
assessment basis measures the average earnings over a specific period (assessment period) after applying a cap to
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large behavioral multipliers of around 1.5. In response to the reform, I find that individuals delay
their retirement and work longer. This increases fiscal revenue both by a reduction in spending on
pensions and by additional pay-roll tax revenue. There is no substitution to other welfare benefits
that would counteract this effect. In sum, this produces a behavioral multiplier of 1.5. Hence,
reducing pension levels is welfare improving – provided that taking one dollar away from a retiree
is associated with a social loss smaller than 1.5 dollars. In a standard parametrization of the model
with CRRA utility I find that the social loss is smaller than 1.5 dollars for reasonable values of risk
aversion. Hence, reducing pension levels is welfare-enhancing. The result that reducing pension
levels generates behavioral multipliers substantially larger than 1 is surprising. A reduction in
pension levels has a large mechanical effect, since individual’s pensions are lower for the rest of
their life. Moreover, a change in pension levels might be less salient and more complicated to
understand than increasing the ERA. Therefore, one might not expect that individuals change
their labor supply and retirement decision in response to this reform.
My framework also allows comparing the welfare effect of increasing the ERA to the welfare
effect of reducing pension levels. Based on my estimates, a social planner with preferences for
redistribution clearly favors reducing pension levels over increasing the ERA. Reducing pension
levels has a substantially higher behavioral multiplier of 1.5 compared to the ERA reform with a
behavioral multiplier of 1. Moreover, the pension level reform did not uniformly cut pension levels
but disproportionately affected high income earners, while the ERA reform affected individuals
across the income distribution. This implies a lower social value of the dollar for the pension level
reform, since taking away one dollar from high income retirees is less costly than taking away
one dollar from all retirees. Hence, reducing pension levels has a higher social benefit (behavioral
multiplier) and comes at lower social costs (social value of the dollar) compared to increasing
the ERA. Therefore, reducing pension levels is preferable to increasing the ERA in the Austrian
context.
The more general message of my analysis is that spillovers to other welfare systems are of first-
order importance and labor market opportunities of older workers are key in this respect. The
behavioral multiplier summarizes these effects. If my framework is applied to reforms in other
countries, the welfare implications can be very different depending on the labor market responses
of affected workers.
Contribution to Literature. The logic that the behavioral multiplier is central to welfare
evaluation is not new. This is a direct consequence of the envelope theorem and the foundation
of the sufficient statistics literature. The previous literature on sufficient statistics has mainly
focused on optimal unemployment insurance and taxation. There is a lot of recent and exciting
work done in these areas (for an overview of this literature see Chetty and Finkelstein (2013);
Kleven (2018a) and for recent papers on unemployment insurance see Chetty (2006a); Shimer
and Werning (2007); Chetty (2008); Schmieder et al. (2012); Kolsrud et al. (2018)). This is the
first paper to take this idea to the retirement context and show that reduced-form estimates are
informative for welfare effects of pension reforms. In the retirement context, with complicated
dynamics and multiple generations, it is not obvious what the relevant reduced-form estimates are
and whether we can estimate them. This paper demonstrates that the behavioral multiplier of
a reform is central and that it can be credibly estimated with reduced-form methods. There are
two recent working papers that closely connect to my paper. Lee et al. (2019) estimate the fiscal
externality (behavioral multiplier minus 1) for two unemployment policies. Hendren and Sprung-
Keyser (2019) estimate the marginal value of public funds (willingness to pay for a policy divided
by the behavioral multiplier) for 133 historical policy changes in the United States, focusing on
policies in social insurance, education and job training, taxes and cash transfers, and in-kind
transfers. Both papers argue, as I do as well, that these measures a key for welfare analysis of
policy changes.
The empirical part of this paper contributes to the large and growing reduced-form literature
evaluating past pension reforms (Duggan et al., 2007; Mastrobuoni, 2009; Behaghel and Blau,
earnings in each year. The 1988 pension reform increases the assessment period from the last 10 years to the last
11 years for men born after January 1st 1928 and for women born after January 1st 1933. Due to seniority wages
this decreases pension by 1.25% on average.
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2012; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Manoli and Weber, 2016a; Cribb et al., 2016; Seibold, 2019)
by evaluating the labor supply and fiscal implications of increasing the ERA and reducing pension
levels. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016b) study the same ERA reform
as this paper. My analysis uses a slightly different identification strategy and estimates the
behavioral multiplier of the reform as a new outcome. The theoretical framework provides a
new perspective on the welfare effects of this reform. The pension level reform has not been
studied before.
There is also a large literature on structural retirement models (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986;
Stock and Wise, 1990; Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Rust and Phelan, 1997; French, 2005; van der
Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008; Iskhakov, 2010; Laitner and Silverman, 2012; Imrohoroglu and Kitao,
2012; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2015). This literature performs counterfactual analysis of social
security reforms in estimated models to understand the labor supply and welfare effects of pension
reforms. I view this structural approach as complementary to my paper. For instance, in my
empirical analysis I cannot observe the labor supply response to a reform over the entire life-cycle
of an individual (especially at younger ages). In policy simulations, French (2005) finds very
little life-cycle variation in hours worked between ages 30 and 55, suggesting that my empirical
analysis might not be missing a substantial effect by ignoring outcomes at younger ages. In the
other direction, careful reduced-form empirical analysis of pension reforms can be informative for
structural model building.
Road-map. Section 2.2 develops the theoretical framework for welfare evaluation. Section 2.3
describes the institutional background in Austria, the seven pension reforms and the data. The
empirical analysis in section 2.4 is divided in two parts. Section 2.4.1 estimates the behavioral
multiplier of increasing the early retirement age. Section 2.4.2 estimates the behavioral multi-
plier of decreasing pension levels. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. Various model extensions and
robustness checks are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Model
This section develops the framework to evaluate welfare effects of pension reforms. The model
is in the spirit of the sufficient-statistics literature. I show that in a large class of models the
multiplier of a pension reform, which can be estimated with reduced-form methods, is key for
welfare evaluation.5 Pension reforms are challenging to evaluate because there are effects within
and between generations. I start with a life-cycle model of only one generation to illustrate the
key trade-offs. In Appendix 2.A.4 I show that with multiple overlapping generations we want to
estimate the exact same multiplier as with only one generation. The logic of the argument is that
we want to design the optimal pension formula for each generation and hence need to know the
multiplier of a reform within one generation.
Agents. There is a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ I facing a life-cycle of T periods. Agent’s
expected life-time utility, denoted by Ui(C,Π, X), depends on their consumption C, other choices
Π (such as labor supply), and the full state history X. In each period, an agent is in a specific
state xt with a state history x
t = {xi}
t−1
i=0 . A state is described by assets at and a vector of other
states st, i.e. xt = {at, st}. The other states st can include, but are not limited to, labor market
status, past earnings, health, productivity and mortality. This formulation is flexible, allowing,
for instance, for utility depending on labor markets status, health status, productivity or age. In
particular, this can also capture differences in longevity. While I fix the maximum length of life
to T periods, this is not restrictive. Differences in longevity can be modeled as a state variable
“death” that sets the utility function to zero for all future periods and T can be arbitrarily large.
Each period, an agent chooses consumption ct(x
t) and other choices πt(x
t), which includes labor
income yt(x
t) and a vector pt(x












1), . . . , πT−1(x
T−1)
)
denote the contingent life-cycle plan of an agent. The agent
therefore solves the following optimization problem





subject to the constraints
at+1 = (1 + rt)at + yt(x










The constraints impose minimal structure on the evolution of state variables. For assets, I
impose the standard budget constraint (2.2) stating that for every state history xt in each period
t assets tomorrow at+1 equal assets today at plus capital income rtat, plus after tax income
yt(x
t) − τ(xt) and benefit receipt b(xt), minus consumption ct(x
t) and expenditures of the other
choices q(p(xt)).6 Constraint (2.3) characterizes the evolution of the other state variables such as
labor market status or health, and is assumed to follow some process f [st, πt(x
t), εt]. This process
is allowed to depend on the full state history st, the random component εt and choices πt.
Social Planner. The social planner can specify state-history-dependent transfers b(xt) and
taxes τ(xt). These functions capture all kinds of (un-)conditional transfers and taxes and therefore,
in principle, describe the entire welfare state. When choosing the benefit and tax function, the
social planner faces a revenue constraint G(b, τ) ≥ Ḡ, where revenue is defined as the present value
of taxes minus transfers. The planner’s objective function sums over the indirect utilities Vi of all
agents weighted by welfare weights ωi. The planner therefore solves
max
b(·),τ(·)














The expectation operator in (2.5) is defined over the distribution of state histories, which
depends on the agent’s choices C and Π.7
Fréchet Derivative. The social planner is optimizing over functions. To formalize this I use
the Fréchet derivative, which is a generalization of the concept of directional derivatives to func-
tions.8 The Fréchet derivative δW (b;h) measures the change in social welfare W (b, τ) if the benefit
function b(·) is tilted in direction of the function h(·). Intuitively, one can think of changing the
current benefit function b(·) in direction h(·) as a specific reform that changes the pension formula
in particular way. Different directions h(·) can capture changes in pension generosity (level shift in
benefit function), in actuarial fairness (slope of the benefit function) and early and normal retire-
ment age (shift to the right in the age dimension). Figure 2.1 illustrates this idea graphically. In
summary, the Fréchet derivative is a powerful tool to capture arbitrarily complicated (marginal)
changes in the benefit function and therefore any small pension reform can be evaluated in my
framework.
6q(·) is mapping the other choices pt(xt) into monetary expenditures.
7Formally,
∑T−1













μ(d(ε0, . . . , εT−1)|x0, C,Π)
where μ(d(ε0, . . . , εT−1)|x0, C,Π) is the product measure on the cross product of Υ
T (the space of the er-
ror terms εt) and T copies of Υ , since xt = {at, st} can be expressed in terms of (ε0, . . . , εT−1) via (2.2)
and (2.3). For notational ease, I assume that the distribution of state histories has a density function, de-









8See Luenberger (1997) for a formal treatment.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration Fréchet Derivative
(a) Actuarial Fairness (b) Early Retirement
Notes: This figure illustrates the idea of the Fréchet derivative. Suppose the black line is the pre-reform benefit function and
the red line the post-reform benefit function. In panel (a) we change the slope of the benefit function. Individuals who retire
early face a reduction in their benefits. Hence, the direction of change h(·) is negative for these individuals. Individuals who
retire later face an increase in their benefits and their direction of change h(·) is positive. Panel (b) illustrates an increase
of the early retirement age (ERA). This shifts the whole benefit function to the right.
Optimal Benefit Function. Suppose the planner implements a particular pension reform, i.e.
the benefit function is changed in the direction of a measurable function h : X → R. The welfare











di+ λ ∗ δG(b;h). (2.6)
The first term measures the direct welfare effect of changing the benefit function. This direct
welfare effect is given by the change of the benefit function h(xt) multiplied by the marginal utility
of consumption ∂Ui(C,Π,X)
∂ct(xt)
of agent i in that state multiplied by her welfare weight ωi. This direct
effect only depends on the mechanical effect of the reform. The Envelope theorem ensures that
behavioral adjustments do not have a first-order welfare effect. The second term, λ ∗ δG(b;h),
captures the social value of the fiscal effect of the reform. δG(b;h) is the total change in fiscal
revenue and consists of two separate effects: The mechanical and behavioral fiscal effect. The
mechanical fiscal effect, M(h), is the hypothetical change in fiscal revenue if agents’ behavior did
not respond to the reform. Formally, this simply sums up all changes in the benefit function h(·)











The behavioral effect B(h) measures the hypothetical change in fiscal revenue of the reform if
only agents’ behavior adjusted and the benefit function was held constant. Formally, the behavioral











where δμ(xt;h) measures the change in the state-history distribution due to changes in the agents’
behavior. The sum of these two effects yields the total fiscal revenue effect δG(b;h) = M(h)+B(h).
Lastly, the multiplier on the planner’s budget constraint, λ, converts the fiscal revenue effect from
dollars to welfare. λ measures the social value of a dollar in public funds. This value depends on
what the planner uses the dollar for. As I formally show below, a natural lower bound for λ is the
average marginal utility of consumption in the population. In this case, the planner would simply
redistribute the dollar lump-sum across all individuals.
The optimal benefit function then ensures that there is no potential welfare improvement from























for all deviations h(·). A formal proof of this optimality condition can be found in Appendix 2.A.
Normalizing the welfare effect by the mechanical effect M(h) provides the same metric for all
reforms in equation (2.9), making an increase in the early retirement age comparable to a cut in
pension levels. The thought experiment in equation (2.9) is therefore to take away one dollar from
retirees through a specific reform. The LHS of (2.9) measures the social value of the dollar in the
hands of the affected group. The RHS of (2.9) measures the multiplier of the reform, i.e. how much
additional fiscal revenue is generated by behavioral responses of agents on top of the mechanically
saved dollar. Formula (2.9) nests the Baily-Chetty formula for optimal unemployment insurance
benefits as a special case as I illustrate in Appendix 2.A.3.
Welfare Effect of a Reform. How is equation (2.9) useful for thinking about welfare effects
of actual pension reforms? Suppose we have a specific reform that makes the pension system less
generous, for instance a reduction in pension levels. Further suppose that we can determine the
social value of the dollar (LHS of (2.9)) and the multiplier (RHS of (2.9)) of this reform. If we find
that the multiplier is larger than the social value of the dollar, we can conclude that the reform is
welfare improving.





















If we find that the social value of the dollar is larger than the multiplier of the reform, we would
have better not changed the system and the dollar is better left in the hands of the retirees. In
that case the reform is welfare-reducing. If the pension system was optimal before the reform, the
social value of the dollar and the multiplier would be equal.
But can we get credible estimates of the social value of the dollar and the multiplier of a reform?
In principle we can estimate the multiplier of a reform with reduced-form methods. The social
value of a dollar, however, is not directly related to observed moments in the data. In the end
this is a judgment call of the planner, since it will always depend on the welfare weights a planner
chooses. Nevertheless, knowing the multiplier of a reform is informative. The multiplier provides
the benchmark of how high the social value of a dollar must be such that the reform is no longer
welfare improving. For instance, assume reducing pension levels has a multiplier of 1.5, meaning
that for each mechanical dollar there is an additional 50 cents reduction in expenditures due to
behavioral response (e.g. individuals retire later and pay more taxes). Reducing pension levels is
then welfare improving as long as the dollar in the hands of the affected retirees is valued at less
than 1.5 dollars. To illustrate the magnitude of the social value of the dollar I also parameterize
the model. Appendix 2.A.5 provides the details for this exercise.
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Lower Bound for the Social Value of the Dollar. A natural lower bound for the social value
of the dollar is unity, meaning that one dollar in the hands of a retiree has a social value of at least
one dollar. To derive this lower bound, we need to make two assumptions. First, assume that
welfare cannot be improved through higher lump-sum taxation. This is a fairly mild assumption
on the efficiency of the tax system and implies that λ is smaller than the average marginal utility
of consumption in the population. Second, assume a utilitarian planner, i.e. ωi = 1 ∀i.
9 With
these two assumptions we can bound the social value of the dollar by the average marginal utility
of consumption of individuals affected by the pension reform divided by the average marginal
consumption in the population, i.e.






















where h is the lump-sum transfer, which would redistribute the mechanical effect from the reform
M(h) equally across all agents and periods. If we think that the marginal utility of consumption
of retirees affected by the reform is larger than the average marginal utility of consumption in the
population, then the social value of the dollar is larger than unity. Put differently, the social value
of the dollar is larger than unity if we think that a transfer to retirees is socially more valuable than
a transfer to all individuals. The formal argument for this lower bound is in Appendix 2.A.2. In
consequence, a reform with a multiplier below unity cannot be welfare-improving if we are willing
to make these fairly mild assumptions.
Ranking Welfare Effects of two Reforms. Multipliers of reforms can be informative to rank
the welfare effects of two reforms without exactly pinning down the social value of the dollar. For
instance, if two reforms target the same individuals, the social value of the dollar is identical.
Hence, the multipliers are sufficient to rank the two reforms and the reform with the higher
multiplier is preferable. In practice, we do not have two reforms that target the exact same
individuals. However, we might have two reforms where we can rank the social value of the dollar
of the two reforms under mild assumptions on the planner’s preferences. For instance, assume
that we have two reforms A and B. Suppose that reform A reduces pension levels for high income
individuals while reform B reduces pension levels for all individuals. In this case the social value
of the dollar of reform A is lower than the social value of the dollar of reform B if we assume
the planner has redistributive preferences (since it is less costly to take away one dollar from rich
individuals). If reform A also has the higher multiplier we can conclude that reform A is preferable
to reform B.
Formally, the difference of the welfare effects of the two reforms is the difference in the multipli-
ers (first line in equation below) minus the difference in the social value of the dollar (second line).
If the multiplier of reform A is larger than the multiplier of reform B, the first term is positive.
If the planner has preferences for redistribution and reform A targets higher income individuals
compared to reform B, then the social loss of reform B is larger and the term in the second line is
positive. As a consequence, reform A is unambiguously preferable to reform B.












































Estimating the Multiplier. The ideal experiment to estimate the multiplier of a reform would
be to observe a treatment and control group under the pre- and post-reform regime over their life-
cycle. In this case the multiplier can be estimated in three steps:
9This simplifies the argument and rules out that a planner would put zero weights on individuals, who are
affected by the reform.
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1. Estimate Total Fiscal Effect T (h) as the mean difference in life-cycle fiscal revenue between
treatment and control group.
2. Calculate the Mechanical Fiscal Effect M(h): Calculate life-cycle fiscal revenue in the control
group under both the pre- and post-reform pension regime (holding behavior fixed). The
difference in fiscal revenue is the mechanical effect.
3. Compute the Behavioral Fiscal Effect as residual B(h) = T (h)−M(h).
Reduced-form methods, such as difference-in-difference or regression-discontinuity estimators, can
deliver credible estimates on the total fiscal effect of a reform. The mechanical effect of a reform
is straightforward to calculate. The challenge of estimating the multiplier, however, is the life-
cycle aspect and the ideal experiment does not usually exist. Typically, individuals learn about
changes in their pension rules around age 50 to 60 and not already at the beginning of their life.
If they knew about the reform already at younger ages, forward-looking individuals might adjust
their behavior in anticipation of the reform. Hence, the challenge is to estimate these potential
anticipation effects of a pension reform. For some of the Austrian reforms, individuals learned
about changes in their rules well in advance and I provide evidence that anticipation seems not to
play a key role. In the empirical part of the paper, I therefore argue that we can get a good sense
of the multiplier of a pension reform with reduced-form methods.
Extensions. In appendix 2.A.4 I show that with multiple overlapping generations we want to
estimate the exact same multiplier as in the one generation setup to evaluate welfare effects of
pension reforms. The logic of the argument is that we want to design the optimal pension formula
for each generation and hence need to know the multiplier of a reform within each generation.
The social value of the dollar now also accounts for the relative valuation of a dollar in the hands
of the current generation versus in the hands of future generations. Appendix 2.A.6 discusses
how the welfare evaluation changes in case of general equilibrium effects, non-marginal changes
or behavioral biases of agents. In presence of these effects, there is an additional term on the
LHS of formula (2.9), i.e. the direct welfare effect looks different. The RHS is still the multiplier
of the reform. In particular, non-marginal changes and behavioral biases imply that behavioral
adjustments have first-order welfare effects. In case of non-marginal reforms we can sign the
additional term on the LHS. Behavioral adjustments to non-marginal reforms are costly and
increase the social value of the dollar. Hence, if a reform is welfare-reducing in the marginal change
framework, the reform is even more welfare-reducing if we account for the direct costs of behavioral
adjustments. With behavioral biases the sign of the additional term (the “bias correction term”)
depends on whether a reform reduces or amplifies the bias. For example, suppose individuals
are myopic and a reform induces them to retire later and save more. In this case, the reform
reduces the bias (myopic individuals save too little and retire too early from the viewpoint of a
paternalistic planner) and hence accounting for this bias term reduces the social value of the dollar
making the reform more attractive.
2.3 Institutional Background and Data
2.3.1 The Public Pension System in Austria
The Austrian public pension system covers all private-sector workers. The system is primarily
financed as a pay-as-you-go system, but financial shortfalls have to be covered by the federal
budget.10 The other pillars of the pension system are of minor importance.11 Public pensions are
10In 2017, the share coming from the federal budget (the so-called “Bundesbeitrag”) amounted to about 1.7%
of GDP or 17.2% of overall spending for old-age pensions (HV, 2018).
11Funded company pension schemes, comparable to 401(k) plans in the U.S., are not mandatory and in 2007
less than 20% of the Austrian workforce was covered by such plans. Since 2002, there has been a new severance
pay scheme where employers transfer 1.53% of the monthly salary to a pension account. The contribution rate to
the pay-as-you-go pension system is 22.8%. Third-pillar pensions (“Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge”) have
only been available since 2003. For more details see Fink (2009).
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the main source of income for retirees and they replace on average 75% of the pre-retirement net
earnings. Public pensions are calculated as a function of insurance years, experience, retirement
age and past wages. Since 1985 Austria had seven major pension reforms that changed the benefit
formula substantially. In general, the pension benefit formula consists of two parts, the assessment
basis and the pension coefficient:
old-age pension = assessment basis× pension coefficient.
The assessment basis measures the average earnings over a specific period after applying a cap
to earnings in each year. The assessment basis is comparable to the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) in the U.S. system. The pension coefficient is the individual’s replacement rate
(in percent) that is applied to the assessment basis. The pension coefficient is a function of the
number of insurance years and the claiming age.12
Individuals with more than fifteen insurance years are eligible to claim old-age pensions. The
normal retirement age (NRA) is 60 for women and 65 for men. The early retirement age (ERA)
was 55 for women and 60 for men and was step-wise increased to 60 for women and to 65 for men.
Since 2005, individuals with more than 37.5 insurance years can still retire early at age 62. In
Austria, pension eligibility and payments always depend on individual accounts. It is not possible
to qualify for retirement benefits through one’s spouse’s contribution record.
2.3.2 Pension Reforms since 1985
Since 1985 Austria has had seven major pension reforms. The seven reforms changed all
relevant margins of the pension benefit formula at least once and Austrian policy makers phased
in most policy changes yielding vast quasi-experimental variation. The early reforms in 1985 and
1988 reduced pension levels by adjusting the definition of the assessment basis. The pension
reforms in 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 changed the actuarial fairness by adjusting the pension
coefficient to penalize early claiming. The reforms in 2000 and 2003 also increased the early
retirement age. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the seven pension reforms. The changes in
the assessment basis, pension coefficient and retirement ages were all phased-in with complicated
transition rules. This creates quasi-experimental variation in pension rules, which I exploit in my
empirical analysis. I explain the complicated transition rules and how I exploit them in section
2.4 in detail. In the following, I shortly describe how the three main determinants of the pension
formula, the assessment basis, the pension coefficient and the retirement age, changed over time.
Assessment Basis. Before 1985, the assessment basis was calculated as the average earnings
in the last five years. The pension reform in 1985 increased the assessment period from the last
five to the last ten years. In 1988, this period was further increased from the last ten years to
the last fifteen years. These reforms reduced the pension level for most individuals, since the
average earnings of the last fifteen years are lower than the average earnings in the last five years
for individuals with increasing wage profiles due to seniority effects. In 1993, the assessment basis
was again changed from the average earnings of the last fifteen years to the average earnings of the
best fifteen years. For most individuals, the best fifteen years are exactly the last fifteen years and
this reform did not substantially change pension levels. Starting in 2004, the assessment period
was step-wise increased from the best fifteen years to the best 40 years. This change was phased
in between 2004 and 2028; each year the assessment period increased by one year.
Pension Coefficient. Before 1993, the pension coefficient only depended on the number of
insurance years and was independent of the claiming age. Up to 30 insurance years, each insurance
year increased the pension coefficient by 1.9 percentage points. Above 30 insurance years, the
pension coefficient increased by 1.5 percentage points with each additional insurance year up to a
maximum of 80%. The maximal pension coefficient was therefore reached at 45 insurance years.
12Insurance years include both contribution years (i.e., periods of employment, including sick leave) and non-
contributory periods of labor force participation (e.g., unemployment).
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The pension reform in 1993 introduced a bonus for claiming pensions after the early retirement
age. This made pensions more generous for individuals who claim after the early retirement
age. For each month after the early retirement age the pension coefficient was scaled up by a
certain factor. For example, claiming five years after the early retirement age scaled the pension
coefficient up by a factor of 1.11. The reform in 1996 introduced a penalty for claiming before
age 56 for women and 61 for men. This penalty for claiming early depends on the number of
insurance years. The pension reforms in 2000 and 2003 further changed the penalty. Since 2000,
each insurance year increases the pension coefficient by two percentage points and the penalty for
each year claiming before the NRA is set at three percentage points with a maximum penalty of
ten percentage points. The reform in 2003 further increased this penalty to 4.2 percentage points
per year with a maximum of 15%. These changes were phased in over time with complicated caps
on benefit losses with respect to prior rules.
Retirement Age. The reforms in 2000 and 2003 also increased the early retirement age in steps
for men from 60 to 65 and for women from 55 to 60. The normal retirement age will be increased
from 60 to 65 for women in 2024. Interestingly, this change was already enacted in 1993. While
the actual change has not taken place yet, the announcement almost 30 years ago allows studying
anticipation effects over long periods of time and shedding light on forward-looking behavior of
individuals with respect to increases in the normal retirement age.
2.3.3 Other Social Insurance Programs
Apart from old-age pensions, there are three other important social insurance programs in
Austria: disability insurance (DI), sickness insurance (SI), and unemployment insurance (UI). The
DI program provides partial earnings replacement to workers below the full retirement age who
have accumulated at least 5 insurance years within the last 10 years and have a health impairment
that is considered severe. DI benefits are calculated in a similar fashion as old-age pensions (based
on the assessment basis and the pension coefficient) and replace approximately 70 percent of pre-
disability net earnings up to a maximum of around e4,500 per month. SI benefits cover workers
with temporary illness, which last longer than 12 weeks. SI benefits replace approximately 65%
of the last net wage and the benefit duration is 52 weeks for individuals who have worked at least
6 months in the previous 12 months, and 26 weeks otherwise. UI benefits replace approximately
55% of the wage on the last job subject to a minimum and maximum. Unemployed below age 50
receive at most 39 weeks of regular UI benefits, job losers above age 50 can claim benefits for up
to 52 weeks provided they have paid UI contributions for at least 9 years in the last 15 years.13
2.3.4 Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD)
In my empirical analysis, I use the Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD), which is described
in Zweimüller et al. (2009). The ASSD cover the universe of private-sector employees since 1972
and contain detailed information on labor market status, earnings and demographic variables.
This data set allows constructing social security benefit receipt. Based on individual’s earnings
records and labor market histories, I calculate old-age pensions (OA), disability pensions (DI),
unemployment benefits (UI) and sick leave benefits (SI) as well as social security contributions.14
13After UI benefit exhaustion individuals can apply for “unemployment assistance” (UA), which is means-tested.
UA benefits last for an indefinite period and replace around 70% of regular UI benefits. However, I do not observe
UA take-up in the data.
14I do not directly observe pension and benefit payments but the corresponding labor market status and then
construct pension and benefit payments based on my calculated benefits. I observe actual OA and DI pension
payments for individuals, who receive OA or DI pensions in 2001 or start claiming after 2001. To verify my pension
calculations, I compare my calculated OA and DI pensions with the actual payments for this subsample. Figures
2.42 to 2.47 in Appendix 2.E show that on average my calculated pensions track actual pensions and that there is
no systematic error in my calculations across pension levels or over time.
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Table 2.1: Austrian Pension Reforms
















50 if 15 ≤ IY < 25
51 + 1.2(IY − 25) if 25 ≤ IY < 30
57 + 1.5(IY − 30) if
79.5 if 45 ≤ IY
ERA: 55 women, 60 men
NRA: 60 women, 65 men
1985 indexed earnings of
last 10 years
reduction in pension coefficient for
individuals with less than 25
insurance years (1.9 ∗ (IY) instead
of the flat 50%).
-
1988 indexed earnings of
last 15 years
- -
1993 indexed earnings of
best 15 years
pension coefficient depends on
claiming age. Bonus for claiming
after ERA, PC is scaled up by a
factor for each month of claiming
after ERA.
Increase of NRA for women from
60 to 65, but implementation
starts in 2024.
1996 - Penalty for claiming before age
56/61. Penalty depends on number
of insurance years and only applies
to individuals with 33 ≤ IY < 40.
-
2000 - increase of penalty for claiming
before NRA (from 2 to 3 pp for
each year before NRA with caps
on loss)
increase of ERA from 55 to 56.5
for women, from 60 to 61.5 for men
2003 indexed earnings of
best 40 years
(increase by 1 year
every year starting
in 2004)
reduction in PC from 2 pp for each
insurance year to 1.78 pp.
increase in penalty for claiming
early from 3 pp to 4.2 pp for each
year before NRA.
increase of ERA from 56.5 to 60





Corridor pension: early retirement
at age 62 again possible with more
than 37.5 insurance years.
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I define fiscal revenue as payroll taxes minus old-age (OA) pensions, disability insurance (DI)
benefits, unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, and sick-leave insurance (SI) benefits
Fiscal Revenue = Pay roll taxes− (OA pension+DI benefits+ UI benefits+SI benefits) .
This definition of fiscal revenue treats social security as a closed system and ignores the potential
effects of a pension reform on other transfer programs and other tax revenue. Ideally, I would
want to include all taxes and transfers that affect the government budget constraint. However, I
am limited by the data. Some taxes, like VAT, and some transfers, like social assistance, simply
cannot be observed in the data. Moreover, I cannot reliably calculate the additional revenue from
income taxation because labor income in the ASSD is top and bottom coded.15 By ignoring other
forms of taxation, I tend to underestimate the multipliers.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 Early Retirement Age
Policy Variation. The pension reforms in 2000 and 2003 increased the early retirement age
(ERA) step-wise from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for women. Figure 2.2 plots the
variation in ERA by date of birth. The 2000 pension reform increased the ERA by 1.5 years
and the increase was phased in by quarter of birth. For men born between October 1940 and
September 1942, the ERA increased by two months every quarter of birth from 60 to 61.5. For
women born between October 1945 and September 1947, the ERA increased by two months every
quarter of birth from 55 to 56.5. Men with at least 45 contribution years and women with at
least 40 contribution years were unaffected by this reform and could still retire at age 60 and 55
respectively. The 2000 pension reform was debated in June 2000 and put into practice in October
2000. The 2003 pension reform further increased the ERA from 61.5 to 65 for men and from
56.5 to 60 for women and the increase was again phased-in by quarter of birth. First, the ERA
increased by two months for each quarter of birth for men born between January and June 1943
and for women born between January and June 1948. Then, the ERA increased by one month
for each quarter of birth for men born between July 1943 and December 1952 and women born
between July 1948 and December 1957. The 2003 pension reform was in parliament in June 2003
and became effective on January 2004.
The pension reforms in 2000 and 2003 also changed other margins of the pension formula.
However, for the 2000 pension reform these other changes are of minor importance for my em-
pirical strategy. Importantly, for the 2000 pension reform the pension formula did not change if
individuals claimed at their ERA. The 2003 pension reform is more challenging in this respect. In
appendix 2.B, I discuss these other changes in detail.
In the main text I focus on the 2000 pension reform, which increased the ERA from 55 to 56.5
for women and from 60 to 61.5 for men. The analysis of the 2003 pension reform is in Appendix
2.C.
Sample Selection. For the 2000 pension reform, my main sample consists of all women born
between 1945 and 1947 and all men born between 1940 and 1942. For the 2003 pension reform, my
main sample consists of all women born between 1948 and 1957 and all men born between 1943 and
1952. In all samples, I exclude individuals who have worked in publicly-owned industries (public
administration, public transportation, and education), as public sector workers are covered by a
separate pension system with different eligibility rules. I further exclude self-employed individuals
and individuals who have spent any time working in jobs defined as heavy labor, as they might
be eligible for a special heavy labor pension. Furthermore, I exclude women with more than 40
contribution years and men with more than 45 contribution years, since they are exempt from the
increase in the ERA.
15Pay roll taxes only apply to the uncensored part of the income distribution and I can therefore calculate them.
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Notes: This figure shows the variation in the early retirement age by date of birth. The 2000 pension reform increased the
ERA for women from 55 to 56.5 and for men from 60 to 61.5 stepwise by 2 months for each quarter of birth. The 2003
pension reform further increased the ERA to 60 for women and 65 for men. The 2004 pension reform reintroduced the
possibility of early retirement at age 62 for individuals with more than 37.5 insurance years (”corridor pension”).
Descriptive Evidence
Figure 2.3 plots the percent of women in retirement, employment, unemployment and the
residual category by age for different birth cohorts. The vertical lines indicate the cohort specific
ERA. Panel (a) shows that around 10 percent of women are on disability benefits before age
55. Right at the ERA retirement take-up jumps up and around 50 percent of all women are in
retirement. Retirement then gradually increases with age and at the NRA almost all women are
retired. Panel (a) also indicates that the increase in the ERA simply shifts this retirement profile to
the right.16 Panel (b) shows that employment rates significantly drop at the ERA and the increase
in ERA shifts the employment profiles to the right. Panel (c) illustrates that the unemployment
rate increases to almost 20 percent in the year before the ERA and then drastically drops at the
ERA. Again the increase in the ERA seems to shift this profile in parallel to the right. Panel (d)
suggests that the residual category does not systematically vary across birth cohorts with different
ERA.
Figure 2.4 displays the labor market - age profiles of men. Panel (a) shows that labor force
participation of older men in Austria is very low. At age 59, already 50 percent of all men retired
through disability pensions and only 30 percent are in employment. This is due to the generous
disability insurance system with relaxed eligibility rules for individuals older than 57.17 At the
16However, the figure also shows that retirement take-up increases already before the ERA. Only around a third
of this increase is explained by disability insurance take-up. Hence, there are women who claim retirement prior
to the new ERA. This is due to measurement error in the number of contribution years, which leads to some
misclassification in eligibility rules. The number of contribution years is not directly observable and I calculate it
based on labor market histories. The calculation of the contribution years is not exact because some labor market
histories are censored in 1972 and I impute contribution years following the approach in Staubli and Zweimüller
(2013). Moreover, the definition of contribution years is not straightforward. For instance, individuals can buy in
contribution years for some of their education and I might not observe all of this. As a consequence, there are some
women (men) who have actually more than 40 (45) contribution years, but I calculate less than 40 (45) contribution
years for them. This problem seems to be more severe for women than for men. However, this is not a problem
for my identification strategy. The misclassification reduces the absolute magnitudes of my estimates, since there
is not 100 percent compliance. However, I am primarily interested in the relative size of effects (behavioral vs.
mechanical fiscal effect) and the relative size is not affected by this misclassification.
17For a detailed discussion of the Austrian DI system see Staubli (2011); Haller et al. (2019)
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Figure 2.3: Women’s Labor Market Status by Age
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Notes: This figure shows the labor market profiles for women born in different quarters. The vertical lines indicate the
cohort specific ERA.
ERA around 90 percent are in retirement and less than 10 percent are still working. As for women,
the increase in the ERA seems to shift all profiles to the right.
Empirical Strategy
I exploit the variation in the ERA by quarter of birth in a cohort difference-in-difference
specification. This approach compares younger and older cohorts, who face different ERA rules,
over time. My control group consists of individuals born in the last quarter, which is not affected
by the reform. Individuals in the control group can still retire at the pre-reform ERA. For the
2000 pension reform I have nine different treatment groups. Each quarter of birth with a different
ERA forms a separate treatment group. I then compare the outcomes of the treatment groups
and the control group at all ages between three years before the ERA and three years after.
The comparison between the control group and the first treatment group identifies the effect of
increasing the ERA by two months. The comparison of the second treatment group with the
control group identifies the effect of increasing the ERA by four months and so on up to the ninth
20
Figure 2.4: Men’s Labor Market Status by Age
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Notes: This figure shows the labor market profiles for men born in different quarters. The vertical lines indicate the cohort
specific ERA.
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treatment group, where we identify the effect of increasing the ERA by 1.5 years.18 I implement














where i denotes individuals and t year-months. Yit is the outcome variable of interest (such
as net transfer payments, and labor supply measures like indicators for working or retirement).
I[ageit = k] are dummies for age at a monthly frequency and control for age-specific levels in the
outcome variable. Treatij are dummies, which indicate to which of the nine treatment groups the
individual belongs. This is determined by their quarter of birth. λt are time dummies at monthly
frequency to capture common time shocks and seasonal effects. βkj then identifies the effect at
age k in treatment group j.
I am interested in three main outcomes. First, how does the policy change affect fiscal revenue?
For this I construct for each individual the net transfer as payroll taxes minus the sum of retirement,
unemployment, disability and sick leave benefits as described in section 2.3.4. Second, I decompose
the fiscal revenue effect into the behavioral and mechanical fiscal effect to get the multiplier of the
reform. Third, I am interested in understanding the behavioral fiscal effect, i.e. how individuals
adjust their labor market decisions in response to the change in the ERA. I construct labor market
status indicators for employment, retirement, unemployment, disability pension and sick leave and
also look at transitions.
Results
Fiscal Revenue Effect. Figure 2.5 plots the βkj-coefficient estimates from regression (2.11) for
the total fiscal revenue (measured in Euros) for women. Panel (a) illustrates the effect of increasing
the ERA by 2 months from 55 to 55 and 2 months. Panel (b) presents the estimates for increasing
the ERA by 6 months, in panel (c) the ERA is increased by one year and in panel (d) by 1.5 years.
The red line indicates the pre-reform ERA at age 55, the grey solid line shows the new ERA
and the dashed grey line is located at the age individuals learned about the reform. There are
three main takeaways from these figures. First, increasing the ERA has a significant and positive
effect on fiscal revenue. For each month of increasing the ERA the net fiscal revenue per capita
increases by around 650 Euros per month. Second, there are no effects before individuals knew
about the reform (at ages to the left of the dashed line), which implies that trends of the control
and treatment groups are parallel pre-reform. Third, the effects are limited to the age window
where the ERA increased. There are no anticipation effects before age 55. Some individuals knew
more than two years in advance that their ERA is increased by more than one year (panel (d)).
One could expect that individuals adjust to this increase already before age 55. For instance, with
a higher ERA unemployed individuals have a stronger incentive to search for a new job, since they
might run out of UI benefits before they reach the ERA. However, there is no strong evidence for
such anticipation effects. Moreover, the effects vanish exactly at the new ERA and hence there
are no long lasting effects beyond the new ERA.
Figure 2.6 shows the fiscal revenue effects for men. The patterns are identical to the women’s
patterns. Only the magnitude of the effects is slightly higher, since men tend to have higher
pensions. The patterns for the other five treatment groups also look very similar, these figures
can be found in Appendix 2.B.1.
Multiplier. The crucial question for welfare analysis is how much of the fiscal revenue effect
is purely mechanical and how much is due to behavioral adjustments. The mechanical fiscal
18As a robustness check I compare only adjacent quarters of birth and run 9 separate difference-in-difference
regressions. The counterfactual is then to increase the ERA by two months but starting at different ages. The
results of this exercise are in Appendix 2.B.2.
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Figure 2.5: DiD Estimates Fiscal Revenue by Age for Women Reform 2000

















52 53 54 55 56 57 58
Age




































52 53 54 55 56 57 58
Age

















52 53 54 55 56 57 58
Age
Notes: This figure plots the βkj-coefficients from regression (2.11) for the total fiscal revenue (measured in Euros). Panel
(a) shows the effect of increasing the ERA by 2 months, Panel (b) for a 6 month increase, Panel (c) for a one year increase
and Panel (d) for a 1.5 year increase. The red line indicates the pre-reform ERA, the grey solid line shows the new ERA.
The dashed grey line is located at the age individuals learned about the reform. Hence, effects between the dashed grey
line and the red line could be interpreted as anticipation effects of the reform.
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Figure 2.6: DiD Estimates Fiscal Revenue by Age for Men Reform 2000
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Notes: This figure plots the βkj-coefficients from regression (2.11) for the total fiscal revenue (measured in Euros). Panel
(a) shows the effect of increasing the ERA by 2 months, Panel (b) for a 6 month increase, Panel (c) for a one year increase
and Panel (d) for a 1.5 year increase. The red line indicates the pre-reform ERA, the grey solid line shows the new ERA.
The dashed grey line is located at the age individuals learned about the reform. Hence, effects between the dashed grey
line and the red line could be interpreted as anticipation effects of the reform.
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Figure 2.7: Mechanical Effect ERA Reform 2000
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated total fiscal revenue effect (black dots) and the mechanical fiscal effect (red area). For
both women and men the fiscal revenue effect is purely mechanical. The green line plots the additional pay roll tax revenue
and the maroon dashed line plots the additional benefit expenditures. The additional revenue from individuals working
longer is offset by the additional expenditures from individuals substituting to UI, SI and DI benefits. These two effects
cancel, leading to no additional savings from behavioral adjustments of individuals.
effect is simply the reduction in old-age pension payments between the old and new ERA. The
counterfactual for the mechanical fiscal effect is that individuals would behave the same as before
the reform. That is, they would stop working at the old ERA and would not receive their old-age
pension until they reach the new ERA. However, individuals respond to the change in the ERA by
working longer or substituting to other benefits. The behavioral fiscal effect therefore consists of
the additional pay roll tax revenue minus the additional expenditures in UI, DI and SI benefits.19
Figure 2.7 plots the estimates for the total fiscal effect (black dots) and the mechanical effect
(red area) for women with ERA 56 and men with ERA 61. The figure shows that the large
and positive fiscal revenue effect of increasing the ERA is purely mechanical, implying that the
behavioral fiscal effect is zero. Why are there no additional savings from individuals working
longer and paying additional taxes? There is a positive fiscal effect through additional pay roll
tax revenue (green line in the figure), but there are also additional expenditures from individuals
substituting to UI, DI and SI benefits (red dashed line in the figure). These two effects cancel and
the net fiscal effect from behavioral adjustments is zero.
Figures 2.20 to 2.23 in Appendix 2.B.1 show the decomposition of the total fiscal effect for the
other treatment groups. The takeaway from these figures is that the total fiscal revenue effect is
in all groups mostly driven by mechanical effect. Interestingly, at higher ERAs the negative fiscal
effect of additional benefit payments starts to dominate the positive pay roll tax effect, which
leads to a negative behavioral fiscal effect and a multiplier below one. Table 2.2 shows the total
fiscal effect and the total effect for each treatment group. The column “Fiscal Revenue Effect”
in table 2.2 is the sum of the significant βkj-estimates from regression (2.11) for fiscal revenue. I
19I construct the mechanical fiscal effect by calculating the old-age pension expenditures in the control group
between the old and new ERA and subtract the old-age pension expenditures in the treatment group in that age
window. I need to subtract the old-age pension expenditures in the treatment group because some individuals in
my treatment groups can still retire early if they have more than 40/45 contribution years. Without this correction
I would overestimate the mechanical effect.
The alternative way to calculate the mechanical fiscal effect is to directly sum up the difference-in-difference
estimates of the old-age pension expenditures between the old and the new ERA. The difference between these two
approaches are minimal, the mechanical fiscal effects only differ by a few Euros.
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abstract from discounting here because all effects are within a narrow time window of 1.5 years.
The column “Mechanical” is the sum of the mechanical fiscal effect between the old and new
ERA (red area in figure 2.7). The behavioral fiscal effect is then calculated as the difference
between the fiscal revenue effect and the mechanical effect. Table 2.2 reveals increasing the ERA
is an effective policy to increase fiscal revenue. A two months increase in the ERA generates an
increase in net fiscal revenue of 1200 - 1400 Euros per capita. However, this total fiscal effect is
purely mechanical (column two). In consequence the behavioral effect is small or even negative.
This leads to multipliers that are centered around one and in some cases as low as 0.9. This means
for taking one dollar away by increasing the ERA, fiscal revenue increases by around one dollar
or in the worst case by only 90 cents.
The multipliers for women are decreasing with the increase in the ERA. One might worry
that this is primarily driven by time trends. However, I also find multipliers around one in the
robustness check in Appendix 2.B.2, where I only compare adjacent quarters of birth.
Table 2.2: Multipliers for the ERA Reform in 2000
ERA Fiscal Revenue Effect Mechanical Behavioral Multiplier (1+B/M)
Women
ERA 55 + 2 months 1253 1120 133 1.12
ERA 55 + 4 months 3890 2474 1417 1.57
ERA 55 + 6 months 4949 3763 1185 1.32
ERA 55 + 8 months 5245 4970 275 1.06
ERA 55 + 10 months 6446 6230 216 1.03
ERA 56 7530 7578 -49 0.99
ERA 56 + 2 months 8337 8565 -228 0.97
ERA 56 + 4 months 8699 9694 -995 0.90
ERA 56 + 6 months 10069 11143 -1074 0.90
Men
ERA 60 + 2 months 1473 1448 25 1.02
ERA 60 + 4 months 2552 3059 -507 0.83
ERA 60 + 6 months 5070 4855 216 1.04
ERA 60 + 8 months 6584 6433 152 1.02
ERA 60 + 10 months 7728 7611 117 1.02
ERA 61 7774 8173 -399 0.95
ERA 61 + 2 months 11102 10314 788 1.08
ERA 61 + 4 months 11576 10809 768 1.07
ERA 61 + 6 months 11918 11448 470 1.04
Labor Market Responses. With a higher ERA, unemployed individuals have a stronger in-
centive to search for a job and find employment, since they might run out of UI benefits before
they reach the ERA. However, this does not happen. Individuals respond to an increase in the
ERA in a very simple way. Individuals, who are employed before the old ERA, remain employed
until they reach their new ERA or lose their job. Individuals, who are unemployed before the
old ERA, remain unemployed until they reach their new ERA. I do not find any evidence for an
increased transition from unemployment to employment at least in the short run. Figure 2.8 shows
the levels for employment, unemployment and retirement. The 40 percentage points reduction in
retirement is accompanied by a 20 percentage points increase in employment and a 20 percentage
points increase in unemployment. Figure 2.9 plots the transitions and shows that this is driven
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by individuals keeping their jobs or remaining unemployed. There is no increased transition from
unemployment to employment or the other way around.20
Welfare Implications
The analysis showed that increasing the ERA has a multiplier of around one. Hence, increasing
the ERA is welfare improving only if the social value of the dollar in the hands of an early retiree
is below one. The theoretical discussion in section 2.2 showed that a natural lower bound for the
social value of the dollar is one. Hence, it is unlikely that increasing the ERA is welfare-enhancing.
It is still important to understand the distributional effects of increasing the ERA, i.e. to
understand who retires early. Figure 2.10 plots the distribution of average income in the last 15
years (grey bars) and the share of individuals in that income bin, who retire early (red bars). The
figure reveals that early retirement is prevalent across the distribution. An ERA reform therefore
affects individuals from everywhere in the income distribution. This makes it harder to argue that
the social value of the dollar is below one. Based on the argument in section 2.2, the average
marginal utility of consumption of retirees would need to be lower than the average marginal
utility of consumption in the population for the ERA reform to be welfare improving.
2.4.2 Pension Levels
An individual’s pension is determined by her assessment basis multiplied with her pension co-
efficient. The assessment basis measures the average earnings over a specific period after applying
a cap to earnings in each year. The pension coefficient is the individual’s replacement rate (in
percent) that is applied to the assessment basis. Before 1985 the assessment basis was the average
earnings in the last 5 years. The pension reforms in 1985 and 1988 increased the assessment period
step-wise from the last 5 years to the last 15 years. This makes old-age pensions on average less
generous because of seniority wage profiles, however, it does not lead to a uniform cut in pension
levels. Individuals across the income distribution are affected differentially. I focus on the change
of the assessment period from the last 10 to the last 11 years implemented in the 1988 pension
reform. This change provides a clean design as I outline in the next paragraph.
Policy Variation. In 1985, the assessment period was changed from the last 5 years to the last
10 years. This change was phased in over time. Between January and April 1985 the assessment
period was either the last 5 or last 7 years, whatever was more favorable. Between May and
December 1985, the assessment period was the last 7 years. In 1986, the assessment period was
the last 9 years and in 1987 this was extended to the last 10 years. The 1985 pension reform also
substantially reduced the pension coefficient for individuals with less than 30 insurance years. 21
The 1988 pension reform changed the assessment period from the last 10 years to the last 15
years. This change was phased in by birth cohorts and over time. Table 2.3 describes the exact
transition rules. The assessment period remains at 10 years for men born before 1.1.1928 and
women born before 1.1.1933. Individuals born after these dates face an assessment period of 11
years in 1988. For men born in 1928 and women born in 1933, the assessment period remains
at 11 years in the following years (unless the longer assessment period is more favorable). For
the other cohorts, the assessment period increases each year by one year until they reach age 60.
Only for the male cohort of 1928 and the female cohort of 1933, the rules changed once and then
remained in place for the following years. I focus my analysis on these two cohorts and the 1988
pension reform, since this is the cleanest design with a clear counterfactual. 22
20In the longer run, there might be a positive employment effect before the old ERA. Figures 2.24 to 2.28 in
appendix 2.B show that for ERA 56 (60) and higher there is a downward sloping trend in unemployment before
the ERA. It is, however, hard to tell whether this is a time trend or an effect of the reform.
21Pre-reform individuals with less than 30 insurance years have a flat 50% pension coefficient. After the reform,
the pension coefficient is calculated as 1.9 times the number of insurance years. Hence, an individual with 15
insurance years has a pension coefficient of 50% pre-reform and after the reform her pension coefficient is 28.5%.
22DI benefits are calculated in the same way as old-age pensions, forward-looking individuals therefore have
an incentive to claim DI benefits at earlier years before their assessment period increases by another year. This
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement. The 40 percentage points
reduction in retirement is accompanied by a 20 percentage points increase in employment and a 20 percentage points
increase in unemployment.
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Figure 2.9: DiD Estimates Labor Market Transitions: Women ERA 55 + 6 months
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for labor market transitions.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of average income in the last 15 years (grey bars) and the share of individuals in
that income bin, who retire early (red bars).
The 1988 pension reform was announced and implemented in a very short time window. In
July 1987, it was announced that a new pension reform will be debated and that the reform should
be implemented in 1989. However, in October 1987 the federal ministry of labor, social affairs,
health and consumer protection sent out a reform proposal. The proposal passed legislation in
November. The transition rules for the increase in the assessment period was not in the initial
proposal and was added during the legislative process. The new rules were in place on 1.1.1988.
Hence, men born in January 1928 and women born in January 1933 only learned two months in
advance that they will be treated by the reform.
Sample Selection. My main sample consists of the male birth cohorts 1927-1928 and female
birth cohorts 1932-1933. I exclude individuals who have worked in publicly-owned industries (pub-
lic administration, public transportation, and education), as public sector workers are covered by a
separate pension system with different eligibility rules. I further exclude self-employed individuals
and individuals who have spent any time working in jobs defined as heavy labor, as they might
be eligible for a special heavy labor pension. Lastly, I exclude individuals who are on DI before
the reform, since they already left the labor force and are not affected by the reform.
Descriptive Evidence
Figure 2.11 plots the distribution of pension levels under the rules in 1981, 1985 and 1988. The
figure shows that the increase of the assessment period from the last 5 to the last 10 to the last
15 years reduced pension levels on average but there is significant heterogeneity. Notably, men
at the top of the pension distribution face a reduction in pension levels, while men at the lower
end of the distribution are less affected. The effects for women are smaller because most women
anticipation effect would be interesting to estimate. However, in 1984 relaxed DI eligibility criteria were introduced.
This led to strong take-up of DI after age 55 and roll-out of these more lenient rules led to very strong trends in DI
take-up across birth cohorts. This makes it hard to disentangle time trends from birth cohort effects. I therefore
focus on the cohorts with the fixed rules and exploit the variation in an RDD, where differential trends across birth
cohorts are less of a concern.
30














0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Old-Age Pension (Euros)















0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Old-Age Pension (Euros)
Rules 1981 Rules 1985
Rules 1988
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of pension benefits under the rules in 1981, 1985 and 1988. To isolate the effect
of the change in the pension calculation, I take the male birthcohort 1927 and the female birth cohort 1932 and simulate
their potential pensions under the different regimes holding their retirement behavior fixed.
are at the lower end of the pension distribution. In my main analysis I focus on the change of
the assessment period from 10 to 11 years. Figure 2.12 plots the distribution of pension benefits
with an assessment period of the last 10 versus the last 11 years. Men at the top of the pension
distribution are strongly treated by the change in the assessment period. For women the effects
are more uniform across the distribution and on average smaller. This makes it more difficult to
precisely identify effects for women. The effects for men are stronger. I therefore focus on men in
the main text, the results for women are in appendix 2.D.
Empirical Strategy
I exploit the variation in pension levels induced by differential assessment periods across birth
cohorts in an regression-discontinuity design (RDD). The running variable is date of birth. The
assessment period for men born before January 1st 1928 is 10 years, for men born between 1/1/1928
and 12/31/1928 the assessment period is 11 years. I estimate the following regression
Yi = βDi + fl(bdatei)1 {bdatei < 1/1/1928}+ fr(bdatei)1 {bdatei ≥ 1/1/1928}+ εi, (2.12)
where Di = 1{bdatei ≥ 1/1/1928} is an indicator for individual i being born after January
1st 1928, fl(·) and fr(·) are flexible functions to capture trends in the outcome variable by date
of birth. I am again interested in the total fiscal effect of the reform, the decomposition of this
effect into the behavioral and mechanical part, and understanding the labor market responses of
individuals.23
Results
Labor Market Responses. Figure 2.13 shows that the reduction in pension levels has signifi-
cant effects on retirement take-up at age 60. Individuals to the left of the cutoff have an assessment
23Figure 2.36 in appendix 2.D shows that the number of observations are not perfectly smooth around January
for all birth cohorts. I discuss in appendix 2.D why this seems not to be a problem for my RDD.
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Table 2.3: Phase in Pension Reform in 1988
Year Men born Women born Assessment period If more favorable
1988
until 1927 until 1932 120 months 132 months
after 1928 after 1933 132 months
1989
until 1927 until 1932 120 months 144 months
in 1928 in 1933 132 months 144 months
after 1929 after 1934 144 months
1990
until 1927 until 1932 120 months 156 months
in 1928 in 1933 132 months 156 months
in 1929 in 1934 144 months 156 months
after 1930 after 1935 156 months
1991
until 1927 until 1932 120 months 168 months
in 1928 in 1933 132 months 168 months
in 1929 in 1934 144 months 168 months
in 1930 in 1935 156 months 168 months
after 1931 after 1936 168 months
1992
until 1927 until 1932 120 months 180 months
in 1928 in 1933 132 months 180 months
in 1929 in 1934 144 months 180 months
in 1930 in 1935 156 months 180 months
in 1931 in 1936 168 months 180 months
after 1932 after 1937 180 months
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of pension benefits with assessment period last 10 years versus last 11 years. To
isolate the effect of the change in the assessment period, I take the male birthcohort 1927 and the female birth cohort 1932
and simulate their potential pensions under the different regimes holding their retirement behavior fixed. Hence, the shift
in the distribution illustrates the mechanical effect of the reform. The vertical lines represent the means.
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Figure 2.13: Retirement and Employment at Age 60
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Notes: This figure shows the average retirement and employment rates at age 60. The fitted lines are local linear polynomials
with a bandwidth of 8 months.
basis of 10 years, individuals to the right of the cutoff have an assessment basis of 11 years. This
leads to a reduction of around 1.25 percent in pensions on average. The lower pensions go hand-
in-hand with a reduction of 2 percentage points in retirement take-up at age 60 (panel (a)) and
to a less precisely estimated increase in employment of around 2 percentage points (panel (b)).
There are no effects on UI or SI take-up. Even though treatment intensity is not very strong with
a 1.25 percent reduction in pension levels at the cutoff, individuals react in their labor supply
decision.
The increase in the assessment period from 10 to 11 years does not lead to a uniform cut in
pension levels. The corresponding pension reduction varies by earnings history. Individuals with
flat wage profiles are not treated by the change, while individuals with seniority wage profiles face
a reduction in pension levels due to the reform. This naturally creates placebo and treatment
groups. To exploit this, I calculate for each individual the potential pension he would get with an
assessment period of 10 and 11 years given his earnings history at age 59.5. Based on these potential
pensions I define two groups: (i) a treatment group composed of individuals, who experience a
reduction in pensions of at least 1.5% and (ii) a placebo group composed of individuals, who
have roughly equal pensions in both regimes (change in pensions is between 0 and 0.25%). This
definition is arbitrary and based on sample size considerations.24Figure 2.14 shows retirement and
employment rates at age 60 for these two groups. The figure reveals that the retirement and
employment effect we observe in the whole sample is driven by the treatment group. For the
treatment group (individuals with a change in pensions of more than 1.5%), retirement at age
60 drops from 66% to 62% at the cutoff (panel (a)). This reduction in retirement rates by 4
percentage points is offset by a 4 percentage points increase in employment (panel (b)). Panels
(c) and (d) show that there is no significant effect in the placebo group.
Figure 2.15 plots the RD estimates at each age between 50 and 85. There are no effects
before age 59. Individuals just learn about the reform at age 59 and hence this is another placebo
test for the validity of the RDD. There is a significant reduction in retirement at age 60 and a
corresponding increase in employment. For ages 61 to 65 the point estimates still suggest a lasting
effect on retirement and employment. However, these effects are not precisely estimated and not
24Roughly 25% of all individuals experience a decline in pensions of more than 1.5%. Taking a higher cutoff
value would significantly reduce the sample size.
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Figure 2.14: Employment and Retirement at Age 60
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Notes: This figure shows the average retirement and employment rates at age 60. The fitted lines are local linear polynomials
with a bandwidth of 8 months. The treatement group is defined as individuals who potentially loose more than 1.5 percent
in their OA pension if the assessment period is changed from 10 to 11 years. This potential loss is measured at age 59.5.
The placebo group consists of individuals, who experience a loss of less than 0.25 percent.
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Figure 2.15: RD Estimates by Age: Men
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Notes: This figure plots the RD estimates at each age between 50 and 85 based on local linear regressions with a bandwith
of 8 months.
statistically different from zero. After the normal retirement age at 65, the point estimates are
close to zero.
Fiscal Revenue Effect and Multiplier. Figure 2.15 already indicates that the policy change
induced behavioral change. Figure 2.16 shows how these labor supply effects translate to fiscal
revenue effects. Figure 2.16 plots the RD estimates for fiscal revenue at each age between 50 and
85 for men and women. The red area indicates the mechanical fiscal effect of the reform. Before
the early retirement age there is no mechanical effect. There are also no effects on fiscal revenue as
we would expect if the RD is valid (individuals did not yet know about the reform at these ages).
Between the early and normal retirement age, the estimated total fiscal effect is larger than the
mechanical fiscal effect. After the normal retirement age the total fiscal effect very closely follows
the mechanical effect. The difference between the total fiscal effect and the mechanical fiscal effect
is the behavioral fiscal effect. Hence, the figure corresponds to what one would expect from the
labor supply responses. There is a behavioral fiscal effect from individuals delaying retirement and
working longer. After the normal retirement age, when everyone is retired, only the mechanical
effect of the reform is left. This is a consistent pattern for both men and women but the effects
are not precisely estimated. However, this is not surprising since treatment intensity is relatively
low with an average reduction in pension levels of 1.25 percent for men (with a median change of
1.5 percent) and 1.2 percent for women (with a median change of 1.2 percent).
Based on these estimates I construct the present value of the total fiscal effect and the present
value of the mechanical fiscal effect at age 60. I discount the effects with an interest rate of two
percent and then add up the estimates from age 60 to age 85. Above the normal retirement age I
set the fiscal revenue estimates equal to the mechanical effect, since they are almost identical. Not
doing this would lead to higher multipliers. Table 2.4 shows the present value of the total fiscal
revenue effect, of the total mechanical fiscal effect and the corresponding multiplier. For men the
multiplier of the reform is 1.48. For women the multiplier is 1.84. Table 2.7 in Appendix shows
multipliers for different discount rates and for different bandwidths of the local linear regressions.
For lower bandwidths and higher discount rates multipliers tend to be higher.
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Notes: This figure plots the RD estimates for fiscal revenue by age (black squares with 95 CI, based on local linear
regressions with bandwidth 8 months). The red area indicates the mechanical fiscal effect of the reform. Between the
ERA and NRA the estimated total fiscal effect is larger than the mechanical fiscal effect. After the NRA the total fiscal
effect very closely follows the mechanical effect. Hence, there is a behavioral fiscal effect (difference btw. total and
mechanical) between ERA and NRA. After the NRA, when everyone is retired, only the mechanical effect of the reform is left.
Table 2.4: Multiplier Benefit Generosity Reform 1988
Group Fiscal Revenue Effect Mechanical Behavioral Multiplier (1+B/M)
Men 7995 5408 2587 1.48
Women 4735 2578 2157 1.84
Welfare Implications
The relative comparison between the ERA reform and the pension level reform reveals a clear
pattern. The multipliers of a reduction in pension levels are 50 percent larger than the multipliers
of increasing the ERA. Additionally, the reduction in pension levels mostly affects individuals at
the top of the income distribution while the ERA reform affects individuals across the income
distribution. Based on the discussion in section 2.2, this implies for a planner with preferences for
redistribution that the reduction in pension levels has a lower social value of the dollar compared
to increasing the ERA because the pension level reform targets higher income individuals. Hence,
a planner with preferences for redistribution clearly favors the pension level reform over the ERA
reform, because it has higher multipliers and comes at a lower social cost (lower social value of
the dollar).
The absolute welfare effect of the pension level reform is positive if the social value of the
dollar is less than 1.48 for men and at less than 1.84 for women. To illustrate the magnitude
of the social value of the dollar, I parameterize the model. In summary, I assume a standard
isoelastic (CRRA) utility function and that the fiscal savings from the pension reform are lump-
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sum redistributed in the working age population, i.e. λ corresponds to the average marginal utility
of consumption of working age individuals. Furthermore, I assume that consumption equals income
since consumption cannot be observed in the data. This potentially overestimates the social value
of the dollar. Working age individuals tend to save (consume less than their income), while retirees
tend to dissave (consume more than their pension payments). Hence, assuming consumption equals
income overestimates the marginal utility of consumption of retirees (numerator of social value
of the dollar) and underestimates the marginal utility of consumption of working age individuals
(denominator of social value of the dollar). Appendix 2.A.5 provides a detailed discussion of this
parametrization.
With these assumptions, I can directly calculate the social value of the dollar as a function of
the risk aversion parameter γ. Figure 2.17 plots the social value of the dollar and the multiplier
of the 1988 pension reform for men and women. Panel (a) shows that reducing pension levels
of men is welfare-enhancing if risk aversion is below 2.4, i.e. the multiplier is larger than the
social value of the dollar. Hence, this parametrization implies that the reform is welfare improving
for reasonable values of risk aversion .25 Panel (b) shows reducing pension levels of women is
welfare-reducing if risk-aversion is above 0.75 even though women have a larger multiplier than
men. The different welfare implications for men and women arise because the pension levels of
women are significantly lower than the pension levels of men, which implies a much larger social
value of the dollar for women. However, individual pension income of women in 1988 in Austria
is probably a poor approximation for their consumption. Income at the household level would
be a better predictor but cannot be observed in my data. For men individual income is a better
approximation for household resources in that time.
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Social Value of the Dollar Multiplier
Notes: This figure plots the social value of the dollar and the multiplier of the 1988 pension reform. The social value of
the dollar is based on the parameterization of the utility function (additive separable CRRA utility function) as detailed in
Appendix 2.A.5. Reducing pension levels of men is welfare-enhancing (multiplier is larger than social value of the dollar) if
risk aversion is below 2.4. For women, reducing pension levels is welfare-reducing if risk-aversion is above 0.75. The large
difference between men and women arises because the pension levels of women are significantly lower than the pension
levels of men, which implies a much larger social value of the dollar for women.
25Estimates from the literature suggest that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is below 2, Chetty (2006b)
finds an upper bound of γ < 1.78.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the behavioral fiscal multiplier is central for welfare evaluation of pension
reforms. The behavioral fiscal multiplier, the total fiscal effect relative to the mechanical fiscal
effect, can be readily estimated with reduced-form methods and provides the benchmark against
which to judge the social value of the dollar. Exploiting a series of pension reforms in Austria, I
find that increasing the early retirement age has a multiplier of 1 and reducing pension levels has
a multiplier of 1.5. This implies that increasing the Austrian early retirement age has not been
welfare-enhancing – unless one thinks that $1 in the hands of an early retiree has a lower social
value than $1 in public funds. By contrast, reducing pension levels is welfare improving – provided
that taking $1 away from a retiree is associated with a social loss smaller than $1.5. For a standard
parametrization of the utility function I find that the social loss is smaller than 1.5 for reasonable
values of risk aversion and hence reducing pension levels was welfare-improving. The low multiplier
of increasing the early retirement age arises because the additional social security contributions
paid by workers spending more time in employment are neutralized by additional expenditures on
unemployment benefits. In contrast, reducing pension levels induced some workers to stay longer
in employment without triggering substitution to other welfare benefits. My empirical analysis
illustrated my framework in the Austrian context. Needless to say that the estimated multiplier
depends on the particular context. If my framework is applied to reforms in other countries, the
welfare implications can be very different depending on the labor market responses of affected
workers.
The more general message of my analysis is twofold. First, the size of the behavioral multi-
plier crucially depends on the extent to which a particular pension reform generates spillovers to
other pension reforms. Second, pension reforms generate high multipliers if older workers face a
labor market with favorable job opportunities. For instance, increasing retirement ages does not
generate large multipliers if older workers cannot find or keep their jobs. To some degree, labor
market opportunities for older workers are a policy parameter. Hence, policy makers can influence
multipliers and the effectiveness of reforms. Potential labor market policies to achieve this are
active labor market policies targeting older unemployed individuals, providing financial incentives
for firms to keep older workers employed (e.g. reduced social security contributions) or increased
job protection to keep older workers in employment. The effectiveness of such policies is an im-
portant topic for future research, especially the role of firms seems understudied in this respect.
Another important topic for future research is to relate the social value of the dollar to observable
moments in the data. In the unemployment literature, there are exciting new approaches on this




2.A.1 Derivation Optimal Benefit Function
This section derives the formula for the optimal benefit function in (2.9). The derivation estab-
lishes the differentiability of the government’s objective function and that the first order condition
(2.6) holds for any optimal benefit function. The derivation exploits the powerful “differentiable
sandwich lemma” from Clausen and Strub (2016), who generalize the envelope theorems in Mil-
grom and Segal (2002). For the derivation, I impose three technical assumptions. First, I assume




> 0 and ∂Ui(.)
∂ct(xt)
→ ∞ for ct(xt) → 0 and
∂2Ui(.)
∂ct(xt)2
≤ 0. Second, I assume the existence of
a solution to the agent’s problem that can be represented by a Lagrangian. Third, I assume the
planner’s budget constraint is differentiable in b.
We can solve agent i’s optimization problem in (2.1)-(2.3) with the following Lagrangian







at+1 − (1 + rt)at − yt(x


















Let a solution to this problem be denoted by C∗i ,Π
∗
i and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers









The government’s optimization problem is to choose functions b(·).26 We can express the






ωiLi(C(b),Π(b), γ(b), η(b))di, where
C(b),Π(b) denote the optimal choices of the agent for a given benefit function b and γ(b), η(b) are
the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian of the planner’s problem in (2.4) and









Suppose b∗ is an optimal solution to the planner’s problem. To establish differentiability of the
planner’s objective function I construct a lower and upper support function and then apply the
differentiable sandwich lemma. As an upper support function I take C(b) = W (b∗), where W (b∗)
is the welfare associated with the optimal benefit function b∗. By definition we have W (b∗) ≥
W (b) ∀b.This upper support function is therefore simply a constant and C ′(b) = δW (b∗;h) = 0.










∗),Π(b∗), γ(b∗), η(b∗)) is the indirect utility of the agent, holding his behavior for benefit
function b∗ fixed. This corresponds to the idea of a lazy decision maker that uses a completely unre-
sponsive policy rule as in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979). We have Li(C(b
∗),Π(b∗), γ(b∗), η(b∗)) ≤
Li(C(b),Π(b), γ(b), η(b)) ∀b. Therefore, L(b) is a lower support function. Since I assume that the











26For notational convenience I suppress the tax function τ(·). Optimization of the tax function would add an
additional first order condition identical with the one for the benefit function, just with opposite sign.
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By the differentiable sandwich lemma of Clausen and Strub (2016), we have δW (b∗;h) =


























yields the result in (2.9).
2.A.2 Lower Bound for the Social Value of the Dollar
To derive a lower bound for the social value of the dollar we first need to bound λ. For this,
suppose that the tax system is such that we cannot improve welfare through lump-sum transfers,

















Moreover, if we assume that for lump-sum transfers the behavioral response is small (income
effects are small), i.e. 1 + B(h)
M(h)














and λ corresponds to the average marginal utility of consumption in the population. If there are
income effects, individuals will adjust their labor supply in response to the transfers and we have
1 + B(h)
M(h)






















































where h is the lump-sum transfer, which would redistribute the mechanical effect from the reform
M(h) equally across all agents and periods and hence we have M(h) = M(h). If we think that the
marginal utility of individuals affected by the reform is larger than the average marginal utility in
the population and assume equal welfare weights for all individuals, then












































for all lump-sum taxes h and the argument still goes through.
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For instance, this is the case if we assume that the utility function is concave in consumption
(falling marginal utility) and that the reform targets individuals, who have below average con-
sumption. These are all reasonable assumptions for pension reforms and hence a natural lower
bound for the social value of the dollar is 1 dollar.
The assumption of equal welfare weights is not crucial. The argument goes through if the
welfare weights are such that a transfer to retirees is socially more valuable than a transfer to all
individuals.
2.A.3 Comparison to the Baily-Chetty Formula (Optimal
Unemployment Insurance)
The famous Baily-Chetty formula for optimal unemployment insurance is a special case of my





= 1 + ε




, denotes the elasticity of unemployment duration D with respect to unem-
ployment benefit generosity b.





. Since individuals can only respond by adjusting their search effort and this affects fiscal
expenditures through altered unemployment duration ∂D, the behavioral fiscal effect is given by
B = ∂D ∗ b. The mechanical fiscal effect is given by M = ∂b ∗D. Hence, the elasticity captures







In this stylized job search model individuals have a utility function for being employed u(ce) and
a utility function for being unemployed v(cu). Both utility functions only depend on consumption
levels and taxes are lump-sum. The cost of taxation λ is simply the marginal utility of the tax-payer
and given by u′(ce). The direct welfare effect of changing unemployment benefit generosity in this


















v′(cu). Hence, my formula applied to this stylized model exactly delivers the Baily-Chetty formula.
2.A.4 Multiple Generations
The model in the main text treats pensions systems as if each generation pays for their own
pensions during their working life. However, an important aspect of pensions is inter-generational
redistribution. I show that even with multiple generations it is key to estimate the multiplier
of a pension reform in one generation. To introduce multiple generations, let there be a stream
of generations indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and each generation consists of a continuum of agents
indexed by i ∈ Ij . Agents in each generation j solve the same maximization problem as in
equations (2.1)-(2.3), but the constraints and objective functions can be generation specific.
Overlapping Generations: In the classical overlapping generations setup, the currently young
generation j+1 finances the pensions of the currently old generation j. The problem of the planner
is to choose benefit and tax functions for each generation j. The planner puts a welfare weight gj
on each generation j and solves the following problem
max
{bj(·),τj(·)}j≥1



























≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. (2.25)
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For each generation there is a separate budget restriction requiring that the present value of
benefit payments to the currently old generation equals the present value of the tax revenues from




















where Bj(h) is the behavioral fiscal effect of generation j over their life cycle and Mj(h) is
the mechanical fiscal effect of generation j. Hence, the RHS of this optimality condition (2.26)
is identical to the RHS of optimality condition (2.9) in the single generation setup. The only
difference to the single generation version is the interpretation of the LHS. The LHS measures the
social value of a dollar in the hand of the currently old generation j relative to the social value of a
dollar in the hand of the currently young generation j+1. To make this more transparent, assume
that the planner redistributes the savings from the pension reform with lump-sum transfers to






























General Setup: The budget restriction in the overlapping generations framework above is too
restrictive in the sense that the planner can smooth expenditures and revenue across multiple
generations. In this more flexible formulation the planner solves
max
bj(·),τj(·)








































and is therefore identical to the optimal benefit formula in the main text (except that there
is the additional welfare weight gi for the generation on the LHS). Importantly, in the multiple
generation setup we also need to estimate the multiplier of the reform within one generation in
the same way as in the one generation model in the main text.
2.A.5 Parametrization Model
The social value of the dollar consists of three parts: (i) the marginal utility of consumption,
(ii) welfare weights and (iii) the social value of public funds λ. Hence, I need to make assumptions
on these three margins.
First, I parameterize the utility function. I assume that utility is additively separable over time
and additively separable in consumption and the other choices. I denote the utility of consumption
in period t by u(ct) and the utility of the other choices by ψ(Π, X). Hence, expected life-time
utility is given by

















1−γ γ ≥ 1& γ > 0
ln(ct) γ = 1
, (2.32)
where γ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Second, I assume a utilitarian planner, i.e. every individual gets the same welfare weight
ωi = 1∀i.
Third, I need to pin down the social value of public funds. Following the discussion in Appendix
2.A.2, I assume that welfare cannot be improved through lump-sum transfers to working age















holds for any small lump-sum transfer h̄. If we further assume that income effects are small, i.e.
1 + B(h)
M(h)












The social value of the dollar is then given by




















where hit is the reduction in individual i’s pension in period t because of the reform and M is the
mechanical effect of the reform (the sum of hit).
In my data, consumption is not observable. As an approximation I use income instead of
consumption. Hence, for retirees I set consumption equal to pension payments, i.e. ct = bt. For
working age individuals I set consumption equal to labor income, i.e. ct = wt. This potentially
overestimates the social value of the dollar. Working age individuals tend to save, i.e. ct ≤ wt, and
hence u′(wt) ≤ u










































holds and that my implementation provides an upper bound for the social value of the dollar
(USVD). Lastly, I assume no discounting β = 1.This provides a further upper bound on the social
value of the dollar (since the numerator of the social value of the dollar would be relatively smaller
with discounting).
Implementation for 1988 Pension Level Reform. To implement the upper bound on the
social value of the dollar (USVD as defined in (2.36)) for the 1988 pension reform, I calculate the
mechanical loss hit for each individual in the control group (men born in 1927 and women born
in 1932) by calculating their old-age pensions with an assessment period of 10 and 11 years and
then take the difference between the two.
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Based on the CRRA specification I calculate the marginal utility of each individual for different
values of γ, multiply it by hit and take the average across individuals and periods. This average
is then divided by the mechanical effect M (the average of hit over individuals and periods). For
the denominator, I take the earnings distribution of working-age individuals in the year 1988 and
calculate the average marginal utility of consumption for this earnings distribution for different
values of γ.
2.A.6 Extensions
The insight that the multiplier of a reform is central for welfare evaluation relies on three
critical assumptions. First, I assume that individuals optimize a consistent utility function and
the social planner respects the preferences of the individuals. Second, I assume that reforms are
small. Third, I abstract from general equilibrium effects and externalities of pensions reforms.
I discuss here how deviations from these three assumptions change the welfare evaluation. In
general, any deviation from these three assumptions leads to an additional term on the LHS of
equation (2.9) but does not change the RHS. Hence, in any case we need to know the multiplier
of the reform.
General Equilibrium Effects
Allowing for price changes does not alter the logic of the welfare evaluation. With perfect
competition the price adjustments only have a direct welfare effect through the mechanical effect of



































and dP (xt) measures the price change due to the
reform. Furthermore, B(h) is evaluated at the new prices, while M(h) is evaluated at the old
prices. The sign of γ depends on the price changes. The general equilibrium effects of pension
reforms we might worry about are changes in wages and interest rates. If a pension reform induces
individuals to retire later and save more we might expect that interest rates fall (since there is more
capital). This affects capital returns of individuals and the planner’s budget constraint through
the discounting (this is captured in the behavioral fiscal effect B(h)). The effect on wages is not a
priori clear. It could be that the additional capital makes workers more productive and therefore
wages increase. It could also be that the additional workers in the market reduce wages (increased
labor supply). In the context of Austria it is unlikely that a pension reform affects interest rates,
since Austria is a small open economy and does not even set their own monetary policy.
Non-marginal Changes
The optimal benefit formula only holds for marginal changes. However, real-world reforms are
never truly marginal. In this section I discuss the welfare effect of discrete changes. Suppose there
are two different benefit functions b0(·) and b1(·), where b1(x
t) = b0(x
t)+h(xt). The welfare effect
of the discrete change from b0(·) to b1(·) is given by
∆W = W (b1, τ)−W (b0, τ) (2.38)
=
ˆ
ωi [Vi(b1)− Vi(b0)] di+ λ (G(b1, τ)−G(b0, τ)) (2.39)
where I assumed that λ0 = λ1 = λ. G(b1, τ)−G(b0, τ) measures the total fiscal effect of moving
from benefit function b0(·) to b1(·). Define G(bk) =
´ ∑
t≥0 [1 + rt]
−t ´
[(τ(x)− bk(x))μk(x)] dxdi,
where bk(x) denotes the benefit payment for state history x in regime k = {0, 1} and μk(x) is the
distribution of state histories in regime k. The state distribution μk(x) depends on the behavior of
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where ∆b0(x) := b1(x) − b0(x) and ∆μ0(x) := μ1(x) − μ0(x). The mechanical effect is now









The mechanical fiscal effect is now evaluated at the post reform state distribution, but this is still









For discrete changes the envelope theorem fails and behavioral adjustments have first order
welfare effects. The direct welfare effect is given by
ˆ
ωi [Vi(b1)− Vi(b0)] di =
ˆ
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we can write the



























2Vi(b0;h, h) + . . .+
1
(k−1)!δ
k−1Vi(b0;h, . . . , h) +Rk
)
.With non-marginal
changes the social value of the dollar term has an additional component γ, since behavioral ad-
justments have first order welfare effects. Nevertheless, the multiplier of the reform is still a key
ingredient for welfare evaluation.
Behavioral Biases
A recent and growing literature documents behavioral elements in retirement decisions (Be-
haghel and Blau, 2012; Goda et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2016; Cribb et al., 2016; Merkle et al.,
2017; Seibold, 2019). This evidence raises the question how the welfare evaluation changes in
presence of behavioral biases. Generally, behavioral biases induce a potential conflict between
the planner’s and the agents objectives. The behavioral welfare literature makes the distinction
between decision utility and true or “experienced” utility. If the two do not coincide, agents do
not maximize their true utility. As a consequence the logic of the envelope theorem fails and
behavioral responses have first order welfare effects. Hence, there is an additional term in the
direct welfare effect that measures the bias correction of behavioral responses. This is analogous
to the effects of behavioral elements in optimal tax frameworks as in Farhi and Gabaix (2015)
and Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018). The crucial question in models with behavioral elements
is: What is the true utility and consequently what is the right welfare criterion? This discussion
45
is interesting and important. However, this paper makes no progress on that frontier. I simply
assume that true preferences exist and are known to the planner. My analysis here follows Farhi
and Gabaix (2015) and I simply adjust notation to my setup.
Let U(θ) denote the true or “experienced” life-time utility for choices θ.28 However, choices
are no longer necessarily made by maximizing the true utility function U(θ). Agents could max-
imize another (biased) decision utility function or fail to maximize completely. The choice func-
tion θ incorporates all these potential behavioral aspects. As in Farhi and Gabaix (2015), the
only restriction I impose is that the agent’s budget restriction is binding. That is, K(b, I) :=
∑T−1
t=0 [1 + rt]
−t
E [yt(x
t)− τ(xt) + b(xt)− ct(x
t)− q(pt(x
t))]− I = 0, where I denotes the initial
endowment. The indirect utility function is denoted by V (b, I) = U(θ(b, I)). The government’s
objective function is then given by




where G(b) is government revenue and defined as in the standard model.
A change of the benefit function with increment h has a welfare effect of δW (b;h) = δV (b, I;h)+
λδG(b;h) and the optimal benefit function sets δW (b;h) = 0 for all h. This expression can be
rewritten using a behavioral version of Roy’s identity to get
VI
λ














is the bias-correction effect. The RHS is the same as in the standard model. The first term on
the LHS, VI
λ
, is analogous to the standard model. However, in the model with optimizing agents
I could express it in terms of marginal utilities of consumption through the agent’s first order
conditions. The new term γ captures the first order welfare effect of behavioral adjustments. The
expression Uθ
VI
− Kθ in γ measures the welfare cost of the behavioral biases. Farhi and Gabaix
(2015) call this term the “behavioral wedge” and Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018) refer to this as
the “price-metric measure of bias”. Intuitively, Uθ
VI
−Kθ is the difference between the money-metric
of marginal utilities, Uθ
VI
, and the prices Kθ and therefore measures the degree of misoptimization.
With rational optimizing agents this behavioral wedge is zero.29 If agents fail to optimize their
true preferences, γ is non-zero and is determined by the behavioral wedge multiplied with the
reform induced change in behavior, δ(θ;h). The sign of bias-correction term, γ, depends on the
exact biases present and whether the reform corrects the sub-optimal behavior or amplifies the
biases.
The two most prominent behavioral biases in the retirement context are myopia and statutory
retirement ages as reference-points. In case of myopic behavior, individuals save too little, work not
enough and retire too early.30 Hence, a policy change that induces more savings, later retirement
and so on has a positive bias correction term and reduces the direct welfare effect of taking a dollar
away from retirees. If retirement ages serve as reference points, it is not clear what the true utility
is or should be. The additional complication is that the planner can set the statutory retirement
ages and might therefore be able to shift the reference point. How to evaluate welfare effects in
this context is an open question and an interesting avenue for future research.
28To save notation θ includes all choices, i.e. θ = {C,Π}, and I suppress that the utility function might depend
on the state history X.
29Formally, a rational agent solves maxθ U(θ) subject toK =
∑T−1
t=0 [1 + rt]
−t E
[
yt(xt)− τ(xt) + b(xt)− ct(xt)− q(pt(xt))
]
−
I = 0, which yields first order condition Uθ = VIKθ. Therefore, γ = 0.
30The consensus in the literature is to model myopic behavior with hyperbolic discounting and assume that
the true utility function uses exponential discounting. However, Bernheim (2009, 2016) argues that it is not clear
whether this is really a bias/mistake. It could also be interpreted as a present focus, i.e. living in the moment, that
should not be corrected by the planner.
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2.B Early Retirement Age Reform 2000
Other Policy Variation 2000 Pension Reform: The 2000 pension reform also changed other
margins but less dramatically than the ERA and these changes do not systematically vary by
quarter of birth. The reform increased the penalty for claiming retirement benefits before the
normal retirement age (NRA). Before the reform the pension coefficient is reduced by 2 percentage
points for each year of claiming retirement benefits before the NRA. This penalty is capped at 10
percentage points. Moreover, the reduction can be at most 15 percent of the pension coefficient
before the penalty.31 The 2000 pension reform increases the penalty from 2 to 3 percentage points
for each year of claiming before the NRA. The maximal penalty is slightly increased from 10
percentage points to 10.5 percentage points and the rule that the pension coefficient with penalty
can at most be 15 percent lower than without penalty remains in place. However, the new penalty
only applies to men born after September 1942 and to women born after September 1947. For
men born before September 1942 and women born before September 1947, there was no change
in the pension formula if they claimed at the earliest possible age. If they claimed at older ages
the change in the penalty from 2 to 3 percentage points is phased in by quarter of birth. This
phase-in led to small differences in the replacement rate between quarter of births for claiming
after the ERA. However, the differences in the replacement rate between two adjacent quarters
of birth are around 0.2 percentage points (this corresponds to a difference in pension of 0.25%).
The treatment groups of the ERA increase of the 2000 pension reform are men born between
October 1940 and September 1942 and women born born between October 1945 and September
1947. Therefore, my treatment groups are subject to the transition rules and are not strongly
treated by the increase in the penalty. Especially, the differences between two adjacent quarters of
birth are minimal. The 2000 pension reform also temporarily extended the maximum duration of
unemployment benefits from 1 to 1.5 years for a subgroup of individuals. To qualify for the benefit
extension individuals need at least 15 years of employment in the past 25 years and only certain
birth cohorts in certain years were eligible. In 2000, only men born in 1940 and women born in
1945 were eligible. In 2001, men born in 1940-41 and women born in 1945-46 were eligible and in
2002 men born in 1940-1942 and women born in 1945-47 were eligible. The UI benefit extension
ended in December 2002.
2.B.1 Results for the Pension Reform in 2000
2.B.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation for Adjacent Birth
Quarters
An alternative to my approach in the main text is to only compare adjacent quarters of birth
with a difference-in-difference approach. In this case the counterfactual is different. For each
group I estimate the effect of increasing the ERA by two months starting at the control group’s
ERA. The potential advantage of this approach is that adjacent quarters of birth might be more
comparable and I observe them at almost the same point in time at a given age. The drawback





βk ∗Treati ∗I[ageit = k]+
ERA+6∑
k=ERA−6
κk ∗I[ageit = k]+Treati+λt+εit. (2.47)
To make all changes directly comparable I normalize ages relative to the control groups ERA.
Figures 2.29 to 2.32 plot the βk estimates of the fiscal revenue effect as well as the mechanical
effect of the ERA increase. We see the same patterns as in the analysis of the main text. The fiscal
31That is, the pension of early claimaints can at most be 15 percent lower compared to their pension if they
retired at NRA (with the same earnings history and number of insurance years).
47
Figure 2.18: DiD Estimates of Fiscal Revenue by Age: Women Reform 2000
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Figure 2.19: DiD Estimates of Fiscal Revenue by Age: Men Reform 2000
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Figure 2.20: Mechanical Effect for Women, Reform in 2000
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Figure 2.21: Mechanical Effect for Women, Reform in 2000
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revenue effect is predominantly driven by the mechanical effect and in some cases the multiplier
is below one. Table presents 2.5 the detailed numbers. Due to the much lower sample size, the
estimates become a bit more jumpy but the multipliers are still centered around one.
Table 2.5: Multipliers for the ERA Reform in 2000
ERA Total Fiscal Effect Mechanical Behavioral Multiplier (1+B/M)
Women
ERA 55 + 2 months 1038 1120 -83 0.93
ERA 55 + 4 months 1227 1216 11 1.01
ERA 55 + 6 months 887 984 -97 0.90
ERA 55 + 8 months 972 823 148 1.18
ERA 55 + 10 months 1008 985 23 1.02
ERA 56 1029 892 138 1.15
ERA 56 + 2 months 934 885 50 1.06
ERA 56 + 4 months 1003 970 33 1.03
ERA 56 + 6 months 757 872 -115 0.87
Men
ERA 60 + 2 months 1249 1448 -199 0.86
ERA 60 + 4 months 1528 1400 128 1.09
ERA 60 + 6 months 1381 1373 8 1.01
ERA 60 + 8 months 1103 1145 -42 0.96
ERA 60 + 10 months 1347 1213 134 1.11
ERA 61 1148 867 281 1.32
ERA 61 + 2 months 1052 1264 -212 0.83
ERA 61 + 4 months 1174 822 352 1.43
ERA 61 + 6 months 955 845 110 1.13
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Figure 2.22: Mechanical Effect for Men, Reform in 2000
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Figure 2.23: Mechanical Effect for Men, Reform in 2000
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2.C Early Retirement Age Reform 2003
The 2003 pension reform further increased the ERA from 56.5 to 60 for women and from 61.5
to 65 for men. However, the reform also changed the penalty for retiring early significantly and the
replacement rate for a given number of insurance years. This makes it more difficult to separate
the ERA from other changes. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the results from the
2000 pension reform as multipliers are still around 1.
Other Policy Variation 2003 Pension Reform:
The 2003 pension reform reduces benefit generosity by reducing the pension coefficient for a
given number of insurance years. Before the reform, each insurance year increased the pension
coefficient by 2 percentage points, after the reform this is reduced to 1.78 percentage points. This
change is also phased-in by claiming year: 1.96 pp in 2004, 1.92 pp in 2005, 1.88 pp in 2006,
1.84 pp in 2007, 1.80 pp in 2008, 1.78 pp since 2009. The penalty for claiming before the NRA
is increased from 3 percentage points per year to 4.2 percentage points without transition rules.
Furthermore, the assessment period changes from the best 15 to the best 40 years. This change is
phased-in: Since 2004 the assessment period increases by one year each year until the assessment
period is 40 years in 2028. The 2004 pension reform reintroduces the possibility of early retirement
by creating the so-called corridor pension. Individuals with at least 37.5 insurance years. Until
2032 pension cuts resulting from the pension reform were capped at 10%, except for the losses due
to the increase in the ERA. However, the 2004 pension reform sets this cap at 5% until 2024 and
then gradually increases the cap to 10%.
2.C.1 Empirical Strategy for the Pension Reform in 2003
I exploit the variation in the ERA by quarter of birth in a cohort difference-in-difference
specification analogous to the specification in the main text. I focus here on women because
for men the ERA increase beyond age 62 was irrelevant for most individuals (see figure 2.34).
Individuals with more than 37.5 insurance years can still retire at age 62 through the so called
“corridor pension”. Hence, most men were not affected by the ERA increase.
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement.
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement.
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement.
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement.
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Notes: This figure shows the DiD estimates for employment, unemployment and retirement.
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Figure 2.29: Mechanical Effect Women Reform 2000
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Figure 2.30: Mechanical Effect Women Reform 2000
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Figure 2.31: Mechanical Effect Men Reform 2000
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Figure 2.32: Mechanical Effect Men Reform 2000
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Figure 2.33: Reform 2003: Women Labor Market Status by Age
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The control group for women is women born in 1948 Q2, with ERA 56 and 10 months. I take
this control group since they are already affected by the change in the penalty and after this group
the ERA increases by 1 month for each quarter of birth.
2.C.2 Descriptive Figures for the Pension Reform in 2003
2.C.3 Results Pension Reform 2003
For brevity, I focus here on fiscal outcomes and the multiplier. Figure 2.35 shows the fiscal
revenue and mechanical effect for women for selected treatment groups. Table shows the multiplier
for all groups for women. The main take-away from these tables is that the multiplier is still
relatively small and around 1. However, the estimates of the multiplier can be a mix between
increasing ERA, level shifts in generosity and changes in actuarial fairness (because the 2003
reform significantly changed other margins of the pension formula as discussed at the beginning).
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Figure 2.34: Reform 2003: Men Labor Market Status by Age
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Table 2.6: Multiplier ERA Reform 2003
ERA Fiscal Revenue Effect Mechanical Behavioral Multiplier
Women
ERA 56 + 11 months 303 260 43 1.16
ERA 57 months 665 582 83 1.14
ERA 57 + 1 months 1027 899 129 1.14
ERA 57 + 2 months 1328 1217 110 1.09
ERA 57 + 3 months 1719 1536 183 1.12
ERA 57 + 4 months 2083 1853 230 1.12
ERA 57 + 5 months 2364 2075 289 1.14
ERA 57 + 6 months 2945 2552 393 1.15
ERA 57 + 7 months 3291 2910 380 1.13
ERA 57 + 8 months 3566 3282 284 1.09
ERA 57 + 9 months 3752 3389 363 1.11
ERA 57 + 10 months 4373 3928 446 1.11
ERA 57 + 11 months 4725 4379 346 1.08
ERA 58 months 4835 4789 46 1.01
ERA 58 + 1 months 5299 5179 120 1.02
ERA 58 + 2 months 5944 5751 193 1.03
ERA 58 + 3 months 7058 6563 495 1.08
ERA 58 + 4 months 6526 6280 247 1.04
ERA 58 + 5 months 6908 6633 275 1.04
ERA 58 + 6 months 7897 7423 474 1.06
ERA 58 + 7 months 8894 8331 564 1.07
ERA 58 + 8 months 8936 8378 558 1.07
ERA 58 + 9 months 9378 8841 537 1.06
ERA 58 + 10 months 10305 9473 832 1.09
ERA 58 + 11 months 11545 10536 1009 1.10
ERA 59 months 10450 9928 522 1.05
ERA 59 + 1 months 11552 10949 603 1.06
ERA 59 + 2 months 12754 11911 843 1.07
ERA 59 + 3 months 13514 12453 1061 1.09
ERA 59 + 4 months 7386 10533 -3147 0.70
ERA 59 + 5 months 7795 10602 -2807 0.74
ERA 59 + 6 months 7933 10506 -2573 0.76
ERA 59 + 7 months 5607 9514 -3907 0.59
ERA 59 + 8 months 4735 8671 -3936 0.55
ERA 59 + 9 months 4227 7626 -3399 0.55
ERA 59 + 10 months 6251 8470 -2218 0.74
2.D Pension Level Reform
2.D.1 Balance Checks
Figure 2.36 shows that the number of observations around January is not balanced. This is
potentially a problem. However, I do not find any effects for labor market outcomes or fiscal
revenue before the reform. Moreover, figure 2.14 in the main text shows that the effects are driven
by the treated group. I do not find effects for the placebo group that is unaffected by the reform.
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This speaks for the validity of my RDD despite the unbalanced number of observations around
the cut-off.
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Notes: This figure shows the number of observations by date of birth. Around January the number of observations is not
balanced. However, this is unlikely to be driven by manipulation as a response to the reform.
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Figure 2.37: Number of Observations by Date of Birth
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Notes: This figure shows the number of observations by date of birth for the treatment and placebo groups. The cutoff is
at 1.1.1928 for men and 1.1.1933 for women.
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2.D.2 Additional Figures and Tables for Men
Figure 2.38: RD Estimates by Age: Labor Supply Men Treatment and Placebo
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Notes: This figure plots the RD estimates at each age between 50 and 85 based on local linear regressions with a bandwith
of 8 months.
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Figure 2.39: RD Estimates by Age: Fiscal Effect Men Treatment and Placebo
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Notes: This figure plots the RD estimates for fiscal revenue by age (black squares with 95 CI, based on local linear
regressions with bandwidth 8 months). The red area indicates the mechanical fiscal effect of the reform.
Table 2.7: Multiplier Benefit Generosity by Discount Rate and Bandwidth
Discount rate: r=0% r=2% r=5% r=7%
Multiplier Men
bandwith = 2 2.34 2.62 3.08 3.39
bandwith = 4 1.61 1.75 1.96 2.10
bandwith = 6 1.48 1.59 1.76 1.88
bandwith = 8 1.39 1.48 1.62 1.72
bandwith = 10 1.30 1.37 1.49 1.57
Multiplier Women
bandwith = 2 1.92 2.15 2.52 2.77
bandwith = 4 1.78 1.98 2.31 2.55
bandwith = 6 1.94 2.19 2.59 2.88
bandwith = 8 1.66 1.84 2.12 2.32
bandwith = 10 1.45 1.56 1.76 1.89
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2.D.3 RDD Figures Women
Figure 2.40: Retirement and Employment at Age 55: Women
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Notes: This figure shows the average retirement and employment rates at age 60. The fitted lines are local linear polynomials
with a bandwidth of 8 months.
Figure 2.41: RD Estimates by Age: Labor Supply Women
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Notes: This figure plots the RD estimates at each age between 50 and 85 based on local linear regressions with a bandwith
of 8 months.
2.E Data: Pension Benefit Calculation
The ASSD provide all information necessary to compute individual old-age and disability
pensions. I validate my pension calculations by comparing my predicted old-age pensions with
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actual old-age pensions for the subsample of retirees who received benefits in 2001 or who retired
after 2001, using matched data obtained from the Austrian Social Security Administration. Figure
2.42 plots mean matched old-age pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins), pooling all years from 1985 to 2014. To get a sense of the distribution of predicted benefits
I plot the 95th percentile (upper bar) and the 5th percentile (the lower bar), i.e. 90% of all
observations lie between the two bars. Figures 2.43 and 2.44 plot this for each year separately.
Figure 2.45 shows the same exercise for disability pensions. In all years, actual pensions track
predicted pensions very closely.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched old-age pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins), pooling all years from 1985 to 2014. The bars represent the 95th percentile (upper bar) and the 5th percentile
(the lower bar), the dot represents the mean. Panels (c) and (d) show the relative frequency of pension levels for
men and women in this subsample.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched old-age pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins) for each year separately.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched old-age pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins) for each year separately.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched disability pensions against mean predicted disability pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins), pooling all years from 1985 to 2014. The bars represent the 95th percentile (upper bar) and the 5th percentile
(the lower bar), the dot represents the mean.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched disability pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins) for each year separately.
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Notes: This figure plots mean matched disability pensions against mean predicted old-age pensions (in 1000-Euro
bins) for each year separately.
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Chapter 3
Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligi-
bility Rules or Reducing Benefits?
joint with Stefan Staubli and Josef Zweimüller
Abstract. This paper provides a framework to evaluate disability insurance (DI) reforms, capturing
insurance value and fiscal costs of changes in the two main DI policy parameters: (i) the strictness
of DI eligiblity rules and (ii) the level of DI benefits. We show that fiscal multipliers, the total fiscal
cost relative to the mechanical fiscal effect of a reform, are crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of
these DI policy parameters. Empirically, we exploit exogenous variation in strictness of eligibility
rules and benefit levels arising from several DI reforms in Austria. We find that stricter eligibility
rules significantly reduce the DI inflow through both a mechanical effect (fewer applicants qualify
for benefits under stricter rules), and a behavioral effect (less workers apply for benefits). Similarly,
a decrease in DI benefits is associated with a significant reduction in the DI inflow. Stricter
eligibility rules create fiscal multipliers of 2-2.5 and reducing benefit generosity has fiscal multipliers
of 1.3-1.4. Hence, by imposing stricter DI eligibility rules the policy maker can induce larger
behavioral changes and generate greater cost reductions compared to reducing DI benefit levels
making DI eligibility rules the more effective policy parameter.
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3.1 Introduction
The share of individuals receiving Disability Insurance (DI) has increased significantly during
the last two decades in many countries. For example, in the United States 2.6 percent of individuals
in the age group of 20 to 64 were receiving DI benefits in 1992, but by 2012 this fraction had risen
to 5.3 percent. This growth has generated substantial interest by policy makers and economists
in measures that reduce DI program caseloads and expenditures.
Two potential ways to slow program inflow are to tighten DI eligibility rules and to reduce
DI benefit levels. Yet, little is known about the welfare effects of these measures. This paper
helps to fill this gap by providing sufficient statistics formulas for welfare analysis that capture
the insurance value and incentive costs of changes in eligibility criteria and benefit levels. These
formulas are functions of parameters that can be estimated using design-based empirical methods.1
Our theoretical analysis shows that fiscal multipliers are crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of DI
policy parameters. A fiscal multiplier measures the total fiscal cost relative to the mechanical fiscal
effect of a reform. Estimating fiscal multipliers has recently become popular to evaluate policy
programs (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2019; Lee et al., 2019).2 This is the first paper to show
the relevance of fiscal multipliers in the DI context. DI programs differ to other social insurance
programs because eligibility is based on the inability to work. The inherent problem of the DI
assessment process is that the true disability is the agent’s private information. For this reason,
a DI applicant has to undergo a disability assessment process, which delivers an estimate of her
disability to the government and determines her eligibility to receive benefits. Changes in disability
eligibility criteria are therefore very different in nature than changes in benefit generosity. Stricter
eligibility rules reduce access to DI benefits for some individuals and do not affect individuals who
still qualify for DI under the stricter rules. We provide a unifying framework that allows to study
the welfare effects of changing DI eligibility rules and DI benefits. Moreover, we show how these
two instruments can be optimally combined (optimal policy mix). Empirically estimating the fiscal
multiplier of stricter DI eligibility is not straightforward. Stricter eligibility rules lead mechanically
to lower DI award rates but at the same time change application behavior. To directly estimate
the mechanical effect of stricter eligibility rules one would need to know the hypothetical change in
the award rates at the individual level. This is a counterfactual we cannot observe.3 An empirical
innovation of this paper is to develop an approach to estimate the mechanical fiscal effect and the
fiscal multiplier of stricter DI eligibility criteria.
We estimate fiscal multipliers of stricter DI eligibility rules and lower DI benefits by exploiting
quasi-experimental variation of DI policies in Austria. Studying the Austrian case has several
advantages. First, we can use the Austrian Social Security Administration database (ASSD)
which contains the complete labor market and earnings histories of all private-sector workers in
Austria dating back to 1972. Additionally, we have detailed information on the various stages of
the application process for all DI applications since 2004. Second, we are able to exploit exogenous
variation in DI eligibility criteria and benefits which is generated by several policy reforms. The
combination of detailed labor market and application data and quasi-experimental policy variation
gives us the unique opportunity to study the impact of stricter screening and changes in benefit
levels on DI inflow, DI applications, labor force outcomes and fiscal costs. Third, certain features
of the Austrian DI- and social protection systems are similar to other countries. In particular, as
described in more detail below, the Austrian reforms we are exploiting are comparable to reforms
that have been proposed in the United States.
Our identification strategy to estimate the effects of stricter disability screening exploits vari-
ation in DI eligibility criteria that is generated by a policy reform. Prior to 2013 DI eligibility
1Recent applications of the sufficient statistic approach for optimal UI design include Shimer and Werning
(2007), Chetty (2008), Kroft (2008), Landais et al. (2010), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011), Schmieder et al. (2012),
and Landais (2012). See the article by Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for a detailed discussion of this literature.
2These papers estimate the “fiscal externality” of reforms, which equals the fiscal multiplier minus one.
3Estimating the mechanical fiscal effect of a benefit level reform is straightforward as we can directly calculate
by how much individual benefits change due to the reform. It is (usually) not possible to directly calculate the
effect of a change in DI eligibility rules on DI award rates at the individual level.
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standards were significantly relaxed for workers above age 57 relative to those below age 57. In
2013 the Austrian government increased the age threshold for relaxed DI access from age 57 to age
58, followed by further increases to age 59 in 2015 and age 60 in 2017. These step-wise increases
imply that the strictness of DI eligibility at a certain age varied by date of birth. On this basis,
our estimation approach is a difference-in-differences design, comparing younger and older birth
cohorts, who faced different DI eligibility rules, over time.
Our identification strategy to analyze the impact of benefit generosity exploits variation in DI
benefits arising from a large pension reform that changed DI benefit levels for individuals with
similar characteristics in different ways. This allows us to use a difference-in-differences approach
that relates individuals’ labor supply response to their differential change in benefit levels stemming
from the policy reform.
The insights from our empirical analysis can be summarized by five broad conclusions. First,
DI benefit receipt is responsive to changes in DI eligibility criteria. We estimate that tighten-
ing DI eligibility standards at age 57 reduces the receipt of DI benefits between age 57 and 61
by 2.5 percentage points (about 13 percent of the DI benefit receipt above the RSA), increases
employment by 1.85 percentage points and creates substitution to other social insurance benefits
(0.95 percentage points). Second, DI applications respond to the stricter criteria. This implies
that the reduction in DI benefit receipt is both driven by a behavioral (fewer individuals apply)
and a mechanical effect (fewer individuals are awarded DI benefits). Interestingly, applications
are not only lower at age 57, when the eligibility criteria change, but this effect persists up to age
61. Third, our complier analysis suggests that the least sick individuals react to the stricter DI
eligibility criteria by no longer applying. Fourth, we find that DI applications and DI claiming
are also sensitive to the level of DI benefits. Fifth, we find that stricter eligibility rules create
fiscal multipliers of 2-2.5 and reducing benefit generosity generates fiscal multipliers of 1.3-1.4.
This implies that by increasing strictness of eligibility rules the policy maker can induce larger
behavioral changes and generate greater cost reductions compared to reducing DI benefits. Hence,
on the cost side stricter eligibility rules are more effective. Reducing benefit generosity is only
preferable to stricter eligibility rules if the insurance loss of reducing benefits was more than 1.1
dollars smaller than the insurance loss induced by stricter eligibility rules.
There is a growing empirical literature studying the effects of DI on labor market outcomes (e.g.
(Autor and Duggan, 2003; de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw, 2011; Staubli, 2011; Maestas,
Mullen, and Strand, 2013; Moore, 2015; Gelber, Moore, and Strand, 2017)) but empirical evidence
on the effect of eligibility criteria on DI application behavior is scarce. Also, from a theoretical
perspective relatively little is known about how imperfect information on disability status should be
used to solve the incentive-insurance trade-off in the DI program. Diamond and Sheshinski (1995)
and Parsons (1996) discuss medical screening in a static environment. More recently, Denk and
Michau (2013) and Low and Pistaferri (2015) assess the optimal screening stringency in a dynamic
environment and both conclude that screening stringency is too strict in the U.S. This paper builds
on this literature and adds to it by exploring how changes in eligibility criteria and benefit levels
affect DI application behavior and labor market outcomes of applicants. In particular, we are able
to examine the relative impact of stricter eligibility criteria on DI enrollment due to more people
being denied benefits under the stricter rules as opposed to more people self-screening, i.e. not
applying for benefits. Moreover, our theoretical framework shows how our empirical estimates
relate to welfare effects of such reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model of disability insurance
and formulae for optimal disability screening and benefits. Section 3.3 describes the data and
institutional background in Austria. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the empirical results on stricter
disability screening and changes in benefit levels, respectively. Section 3.6 estimates the fiscal
multipliers of stricter screening and reduced benefits and discusses how our estimates can be used
for welfare evaluation. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we explore how the two main DI policy parameters – the strictness of DI
eligibility rules and the level of DI benefits – affect social welfare, as well as labor supply and
application behavior of potential DI claimants.4 Section 3.2.1 uses the static framework of Dia-
mond and Sheshinski (1995) to illustrate the basic trade-offs, characterizes the socially optimal
policy mix and derives sufficient-statistics formulas. Section 3.2.2 extends the static framework
to a dynamic setting with a sequence of (health and economic) shocks showing that the basic
trade-offs highlighted in the static model carry over to more general environments.
3.2.1 A Static Model of Optimal DI
Setup. Consider an agent living for two periods. In the first period, she works, earns a wage w,
pays a lump-sum tax τ (which finances the DI program) and enjoys utility u(w− τ). There are no
savings nor any other choices in the first period.5 In the second period, the agent suffers a disability
shock θ, modeled as a random draw from a continuous distribution F (θ). Figure 3.1 details the
sequence of events and agent’s choices in the second period. If θ is small (= the disability not very
severe), the agent continues working and enjoys second-period utility u(w)− θ. If θ is sufficiently
large (= the disability severe), the agent applies for DI benefits. A DI application causes disutility
ψ, capturing the extensive medical checks, the bureaucratic hassle, etc. associated with the DI
assessment process. The fixed welfare cost ψ is important in the present context as it ensures
that DI application choices depend on the generosity of the DI system.6 With probability p(θ) the
application is accepted, where p′(θ) > 0.7 When the application is accepted, the agent withdraws
from work, claims DI benefits b and gets second-period utility v(b)− ψ. When the application is
rejected, the applicant either resumes work and gets second-period utility u(w)− θ−ψ; or claims
social welfare z < b and gets second-period utility v(z) − ψ. (No disutility or uncertainty are
associated with claiming social welfare .)
Notice that the decision tree of Figure 3.1 assumes that the social welfare program is a safety
net to which an agent only applies after a DI application is rejected. It is useful to make explicit
the condition under which claiming social welfare is a “second choice” for any agent. The utility
of claiming social welfare falls short of the utility of working if the agent’s disability is θ <
θR ≡ u(w) − v(z) > 0. Hence, θR is the “marginal social welfare claimant”. If θ ≥ θR the
agent prefers social welfare over working and vice versa. An agent with θ ≥ θR applies to DI
if v(z) < p (θ) v(b) + [1− p (θ)] v(z) − ψ (the utility on social welfare falls short of the expected
utility of applying to DI). If this latter condition holds for θ = θR, it also holds for θ > θR,
because p′(θ) > 0 and b > z. Thus, no agent will claim social welfare benefits unless a previous
DI application has been rejected (= the situation depicted in Figure 1), if
ψ < p(θR) [(v(b)− v(z)] . (3.1)
4By increasing the “strictness of disability rules” we mean any policy making it more difficult that a DI
application – with a given degree of disability – gets accepted. This is what Low and Pistaferri (2015) and Diamond
and Sheshinski (1995) call, respectively, “strictness of screening” and “disability standard”. The terms disability
rules, disability standard, and disability screening are used interchangeably. The formal definition of strictness is
discussed in detail in section 3.2.1.
5The setup follows Chetty (2006) who reconsiders Baily’s (1978) formula of optimal unemployment insurance
(UI). The stylized two-period framework - tax payments but no DI application choices in the first period, while
no tax payments but DI application choices in the second period - simplifies the formula without changing the
substance of the argument.
6Here we deviate from Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) who do not consider application costs. Recent empirical
studies support the idea that application costs are important drivers of DI applications, e.g. Deshpande et al.
(2019) and Godard et al. (2019).
7Below, we will analyze a situation where the government has control over the p(θ)-function. By adopting
stricter eligibility rules, the p(θ)-function shifts down, so that p takes a lower value for any given θ (and vice versa).
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Figure 3.1: Decision Tree Model
Note: This figure shows the decision tree of the second period in the static model. If the disability level θ is small, the
agent continues working and enjoys utility u(w)− θ. If the disability is severe an agent applies to DI and is accepted with
probability p(θ). Second period utility is v(b) − ψin case of acceptance into DI. If the agent’s application is rejected, she
needs to decide whether to return to work (with utility u(w)− θ−ψ) or consume other social welfare benefits (with utility
v(z) − ψ).
The condition is intuitive: if the DI program is generous (low ψ, high p(θ) and high b) and/or
the social welfare program restrictive (low z), an agent with a severe disability first tries to get on
DI, and claims social welfare only if her DI application gets denied. In what follows, we assume
condition (1) is satisfied.
DI Applications and Labor Supply. Let us now look at the DI application choice. Consider
an agent whose disability is not extremely severe, θ < θR. (This implies she goes back to work in
case her DI application gets rejected.) Her application choice compares the utility when staying
employed, u(w) − θ, to the expected utility when applying for DI, p (θ) v(b) + [1− p (θ)] (u(w) −
θ)−ψ. The “marginal applicant,” the agent who is indifferent between filing a DI application and
remaining employed, has disability




It follows that agents with disability θ ≥ θA apply for DI, while agents with disability θ < θA
remain employed. Figure 3.2 characterizes the outcome of agents’ DI application choices. It draws
the probability of DI award p(θ) against θ and indicates the disability cutoff-levels θA and θR.





to work, while those with θ ≥ θR go on social welfare.
Equation (3.2), and its graphical representation in Figure 3.2, applies when θA < θR, i.e. a
marginal applicant returns to work in case her DI application is rejected. Indeed, this outcome
will arise as long as condition (3.1) holds.8 It is worth emphasizing that condition (3.1) is the
natural assumption in the present context. When this condition holds, the model predicts that DI
8To see this, consider the alternative scenario, θA ≥ θR, in which a rejected marginal applicant claims social
welfare. In that scenario, the marginal applicant is indifferent between applying for DI and claiming social welfare,
p(θ̂A)]v(b) + [1 − p(θ̂A)]v(z) − ψ = v(z) or ψ = p(θ̂A) [v(b)− v(z)], where θ̂A is the corresponding threshold
80
Figure 3.2: Illustration of model
Note: This figure illustrates the basic setup. Individuals are characterized by disability level θ and can choose whether
to work, apply to DI or leave the labor force and consume social welfare benefits. The award process to DI is noisy and
individuals are awarded DI with probability p(θ). We assume that p(θ) is weakly increasing in θ. This captures that (i)
it is difficult to assess the true disability level of an individual and (ii) the assessment contains nonetheless some valuable
information on the true disability level. The marginal DI applicant is denoted by θA and individuals with θ ≥ θA apply
to DI. The marginal welfare benefits type is denoted by θR and individuals with θ ≥ θR will go on welfare benefits if they
are rejected.
policy parameters affect labor supply decisions. Distortionary labor supply effects of DI programs
are supported by a large body of empirical evidence.9
DI Policy Instruments. We now assess the welfare effects of two policy instruments that
characterize any DI system: the level of DI benefits and the strictness of DI eligibility rules. While
the role of DI benefits b is straightforward and poses no major conceptual problems, the role of DI
eligibility rules θ∗ needs further discussion. The inherent problem of the DI assessment process
is that the true disability θ is the agent’s private information. For this reason, a DI applicant
has to undergo a disability assessment process, which delivers an estimate of her disability to the
government. Formally, the government observes s = θ + e(θ), where s is a noisy signal, θ is the
applicant’s true disability and e(θ) is the noise.10 Define by G(s|θ) the (continuous) cumulative
distribution of signals s among a pool of applicants with disability θ.11 In the following we assume
disability. However, this latter equality – together with p(θ̂A) ≥ p(θR) – implies that condition (3.1) is violated. In
other words, while this alternative scenario is possible in principle, it is ruled out under the maintained parameter
constellation. The intuition is similar as before: if the DI system is generous and/or social welfare restrictive, the
rejected marginal applicant goes back to employment.
9A number of papers provide direct evidence on the work behavior of rejected DI applicants. These findings
are perfectly consistent with the predictions of the model under condition (3.1). Bound (1989); von Wachter et al.
(2011); Maestas et al. (2013); French and Song (2014) use rejected DI applicants as a control group for accepted
applicants to study the impact of DI on labor supply. For instance,von Wachter et al. (2011) report that, in 69.6%
of rejected DI applicants aged 30-44 in the US report positive yearly earnings two years after the DI application
and 57.4% report earnings higher than three months of full-time employment at the minimum wage in 2000. The
corresponding numbers are 52.6% and 42.7% for rejected DI applicants aged 45-64. In the Norwegian study by
Kostol and Mogstad (2014), about 30 percent of rejected DI applicants aged 18-49 are participating on the labor
market.
10The variance of the noise is likely to vary with the severity of the disability as very severe and perhaps also
very weak disabilities are more easy to assess than intermediate cases.
11Formally, G(s|θ) is the marginal distribution of s with respect to a given level of θ of the bivariate distribution
of s and θ.
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that the DI assessment process is informative, i.e. we assume ∂G(s̄|θ)/∂θ < 0. This implies that
in an applicant pool with a more severe disability a smaller fraction of DI assessments fall short
of an arbitrary cutoff s̄ and will ensure that on average the award probability is increasing in the
severity of the disability.
The strictness of DI eligibility rules – the policy parameter under direct control of the govern-
ment – can be captured by a critical value of s, call it θ∗, such that a DI application with s ≥ θ∗
is accepted, while an application with s < θ∗ is rejected. The acceptance probability can then be
written as p(θ; θ∗) = 1−G(θ∗|θ). In what follows, we consider the case where the government can
change θ∗ but takes G(s|θ) as given. This is the context of our empirical anlaysis below, which
exploits quasi-experimental variation in the “relaxed screening age” (RSA) at which DI eligibility
rules become more lenient. In our notation, the strictness of DI eligibility equals θ∗ = θH before
the RSA and falls to θL < θH after the RSA. An increase in the RSA from age R to some higher
age R + ∆, implies that, during the age window [R,R+∆], the treated cohort is subject to the
strict DI eligiblity standard θH , while the control cohort is subject to the lenient standard θL. If
cohorts are otherwise similar (in productivity, health, preferences, etc.), a plausible assumption for
“adjacent” cohorts, comparing treated to control cohorts identifies the causal effect of an increase
in θ∗ on the outcomes of interest.
It should be clear that the government could, in principle, take measures other than varying θ∗
to manipulate the DI award probability p(θ; θ∗). For instance, the goal of a DI reform could be to
increase the precision of DI screening, to avoid type-I and type II errors (= false acceptances and
false rejections) of an imperfectly functioning DI assessment system. This could be done through
more extensive medical checks, better equipment, monitoring of DI applicants, etc.. Such measures
would change the function G(s|θ) by reducing the variance of the noise e(θ). However, unlike
changing θ∗, changing G(s|θ) requires resources and welfare calculations need to take into account
society’s willingness to pay for improved DI screening. While such policies are clearly relevant
in practice, we do not analyze their welfare implications here, mainly because we cannot address
them empirically with our data. However, we consider this a potentially interesting direction for
future research.
Welfare Effects of DI Reforms. We follow the literature assuming society’s objective can
be represented by a utilitarian social welfare function. Assuming a population of mass unity and
abstracting from discounting, the social welfare function is given by
W (θ∗, b) = u(w − τ) +
´ θA
0
(u(w)− θ)dF (θ) +
´ θR
θA




p(θ; θ∗)v(b)dF (θ) +
´∞
θR





The right-hand-side terms sum up the welfare levels of the various agents: first-period workers,
all of whom are working and paying taxes (first term on the right-hand-side); the working healthy
(second term), the rejected DI applicants resuming work (third term); the DI recipients (fourth
term); and the social-welfare recipients (fifth term). The last term takes account of the aggregate
welfare losses associated with DI application costs. When designing the optimal DI program,
the government needs to take into account agents’ behavioral responses to changes in DI policy
parameters. Furthermore, the social planner is constrained by a balanced-budget requirement: DI




p(θ; θ∗)dF (θ) + z
∞̂
θR
(1− p(θ; θ∗))dF (θ). (3.4)
.
In what follows, we discuss the welfare effects of DI reforms. We first look at the effects
of implementing more stringent DI eligibility rules, before we turn to the effects of reducing
DI benefits. Finally, we discuss optimal policy mix of DI reforms when θ∗ and b are changed
simultaneously. The discussion is framed in terms of implementing a more restrictive DI system,
because most policy debates center around releasing the financial burden of the DI program. Of
course, analogous arguments hold for reforms that increase the generosity of the DI system.
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Stricter DI Eligibility Rules. The utilitarian government sets DI eligibility rules θ∗ to
maximize social welfare W , taking into account the balanced-budget requirement and agents’ DI
application responses. In Appendix 3.B.1, we show that the welfare effect of increasing θ∗ is
∂W
∂θ∗










Condition (3.5) highlights the two opposing effects of stricter DI eligiblity rules θ∗ on social welfare.
On the one hand, a higher θ∗ raises social welfare because it saves taxpayers’ money (fiscal cost
reduction). On the other hand, a higher θ∗ reduces social welfare, because fewer agents are awarded
DI when hit by a severe disability shock (insurance losses).
The fiscal cost reduction consist of two components: the behavioral fiscal effect B(θ∗) and
the mechanical fiscal effect M(θ∗). The behavioral fiscal effect measures the reduction in DI ex-
penditures due to fewer DI applications. The mechanical fiscal effect M(θ∗) comes from fewer DI
applications getting accepted. To see the behavioral and mechanical effects more clearly, note that
the DI inflow probability is the product of two factors: the probability of filing an application times
the probability that the application gets accepted, Pr(DI) = Pr(Apply) ∗ Pr(Accept|Apply). In
the above notation, the application probability is Pr(Apply) = 1 − F (θA), while the acceptance









. The derivative of the appli-
cation probability with respect to θ∗ yields the average agent’s change in application behavior,
(∂θA/∂θ∗)p(θA; θ∗)f(θA), which is the red area of Figure 3.3. Multiplying with the DI benefit
b yields the behavioral fiscal effect B(θ∗) = (∂θA/∂θ∗)p(θA; θ∗)f(θA) · b. The derivative of the
acceptance probability with respect to θ∗ equals −
´∞
θA
(∂p(θ; θ∗)/∂θ∗)dF (θ), which is the sum of








(∂p(θ; θ∗)/∂θ∗)dF (θ). Each rejected applicant resuming work saves the amount b to
the taxpayer (recall that, in the second period, workers do not pay taxes), while each rejected
applicant substituting DI for social welfare saves b− z > 0 to the taxpayer. The mechanical fiscal
effect is therefore M(θ∗) ≡ MW · b+MZ · (b− z). Since fiscal savings are used to reduce taxes, the
total fiscal gain, B(θ∗) +M(θ∗), is valued at the marginal utility of consumption of the taxpayer
u′(w − τ) in equation (3.5).
Adopting stricter DI elgibility rules θ∗ does not only save money to taxpayers, it also reduces
the insurance value of the DI system. The lower DI acceptance probability corresponds to a higher
probability that a DI applicant eventually has to resume work, MW , or has to claim social welfare,
MZ . The average utility loss of the former is v(b)−(u(w)− θ̃) > 0, where θ̃ is the average disability
level of rejected applicants who go back to work.12 The utility loss of the latter is v(b)− v(z) > 0.
Note the reduction in the insurance value depends only on the mechanical effect but not on
the behavioral effect. This is a direct implication of the Envelope theorem.13 Intuitively, only
marginal applicants react to a marginal change in the strictness of screening. Marginal applicants
are indifferent between applying and not applying. Hence, if a marginal increase in θ∗ induces
them not to file an application, their welfare is not directly affected. However, fewer applications
reduce the financial burden of the DI system, thus they generate a positive fiscal effect that benefits
taxpayers.
The optimal strictness of screening θ∗ balances the trade-off between insurance loss and fiscal
gain, where (3.5) is set to zero. For later use, we rewrite this condition as












13While the decision to apply is discrete the envelope theorem applies because we have a marginal change in the
policy parameter θ∗. In Appendix 3.B.1 we show this formally and also discuss how the welfare evaluation changes
in case of a discrete (non-marginal) change of θ∗.
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Figure 3.3: Effects of stricter screening
(a) Shift of award probability curve (b) Different effects
Notes: The figure illustrates the effects of stricter screening. Stricter screening shifts down the award probability curve
(Panel a). The area between the two award probability curves is the mechanical effect. Panel b illustrates the different
effects of stricter screening. A fraction of rejected applicants due to the mechncial effect returns to work (gray area). The
other fraction substitutes DI benefits with welfare benefits (blue area). Stricter screening also shifts the marginal applicant











where LW ≡ [v(b) − (u(w) − θ̃)]MW > 0 and LZ ≡ [v(b)− v(z)]MZ > 0 are the aggregate
utility losses suffered by the additionally rejected applicants resuming work (LW ) and claiming
social welfare (LZ), respectively. The two sides of the inequality have an intuitive interpretation.
The left-hand-side is the fiscal multiplier, 1 + B(θ∗)/M(θ∗), and measures the reduction in the
financial burden for the taxpayer per mechanically saved dollar (= hypothetical fiscal gain when
application behavior remains unchanged). The right-hand-side is the corresponding reduction of
the insurance value in monetary units. Dividing by the marginal utility of consumption of the
taxpayer u′(w − τ)M(θ∗) yields the insurance loss (in monetary terms) per mechanically saved
dollar.
Lower DI Benefits. The second key DI policy parameter is the level of DI benefits b. It is











Similar to condition (3.6) above, condition (3.7) tells us that a reduction in DI benefits b is
welfare-improving if the fiscal gains to taxpayers exceeds the insurance loss suffered by disabled
workers. On the one hand, a lower b reduces the financial burden of the DI system because fewer
agents apply for DI. In condition (3.7), this is captured by the fiscal multiplier, 1 + B(b)/M(b).
On the other hand, a lower b reduces the consumption smoothing benefit, because it reduces the
consumption possibilities when hit by disability shock. This is captured by the ratio of marginal
utilities of a DI benefit recipient relative to the one of a taxpayer.




p(θA)f(θA) · b and the mechanical fiscal
effects is M(b) ≡
´∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ). The ratio of behavioral over mechanical fiscal effect corresponds








B(b)/M(b). This yields an interesting analogy of the optimal DI formula to the famous Baily
(1978) formula for optimal unemployment insurance (UI). Both in the case of UI and in the case
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of DI, the condition for the socially optimal benefit level can be written as 1+η = v′(b)/u′(w−τ).
In the Baily (1978) model of optimal UI, η is the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect
to the UI benefit level; in the above model of optimal DI, η = ξ, the elasticity of the DI inflow
with respect to the DI benefit level. In other words, the relevant moral-hazard margin in the case
of DI is the program inflow, while the relevant margin in the case of UI is the program outflow.14
Optimal DI Policy Mix. So far, we have derived conditions for social optimality for each
single DI policy parameter, holding the other policy parameter fixed. However, a natural question
is how a DI reform should optimally combine these two policy parameters. More precisely: how
strongly – and in which direction – should DI eligibility rules θ∗ be changed per unit change of DI
benefits b?
Figure 3.4 illustrates the idea. It depicts the current policy (θ∗0 , b0). The dotted curve indicates
the combinations of (θ∗, b) that generate the same level of social welfare. Consider the effect of
a DI reform starting from the pre-reform DI policy is (θ∗0 , b0). The vertical (horizontal) arrow
shows how θ∗ (b) needs to be changed to increase welfare. In Figure 3.4 the vertical arrow points
up and the horizontal arrow points to the left, indicating that a welfare-enhancing DI reform
implement lower benefits and stricter eligibility rules.15 The length of the arrows correspond to
the effectiveness of the respective policy instrument. In Figure 3.4 the horizontal arrow is short,
while the vertical arrow is long, suggesting that the DI reform should strongly increase θ∗ per
unit reduction of b. The slope of the gradient – the arrow pointing to the northwest – yields the
optimal policy mix.
Figure 3.4: Optimal policy mix – gradient of welfare function
Notes: The figure illustrates the idea of the optimal policy mix. It shows the gradient in case screening should be stricter
and benefits should be less generous. The dashed line is the indifference curve of the welfare function of the current benefit
level and strictness of screening. The gradient of the welfare function is orthogonal to the indifference curve and points in
the direction of greatest increase of the function.
14The implicit assumption here is that DI generosity does neither affect the intensive margin of labor supply (DI
recipients do not work on the labor market) nor the outflow from DI (DI is an absorbing state, no DI spell ever
terminates to a regular job or any other destination).
15Alternatively, if the horizontal arrow points to the right and the vertical arrow points up, the existing DI
system is too restrictive in both dimensions and a welfare reform increasing DI benefits and implementing more
lenient DI eligibility rules is welfare improving. Of course, all other permutations are possible.
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⎠u′(w − τ) (3.8)
where σ and γ measure the gap between fiscal gains and insurance loss for changes in b and
θ∗, respectively. Formally, we have σ ≡ [1 +B(b)/M(b)] − [v′(cd)] / [u
′(w − τ)M(b)] and γ ≡
[1 +B(θ∗)/M(θ∗)]− [LW + LZ ] / [u
















The sign of σ determines the direction in which benefits should be adjusted (if σ ≷ 0 ⇔ −∂W/∂b ≷
0 ⇔ ∂b ⋚ 0). Similarly, the sign of γ determines the direction of adjustment in θ∗ (if γ ≷
0 ⇔ ∂W/∂θ∗ ≷ 0 ⇔ ∂θ∗ ≷ 0). Hence, σ and γ determine the direction of welfare-enhancing
adjustments in b and θ∗, while the ratio γ/σ determines the optimal DI policy mix, (∂θ∗/∂b)opt.
b and θ∗ have different units. Hence, for a meaningful interpretation of the optimal direction we
normalize by the respective mechanical fiscal effects of a one unit change in b and θ∗ respectively.
This means that the optimal direction is expressed in terms of a mechanical 1 dollar change in
fiscal costs: For a mechanical one dollar reduction in fiscal costs due to lower benefits, screening
should be adjusted such that fiscal costs are mechanically reduced by γ
σ
dollars.
3.2.2 The General Model
The above model highlights the basic trade-offs of DI policy reforms but misses two ingredients
that are crucial in designing and evaluating DI reforms: heterogeneity across individuals and
intertemporal choices. In the model of section 3.2.1, agents differ only in θ and all actions happen
within one period. In what follows, we allow for multiple sources of heterogeneity (such as wages
and other factors) and we extend the model to multiple periods. This latter extension allows us
to capture the intertemporal nature of the DI application choice. In the context of our empirical
analysis below – which exploits an RSA increase from R to some higher age R+△ – it is obvious,
that the question “When should I apply?” becomes crucial. To address the DI application timing
in a meaningful way, a dynamic framework is needed.
Agents’ Choices and Social Welfare. Assume that the agent’s time horizon consists of T
periods, indexed by t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Denote by θi,t the disability shock, by χi,t a vector of other
shocks (such as wages/productivity and other factors) influencing the DI application choice, and
by Ai,t the level of financial assets available at the beginning of period t. Once the state vector
Xi,t = (θi,t, Ai,t, χi,t) is revealed, agent i decides whether to apply for DI, and if rejected, whether
to resume work or claim social welfare. The application and work decisions are based on knowledge
of Xi,t and expectations about future realizations of Xi,t+s, s = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1. Simultaneously
with the DI application choice, the agent decides how much to consume and save in period t.16
The decisions in period t determine Ai,t+1 and, together with realizations θi,t+1 and χi,t+1, form
the state vector Xt+1, on the basis of which the agent makes her t+ 1 choices, and so on.
The utilitarian government can freely chose DI policy parameters P = (θ∗0 , . . . , θ
∗
T−1; b0, . . . , bT−1)
and seeks to maximize the objective
max
P








16The within-period sequence of work and DI-application choices is just like the one of the static model, captured
in Figure 3.1. However, the general model also admits the possibility that θA ≥ θR, so that equation (3.1) is violated.
This might occur for agents with low wage realization and low DI acceptance probabilities.
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where W (P ) denotes social welfare under policy P ; Vi(P ) is the (expected) indirect lifetime utility
of agent i (who responds optimally to policy P ), λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government’s











(Wi,t · τi,t −Di,t · bi,t − Zi,t · zi,t)
]
di, (3.11)
where (Di,t,Wi,t, Zi,t) denote the probabilities that in period t agent i is on DI, at work or on
social welfare. In Appendix 3.B.2 we show that agent i’s indirect (expected) lifetime utility can
be written as
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i,t) as the consumption
levels in the various states, and Λi,t as the DI application indicator. The remaining lines are agent
i’s budget constraints associated with being on DI (second line), at work (third line), and on social





Stricter DI Eligibility Rules. We now explore the welfare effects of marginally changing
the strictness of DI eligibility rules θ∗s , while leaving all other elements of the DI policy vector
P = (θ∗0 , . . . , θ
∗
T−1; b0, . . . , bT−1) unchanged. Notice that this thought experiment is equivalent to
an RSA increase, the policy change we exploit below to empirically estimate the effect of stricter
DI eligibility rules. An RSA policy implies that θ∗t takes high values up until age R − 1 and falls
to lower values from age R onward. If the relaxed screening age is increased from age R = s to









E [LW ] + E [LZ ]
λ · E [M(θ∗s)]
, (3.13)
where the operator E [Y ] encompasses aggregation of the variable Yi,t across individuals, time
and states of nature.18 The left-hand-side is the fiscal multiplier of increasing θ∗s where E [M(θ
∗
s)]
denotes the mechanical fiscal effect and E [B(θ∗s)] is the behavioral fiscal effect. The right-hand
side, E [LW ] + E [LZ ] are the dynamic insurance losses arising from fewer agents being admitted
to the DI program in period s. Normalizing by the Lagrange multiplier λ (= the value to society
of relaxing the government budget constraint), yields the money-metric of these utility losses.
Notice the similarity of social optimality condition (3.13) of the general model with the social
optimality condition (3.6) of the simple static framework. In the simple framework of section
17Notice further that our analysis in the text studies the welfare effects of a marginal increase θ∗s while an RSA
policy typically implies a discrete change in θ∗t at the RSA. Assume that θ
∗
t = θ
H for ages t = 0, . . . , R − 1 and
θ∗t = θ
L < θH for ages t = R, . . . , T − 1. Then an increase in the RSA from R = s to R = s + 1 is associated
with a discrete change in θ∗s equal to △θ
∗
s = θ
H − θL. We discuss the welfare effects of a discrete change in θ∗ in
Appendix 3.B.1 for the static model and in Appendix 3.B.2 for the general model. Our empirical implementation of
the fiscal multiplier is robust to non-marginal changes. Kleven (2018b) discusses the issues when studying discrete
rather than marginal changes in benefit levels.




t=0 E(Yi,t)di with E(Yi,t) =
´
X(i,t) Y (i, t)dF (Xi,t).
87
2.1, agents differ only in θ and all actions happen within one period. In the general model, the
time horizon extends to T periods and agents differ in arbitrarily many dimensions.19 The key
difference in the dynamic model is that an increase in θ∗s – stricter DI eligibility rules at some age
s – does not only affect the DI inflow at that age s, but also at other ages. Moreover, because
DI is an absorbing state the mechanical effect of an increase in θ∗s persists at older ages. If
many applicants are screened out today, more applicants might reapply tomorrow. As a result,
E [M(θ∗s)] is mechanically spread out over the age window [s, T − 1]. It is instructive to formalize
the dynamic of the mechanical effect here. Let αi,k denote the application decision of individual i
at age k (αi,k = 1 if apply and 0 otherwise) and pi,k denote the DI award probability of individual




the award probabilities at all other ages unchanged. The mechanical effect at age s is then given
by










the change in the award probability
∂pi,s
∂θ∗s
times the population at risk αi,s
∏s−1
k=0 (1− αi,kpi,k)
(those who are not on DI already before age s (=
∏s−1
k=0 (1− αi,kpi,k)) and apply to DI at age s
(αi,s = 1)). This mechanical effect is persistent. At age s+1, E [Mi,s+1] = E [(1− αi,s+1pi,s+1)Mi,s]
fewer individuals are on DI because of the stricter screening at age s. The Mi,s rejected individuals
remain outside the DI program at age s+1 with probability (1− αi,s+1pi,s+1). This logic continues
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]
.
Therefore, the mechanical fiscal effect E [M(θ∗s)] can persist over multiple periods after s. The
behavioral fiscal effect E [B(θ∗s)] can occur in all periods, even before age s, as forward-looking
individuals might change their behavior already at younger ages. In Appendix 3.B.2, we make
explicit how E [B(θ∗s)] , E [M(θ
∗
s)], E [LW ] and E [LZ ] are determined. Our empirical analysis will
shed light on the dynamics and timing of these effects. In Section 3.4 we estimate how stricter
screening at a specific age affects fiscal costs, DI applications and labor market outcomes before
and after that age. In Section 3.6, we decompose the estimated fiscal costs into the behavioral and
mechanical fiscal effect and therefore provide direct evidence on how persistent the mechanical
fiscal effect is. In section 3.6 we also discuss how our empirical estimates map to the dynamic
model and can be used for welfare evaluation.
Lower DI Benefits. Alternatively, the DI reform may implement lower DI benefits. So let us
consider the welfare effects of a reduction in the DI benefit bs (while leaving DI benefits unchanged










λ · E [M(bs)]
, (3.14)
where E [B(bs)] and E [M(bs)] are the behavioral and mechanical fiscal effects of a marginal reduc-
tion of bs. Again, this looks very similar to the static model. Just like before, behavioral responses
to a reduction of bs occur in all periods. Mechanical responses occur at age s only (because we
consider lower benefits paid out at age s but unchanged benefits at all other ages).
The optimal policy mix is analogous to the static model. It is simply the ratio of the generalized
conditions (3.13) and (3.14) as we discuss in Appendix 3.B.2. Before turning to the empirical
analysis of changes in strictness of screening and benefit generosity we describe the institutional
background and data in the next section.
19In particular, the optimal DI formulas (3.13) and (3.14) let us calculate the welfare gains of DI reforms in a broad
set of stochastic dynamic environments, such as investments in health or human capital (that might accommodate
the disability and productivity shocks), borrowing constraints, spousal labor supply, home production, etc. In this
respect, the analysis of optimal DI does not differ from the the case of optimal UI studied in Chetty (2006).





3.3 Institutional Background and Data
Institutional Background. Like in many developed countries, Austria has three transfer pro-
grams that provide income replacement when separating from the labor market for economic or
health reasons: disability insurance (DI), sickness insurance (SI), and unemployment insurance
(UI). The DI program is financed by a payroll tax on earned income and provides partial earnings
replacement to workers below the full retirement age who have accumulated at least 5 insur-
ance years within the last 10 years. Insurance years include both contribution years (periods of
employment, including sick leave and maternity leave) and non-contribution years (periods of un-
employment, military service, or secondary education). The required insurance years increase by
one month for every two months above age 50 up to a maximum of 15 insurance years.21
To apply for DI benefits, an individual must submit an application to the local DI office.
Employees at the DI office first check whether the applicant is below the full retirement age
and meets the insurance years requirement. DI eligibility is not conditioned on earnings, so
applicants are not required to stop working in order to apply for benefits. In a second step, a
team of disability examiners and physicians assesses the severity of the medical impairment and
the applicant’s residual earnings capacity. An impairment is considered to be severe if it lasts
at least six months and limits the applicant’s mental or physical ability to engage in substantial
gainful activity.
The assessment of the applicant’s residual earnings capacity depends on work experience and
whether their age is below or above a relaxed screening age (RSA) threshold, currently set at age 60.
Applicants below the RSA threshold are awarded benefits if the earnings capacity has been reduced
to less than half of the earnings capacity of a healthy person in any reasonable occupation in the
economy the individual could be expected to carry out. Eligibility standards are less strict for semi-
skilled and skilled applicants below the RSA threshold, whose set of reasonable occupations is more
limited.22 Eligibility criteria are substantially relaxed for applicants above the RSA threshold who
have worked in a similar occupation for 10 years in the last 15 years, by changing the comparison
from a healthy worker in any reasonable occupation to a healthy worker in a similar occupation.
An occupation is considered similar if the following requirements are identical: manual and mental
demands, amount of responsibility, posture, concentration, endurance, required care, and stress
level (Wörister, 1999). Older applicants are therefore more likely to be awarded benefits, because
they are only compared to healthy workers in their occupation.23 The RSA was 57 in 2004, but
was increased in three one-year steps to 60 by 2017. In the empirical analysis, we exploit this
variation in the RSA to identify the labor market effects of stricter disability screening (section
3.4). Once benefits are awarded, DI beneficiaries receive monthly payments until their return to
work, medical recovery or death. DI benefits can be granted for a temporary period, but few
claimants (less than 4 percent) ever leave the DI rolls.
DI benefits are subject to income and payroll taxation and replace approximately 70 percent
of pre-disability net earnings up to a maximum of about e4,500 per month. The level of benefits
is calculated by multiplying a pension coefficient, which varies by age and insurance years, with an
assessment basis, which is the average indexed capped earnings over a given period of time (e.g.,
the best 16 years in 2004 at the beginning of our study period). Younger applicants with limited
work experience qualify for a special increment to supplement their benefits. DI beneficiaries
may continue work, but those earning more than an exempt threshold lose up to 50 percent of
their benefits.24 A pension reform in 2004 gradually decreased pension levels for most workers,
providing exogenous variation in benefit levels to identify the labor market effects of changes
benefit generosity (section 3.5).
21The insurance years requirement does not apply if the disability is job-related; for each occupation there exists
an explicit list of qualifying impairments.
22To be classified as semi-skilled or skilled, an applicant must have worked in a semi-skilled or skilled occupation
for 7.5 years or more in the most recent 15 years.
23Access to disability insurance is also relaxed in other countries at older ages, including Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Sweden until 1997 (Karlström et al., 2008), and the United States (Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008).
24Ruh and Staubli (2016) show that this policy induces DI beneficiaries to keep their earnings below the exempt
threshold in order to retain benefits.
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In case of a temporary illness, employers continue to pay 100% of earnings for up to 12 weeks.
Once the right to full benefits paid by the employer has expired, individuals may claim benefits
from the Austrian SI system. SI benefits replace approximately 65% of the last net wage up to the
same maximum that applies to DI benefits. Continued wage payments and SI benefits are both
subject to income taxation. The benefit duration is 52 weeks for individuals who have worked at
least 6 months in the previous 12 months, otherwise the duration is 26 weeks.
Regular UI benefits are a function of the wage on the last job and replace approximately 55
percent of the prior net wage subject to a minimum and maximum. The UI system is more
generous for older workers. Specifically, while job losers below age 50 receive at most 39 weeks of
regular UI benefits, job losers above age 50 can claim benefits for up to 52 weeks provided they
have paid UI contributions for at least 9 years in the last 15 years. Job losers who exhaust the
regular UI benefits can apply for “unemployment assistance” (UA). These means-tested transfers
last for an indefinite period and are about 70 percent of regular UI benefits.
Data. We merge data from two administrative registers. First, the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD) contains detailed longitudinal information for the universe of workers in Austria
between 1972 and 2018. At the individual level the data include gender, nationality, month and
year of birth, blue- or white-collar status, and labor market history. Labor histories are summarized
in spells; all employment, unemployment, disability, sick leave, and retirement spells are recorded.
Spells before 1972 are available for individuals who have claimed a public pension by the end
of 2008. The ASSD also contains some firm-specific information: geographic region, industry
affiliation, and firm identifiers that allow us to link both individuals and firms. See Zweimüller
et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the data. Second, we use data on all DI applications, which
cover the period 2004 to 2017 and contain detailed information on the date of the application, the
date of the decision, the decision itself (i.e. reject or accept), the reported medical impairment of
the applicant, and the stage of the application (i.e. first application, re-application, or appeal).
Starting from the population data set, we impose three restrictions. First, we exclude women
because their eligibility age for an old age pension gradually increased from age 56 to age 60 during
our observation window. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) show that this increase had sizeable em-
ployment and unemployment effects. Second, we exclude self-employed and civil service workers,
because they are covered by a different pension system than private-sector workers. Third, we
exclude observations in which individuals are over age 62, at which point many individuals become
eligible for an old age pension. Our sample covers more than three quarters of all active labor
market participants in Austria. Since we can observe complete work histories, we can precisely
calculate (1) how much DI benefits individuals would get at any point in time and (2) whether
individuals have sufficient work experience to apply for DI benefits under the relaxed eligibility
criteria above the RSA.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the “screening sample”, we use to study the effects of
stricter disability screening. To capture changes in labor market behavior around the RSA, we
limit the sample to men between age 54 and age 62 with at least 10 employment years in the past
15 years (measured at age 56). These men are considered eligible for relaxed screening, while men
with less than 10 employment years in the past 15 years are considered ineligible.25 We will use
the sample of ineligibles for placebo tests. Since our empirical strategy exploits increases in the
RSA from 57 to 58 and from 58 to 59, we distinguish between three cohorts of men: RSA 57, RSA
58, and RSA 59 who qualify for relaxed screening at age 57, age 58, and age 59, respectively. We
observe individuals on a quarterly basis.
Our first set of outcome variables focus on DI application behavior. Application ever is an
indicator for whether an individual has ever applied for DI benefits. Application yearly is an
indicator for whether an individual has applied for DI benefits at a particular age. We also distin-
25Note that only individuals who worked in a similar occupation for 10 of the last 15 years are eligible for relaxed
screening, while our definition is based on whether somebody has worked in any occupation for 10 years of the last
15 years because we can only observe industry affiliation and not occupation. This implies that the eligible sample
will include some individuals who are in fact not eligible for relaxed screening, but this number is likely small
because what constitutes a similar occupation is defined very broadly.
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guish yearly applications by the underlying health impairment (mental disorders, musculoskeletal
disorders, and other disorders) and whether the applications is a re-application, meaning that the
applicant has applied for DI before. The second set of outcome variables focus on labor market
outcomes. DI benefit receipt is an indicator for whether an individual is receiving DI benefits,
employment is indicator for whether an individual is employed, and other benefit receipt is an
indicator for whether the individual is receiving UI or SI benefits.26 In the empirical analysis, we
also calculate the benefit and earnings streams associated with each labor market status, allowing
us to study the fiscal effects of stricter disability screening. Finally, we have some information on
background characteristics, which we use to characterize individuals who, when screening becomes
stricter, are on the margin of applying (marginal applicants) and on the margin of being awarded
DI benefits (marginal enrollees).
Table 3.1: Summary statistics, screening sample
RSA 57 RSA 58 RSA 59
Application ever (%) 17.23 14.83 11.84
Application yearly (%) 4.66 3.96 3.54
w/ mental disorders 0.65 0.63 0.60
w/ musculoskeletal system 2.24 1.78 1.51
w/ other disorders (%) 1.78 1.56 1.44
Re-application yearly (%) 1.46 1.41 1.28
DI benefit receipt (%) 12.94 10.01 7.01
Employment ( %) 75.54 77.69 81.60
Other benefit receipt (%) 7.51 7.85 7.92
Avg. annual earnings (euro) 41,148 42,193 43,007
(10,743) (10,933) (10,956)
Insurance years by age 50 28.72 29.29 29.44
(7.02) (6.97) (6.78)
Employment years by age 50 13.87 13.93 13.95
(2.01) (1.99) (1.99)
Was on sick leave (%) 33.27 32.02 31.15
No. Observations 1,557,723 887,252 809,342
No. Individuals 49,418 28,144 29,245
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of men between age 54 and age 62. The RSA 57 cohort are men born between
December 1953 and November 1955, the RSA 58 cohort are men born between December 1955 and November 1956, and
the RSA 59 cohort are men born between December 1956 and November 1957.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for the “benefit generosity sample”, we use to study the
effects of changes in DI benefit levels. Following Mullen and Staubli (2016), we define a reference
date, January 1, and obtain all information to compute potential DI benefits and other relevant
individuals characteristics as of this date for each year an individual is not receiving DI benefits.
We estimate the effects separately for men who, on January 1, are 56-59 years old (they will
reach the RSA within a year) and 30-55 years old. Our main outcome variables of interest are
indicators for whether, within a year, individuals apply for DI (DI application yearly), are awarded
DI benefits (DI inflow), exit employment (employment outflow), or stop receiving UI or SI benefits
(other benefit outflow).
26DI spells are back-dated in the ASSD to the date the claim was filed, so an individual who applied for disability
benefits late in the calendar year and was awarded benefits in the next calendar year is observed to claim disability
benefits in the original calendar year.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics, benefit generosity sample
Age Groups
56-59 30-55
DI application yearly (%) 6.23 0.41
w/ mental disorders 0.44 0.07
w/ musculoskeletal system 1.86 0.06
w/ other disorders 3.93 0.28
DI inflow (%) 4.34 0.19
Employment outlfow (%) 2.01 0.03
Other benefits outflow (%) 2.33 0.16
Age (years) 57.35 39.96
(6.71) (2.62)




Last annual earnings (euro) 38,201 38,624
(20,556) (17,563)
Avg. annual earnings (euro) 37,216 42,472
(13,775) (13,796)
No. Observations 1,575,659 12,989,251
No. Individuals 215,348 1,421,953
Notes: Table presents summary statistics of men in our benefit generosity sample.
3.4 Impacts of Stricter Disability Screening
3.4.1 The 2013 reform
In April 2012, the Austrian government announced the 2. Stability Act (2. Stabilitätsgesetz),
which became effective on January 1, 2013. The Act had two primary objectives: reduce expendi-
tures in the public pension systems and foster employment among older workers. The only change
to the DI program was a step wise increase in the RSA threshold from age 57 to age 60. As Figure
3.5 shows, the RSA was increased to age 58 in January 2013, followed by further increases to age
59 in January 2015 and age 60 in January 2017. Individuals who had not worked in a similar
occupation for 10 years in the last 15 years were not affected by the increases as they were not
eligible for relaxed screening. We focus on the 2013 and 2015 changes, because the available data
preclude the analysis of the 2017 change.
The RSA increases create variation in disability screening stringency at certain ages across
birth cohorts. For example, the RSA is 58 for men who turn 57 in December 2012 or after (those
born after November 1955).27 We label this birth cohort the RSA 58 cohort. Conversely, the RSA
is 58 for men born before December 1955 and we label this cohort the RSA 57 cohort. Men in
the RSA 58 cohort, compared to men in the RSA 57 cohort, face stricter disability screening at
age 57. The RSA is 59 for men born after November 1956 and we therefore label this cohort the
RSA 59 cohort. Men in the RSA 59 cohort, compared to men in the RSA 57 cohort, face stricter
screening at ages 57 and 58.
27Applications are assessed using the rules in the month after filing. Therefore, if someone turns 57 in December
2012 and applies to DI his application is evaluated in January 2013, when the new RSA 58 applies.
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1/2011 1/2013 1/2015 1/2017
Calendar time
Notes: This figure displays the stepwise increase in the relaxed screening age (RSA) for DI benefits from age 57 to age 60,
as mandated by the 2012 2nd Stability Act.
Source: Austrian federal law (Bundesgesetzblatt) no. 35/2012.
Figure 3.6 provides descriptive evidence on the labor market effects of the RSA increases. We
plot the percent of 54 to 61 year old men receiving DI benefits, having ever applied for DI, working,
and receiving other benefits by birth cohort. For each variable, trends across birth cohorts are
remarkably similar until age 57 – the relaxed screening age for the RSA 57 cohort. At this age,
the DI recipient rate rises sharply in the RSA 57 cohort. The percent of DI applicants also
increases, suggesting that individuals are aware of the RSA and time their DI application to this
age. Conversely, the percent of men in the RSA 57 cohort who are employed or receive other
benefits drops at age 57, pointing to the role of DI as a substitute for UI or SI.
We observe similar breaks in trends when the RSA 58 and RSA 59 cohorts reach their RSA, but
interestingly cohorts with a higher RSA never catch up to cohorts with a lower RSA. For example,
the DI recipiency rate rises sharply at age 58 for the RSA 58 cohort, but it never reaches the level
of the RSA 57 cohort. A one year increase in the RSA changes labor market dynamics not only at
the age where disability screening becomes stricter, but also at higher ages. Our empirical strategy
is designed to separately identify the effect of the RSA at the ages where screening becomes stricter
as well as at higher ages where screening is relaxed.
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy exploits the exogenous variation in the RSA threshold across birth
cohorts using a difference-in-differences design. Older birth cohorts are eligible for relaxed screen-
ing already at age 57, while younger birth cohorts only become eligible at age 58 or age 59. Thus,
we can identify the effect of stricter screening by comparing the age profiles of younger and older
birth cohorts. This comparison can be implemented by estimating regressions of the following
type:
yit = α+ θa + πc + λt +
61∑
k=54\56
βkI[age = k] +X
′
itδ + εit, (3.15)
where i denotes individual, t year-quarter, c birth cohort; yict is the outcome variable of interest
(such as an indicator for having ever applied for DI, an indicator for receiving DI benefits, and
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Figure 3.6: Labor market states and DI applications by age and RSA for men
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Notes: The figure shows trends in DI receipt, DI application levels (measuring whether somebody has ever applied for DI),
employment, and other benefit receipt by age and RSA.
labor supply measures such an indicator for working), θa are dummies for age in years to control for
age-specific levels in the outcome variable, πc are dummies for year-month of birth to capture time-
constant differences across birth cohorts, λt are dummies for year and quarter to capture common
time shocks and seasonal effects, and Xict represent individual or region specific characteristics
to control for any observable differences that might confound the analysis. We cluster standard
errors at the year-month of birth.
The key variables of interest are the indicators I[age = k], which are equal to one if an
individual’s age is equal to k, where k runs from 54 to 61 using k = 56 as the reference age.
Each βk-coefficient measures the average causal effect of an RSA increase at age k. To obtain
the average effect of an RSA increase over a wider age interval, we can simply take the average of
different βk-coefficients. For example,
∑61
k=57 βk/5 measures the average change in the outcome
variable at each age in the age interval 57 to 61.
We estimate the effects of the RSA 58 and RSA 59 change separately, using always the RSA
57 cohort as the control group. This way we can compare whether an increase in the RSA by one
year (from 57 to 58) has similar effects as an increase in the RSA by two years (from 57 to 59).
Another reason to estimate the effects separately is that, compared to the RSA 58 cohort, men in
the RSA 59 cohort have more time to adjust to the reform. They just turned 55 years old when
the reform was announced, while men in the RSA 58 cohort were almost 57 years old. Having
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more time to adjust increases the scope for anticipation effect: changes in behavior even before
age 57.
The identification assumption is that, absent the increase in the RSA, the change in yit at
a certain age would have been comparable between birth cohorts who are eligible for relaxed
screening and those not yet eligible. A potential concern is that age-specific trends in the outcome
variable could be changing across birth cohorts for reasons unrelated to the RSA increases. The
estimated βk-coefficients for k < 57 provide placebo checks for spurious trends. They should not
be statistically significant if the identification assumption hold, although they could also pick up
anticipation effects. As an additional placebo check, we estimate equation (3.15) for men who at
age 56 have worked less than 10 years in the past 15 years and are therefor not eligible for relaxed
DI screening. They should not respond to the changes in the RSA.
3.4.3 Main Results
Figure 3.7 shows the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for the RSA 58 and the
RSA 59 increases for four key outcomes. The shaded area denotes the 95 percent confidence
interval. In all graphs, we see that the estimates before age 57, the pre-reform RSA, are close to
zero and statistically insignificant, providing evidence that the estimates are not confounded by
differential trends across birth cohorts.
As panel (a) shows, because of the increases in the RSA, fewer men receive DI benefits between
age 57 and age 61. At age 57, DI recipiency rates drop by about 4 percentage points for the RSA
58 and RSA 59 cohorts relative to the RSA 57 cohort. For the RSA 58 cohort, DI recipiency
rate remains lower after age 57, even though disability screening is now relaxed. For the RSA
59 cohort, the DI recipiency rate declines further at age 58, because they only qualify for relaxed
screening at age 59, but even at age 59 (and age 60) the DI recipiency rate remains lower.
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Figure 3.7: Effects of RSA on labor market states and DI applications by age
(a) DI benefit receipt
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for the RSA 58 and the RSA 59 increases for
four key outcomes. The shaded area denotes the 95 percent confidence interval.
96
Panel (b) documents that fewer men in the RSA 58 and RSA 59 cohorts apply for DI benefits
after age 56, particularly for the RSA 59 cohort. A drop in applications provides evidence con-
sistent with applications for DI being costly. Paying the application cost becomes less attractive
once disability screening becomes stricter. For the RSA 58 cohort, we observe that the decline in
application rates persists even after they become eligible for relaxed screening. For the RSA 59
cohort, we cannot examine application rates after they reach their RSA, because our data end at
age 59.
Panels (c) and (d) shows that stricter disability screening increases employment and other
benefit receipt above age 56 for the RSA 58 and RSA 59 cohorts. The expansion in employment
persists until the last age, where we can observe these cohorts, and is about twice as large for the
RSA 59 cohort compared to the RSA 58 cohort. The rise in other benefit receipt is temporary for
the RSA 58 cohort and vanishes completely after age 59, while it persists up to the last age for
the RSA 59 cohort.
The timing and dynamics of these estimates directly relate to the discussion of the dynamic
effects in the model from Section 3.2.2 in three ways. First, we find no evidence for forward-
looking anticipation effects (changes in behavior before age 57). For the RSA 58 cohort this is
not surprising because they learned about the reform just a couple months before they turn 57.
However, the RSA 59 cohort knew about the reform 2 years before turning 57 and had time to
adjust. Nevertheless, all estimates before age 57 are close to zero and insignificant. Second, DI
applications fall at age 57 implying that individuals are aware of this policy and adjust their
behavior. If the estimated effects were purely mechanical, the applications should no react at
age 57. Third, it is interesting how persistent the effects are. DI levels are permanently lower
by around 2 pp and employment rates are 2 pp higher for the RSA 58 cohort. The question is
whether this is due to permanent changes in behavior or the persistence of the mechanical effect.
Section 3.6 will shed light on this by estimating the mechanical effect directly.
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Figure 3.8: Effects of RSA on DI benefit receipt and DI applications by age, non-eligibles
(a) DI benefit receipt
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for the RSA 58 and the RSA 59 increases for
individuals not affected by the policy change because they have too little work experience to qualify for relaxed screening.
Finding no significant effects for ineligible men provides strong support that our main estimates are not confounded by
differential trends across birth cohorts.
In Figure 3.8, we plot the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for men with too little
work experience to be eligible for relaxed screening. We find that DI benefit recipiency and DI
applications do not differ significantly across birth cohorts, even after age 56. As Appendix Figure
3.12 shows, we also find that employment and other benefit do not differ across birth cohorts.
Finding no significant effects for ineligible men provides strong support that our main estimates
are not confounded by differential trends across birth cohorts.
A useful way to summarize the effects of stricter screening is by taking the average of the
βk-coefficients after age 56 (since point estimates are insignificant before age 57). We report these
estimates in Table 3.3 for the RSA 58 and RSA 59 increases, distinguishing between men who are
and are not eligible for relaxed screening. The estimates capture the average effect between age
57 and age 61 for the RSA 58 increase and between age 57 and age 60 for the RSA 59 increase.28
28While the effects are still visible at age 61 for RSA 58 and age 60 for RSA 59, these effects should disappear
at age 62 when most men in Austria retire (see Figure 3.13 in the Appendix). We can estimate the effect of RSA
58 and RSA 59 up to age 62 if we assume that the RSA increases have the same effect until age 62 as at the last
age, we currently observe in the data. This assumption is reasonable because the effects stabilize after age 58 as
Figure 3.7 shows. Appendix Table 3.8 shows the corresponding average effects up to age 62. They are statistically
indistinguishable from the estimates in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Average effect of stricter screening
Eligible Non-eligible
2013 2015 2013 2015
Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean
A. Labor market effects (%)
DI benefit receipt -2.54⋆⋆⋆ 18.56 -4.82⋆⋆⋆ 17.3 -0.40 38.17 -0.91⋆⋆ 37.52
(0.44) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39)
Application ever -1.19⋆⋆⋆ 21.81 -2.67⋆⋆⋆ 20.29 -0.16 38.61 -0.1 37.89
(0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34)
Employment 1.85⋆⋆⋆ 68.36 3.01⋆⋆⋆ 71.59 0.32 14.34 0.2 14.73
(0.39) (0.39) (0.3) (0.33)
Other benefit receipt 0.94⋆⋆⋆ 7.55 2.26⋆⋆⋆ 7.30 -0.01 19.8 0.49 20.08
(0.25) (0.27) (0.38) (0.39)
B. Fiscal effects (euro)
DI benefits -884⋆⋆⋆ 6756 -1727⋆⋆⋆ 6245 -115 11012 -395⋆⋆⋆ 10721
(A) (161) (150) (120) (113)
Tax revenue 263⋆⋆⋆ 11185 407⋆⋆⋆ 11625 16 1582 -10 1608
(B) (56) (59) (33) (35)
Other benefits 172⋆⋆⋆ 1217 448⋆⋆⋆ 1182 -5 2233 89 2277
(C) (46) (57) (55) (62)
Total fiscal effect -976⋆⋆⋆ -3213 -1686⋆⋆⋆ -4199 -135 11663 -297⋆⋆⋆ 11389
(A-B+C) (185) (176) (115) (113)
No. Observations 2,444,975 2,176,311 916,207 806,100
Notes: Tabe presents average effect of the RSA for the ages above the RSA. The estimates are constructed by summing
up all the βk-coefficients from equation 3.15 for k ≥ 57 and dividing by the number of years above the RSA.
The exception are DI applications, which we can only track up to age 60 for the RSA 58 increase
and up to age 59 for the RSA 59 increase.
Concerning the labor market effects (Panel A), we find that the share of men in the RSA 58
cohort receiving DI benefits declines by 2.54 percentage points, or about 14 percent relative to the
mean above the RSA. Men in the RSA 58 cohort are also less likely to apply for DI, but the decline
is only half as large as the decline in DI benefit receipt. Most men in the RSA 58 cohort who are
screened out of the DI program continue to work: the average employment rate increases by 1.85
percentage points. But benefit substitution is also important: other benefit receipt increases by
0.94 percentage points. The RSA 59 cohort experiences similar changes in labor market outcomes
as the RSA 58 cohort, but the effects are about twice as large. The larger effects for the RSA 59
cohort makes sense, because their RSA increases by two years as opposed to one year. On the
other hand, we find that men who are not eligible for relaxed screening barely change their labor
market behavior. The DI recipiency rate declines among non-eligible men in the RSA 59 cohort,
but the reduction is about five times smaller compared to eligible men and likely reflects that some
non-eligible men become eligible for relaxed screening as they get older.
Panel B reports the fiscal effect of RSA 58 and RSA 59 increases. Theses estimates are crucial
for assessing the welfare effects of stricter screening. We focus on four outcomes: DI benefits, tax
revenue, other benefits, and the total fiscal effect, which is simply the sum of benefits received
minus taxes paid. We calculate these outcomes on an individual basis, multiplying at each age the
number of days an individual spends in a given labor market state times the daily benefit received
or taxes paid in that state. We then estimate equation (3.15) for each outcome separately and
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average the βk-coefficients above age 56. Appendix Figure 3.15 plots the estimated βk-coefficients.
They are close to zero and statistically insignificant before age 57, while they are statistically
different from zero after age 56.
We find that the stricter screening lessens spending on DI benefits and raises tax revenue from
increased work activity, but also raises spending on other benefits because of benefit substitution.
The reduction in DI benefits for RSA 58 is 884 euro per individual, which in absolute value is
about three times larger than the increase in tax revenue (263 euro) and five times larger than the
increase in other benefits (172 euro). Overall, we find that the total fiscal cost at each age above
56 declines by 976 euro per individuals. For the RSA 59 increase, we find that the estimates are
about twice as large among men eligible for relaxed screening, while they are small and mostly
insignificant for men not eligible for relaxed screening.
3.4.4 Complier Analysis
In this section, we apply the complier analysis method for difference-in-differences settings to
study the characteristics of marginal applicants and enrollees whose behavior is affected by stricter
screening (Imbens and Rubin (1997); Abadie (2003); Jäger et al. (2019)). We compare the average
of a specific characteristic, for example average earnings at age 56, among individuals who apply
or enroll when screening is relaxed to those who apply or enroll when screening is strict. The
differences in the average characteristics uncover how marginal applicants or enrollees who apply
or enroll only when screening is relaxed differ from always applicants or enrollees who apply or
enroll even when screening is strict. We can also compare average characteristics of marginal
applicants or enrollees to those of never applicants or enrollees who do not apply or enroll even
when screening is relaxed.29
Table 3.4 shows the population shares and average characteristics of marginal applicants and
enrollees, always applicants and enrollees, and never applicants and enrollees for the RSA 58.
Appendix Table 3.10 shows analogous results for the RSA 59 change; they resemble qualitatively
the results for the RSA 58 change. Marginal applicants are less likely to be on sick leave at
age 56 than always applicants, but more likely than never applicants. Whether somebody is
on sick leave or not is a good proxy for the underlying health status. Marginal applicants also
have less labor market attachment than never applicants, but more than always applicants. For
example, 73 percent of marginal applicants are employed at age 56, compared to 60 percents of
always applicants and 87 percent of never applicants. Compared to always and never applicants,
marginal applicants are also more likely to be blue-collar workers, consistent with low-skilled
workers experiencing the largest relaxation in disability screening. They are more likely to apply
with a musculoskeletal impairment, consistent with the RSA targeting older workers.
We see similar patterns when comparing marginal enrollees to always and never enrollees.
Marginal enrollees are more likely to work in blue-collar jobs and to apply with a musculoskeletal
impairment. They are also in better health, as proxied by sick leave at age 56, than always
enrollees, but in worse health than never enrollees. To better understand who is screened out
when screening becomes stricter, we can compare characteristics of marginal enrollees and marginal
applicants.30 This comparison reveals that marginal enrollees have less labor market attachment,
have lower earnings, and are less healthy than marginal applicants, implying that stricter screening
screens out marginal applicants whose work capacity is likely higher.
3.5 Impact of Benefit Generosity
The ideal experiment to analyze the impact of a change benefit generosity would be to ran-
domize the level of DI benefits across individuals. We emulate this ideal experiment with a
29Appendix 3.C provides a detailed discussion of how we implement the complier analysis in our setting.
30Appendix Figures 3.20 and 3.21 graphically illustrate differences between marginal applicants and enrollees as
well as between always applicants and enrollees.
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Table 3.4: Applicant and enrollee characteristics, RSA 58
Marginal (M) Always (A) Difference Never Difference
M-A M-N
A. Applicants
Share in population 1.44∗∗∗ 7.00∗∗∗ -5.56∗∗∗ 91.56∗∗∗ -90.13∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.22) (0.06) (0.17)
Sick Leave at age 56 (%) 1.00 9.63∗∗∗ -8.63∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ -0.03
(1.87) (0.30) (2.11) (0.02) (1.87)
Unemployed at age 56 (%) 21.02∗∗∗ 26.02∗∗∗ -5.00 4.91∗∗∗ 16.11∗∗∗
(3.38) (0.59) (3.89) (0.04) (3.38)
Employed at age 56 (%) 72.94∗∗∗ 60.29∗∗∗ 12.65∗∗∗ 86.57∗∗∗ -13.64∗∗∗
(3.85) (0.65) (4.39) (0.07) (3.85)
Avg. annual earnings (euro) 41,183∗∗∗ 40,894∗∗∗ 289 46,074∗∗∗ -4,891∗∗∗
(791) (146) (918) (27) (792)
Blue-collar (%) 93.26∗∗∗ 81.35∗∗∗ 11.91∗∗∗ 55.29∗∗∗ 37.98∗∗∗
(3.59) (0.63) (4.12) (0.12) (3.60)
Musculoskeletal (%) 59.52∗∗∗ 43.89∗∗∗ 15.63∗∗∗
(4.57) (0.77) (5.23)
Mental (%) 15.27∗∗∗ 14.28∗∗∗ 0.99
(3.44) (0.64) (4.02)
Other (%) 25.21∗∗∗ 41.83∗∗∗ -16.62∗∗∗
(4.66) (0.77) (5.33)
B. Enrollees
Share in population 3.84∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 94.49∗∗∗ -90.65∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11)
Sick Leave at age 56 (%) 10.78∗∗∗ 15.9∗∗∗ -5.18∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 9.77∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.63) (0.92) (0.01) (0.40)
Unemployed at age 56 (%) 36.13∗∗∗ 23.05∗∗∗ 13.07∗∗∗ 5.13∗∗∗ 31.00∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.88) (1.39) (0.04) (0.71)
Employed at age 56 (%) 49.41∗∗∗ 57.37∗∗∗ -7.96∗∗∗ 86.44∗∗∗ -37.03∗∗∗
(0.74) (0.99) (1.54) (0.07) (0.74)
Avg. annual earnings (euro) 40,639∗∗∗ 41,433∗∗∗ -794∗ 45,919∗∗∗ -5,280∗∗∗
(177) (321) (467) (25) (179)
Blue-collar (%) 88.12∗∗∗ 77.20∗∗∗ 10.91∗∗∗ 56.07∗∗∗ 32.04∗∗∗
(0.81) (1.40) (2.07) (0.11) (0.81)
Musculoskeletal (%) 56.40∗∗∗ 28.83∗∗∗ 27.57∗∗∗
(0.98) (1.43) (2.17)
Mental (%) 6.96∗∗∗ 23.46∗∗∗ -16.50∗∗∗
(0.78) (1.47) (2.14)
Other (%) 35.43∗∗∗ 46.26∗∗∗ -10.83∗∗∗
(1.02) (1.69) (2.53)
Notes: Tabe presents the population shares and average characteristics of marginal applicants and enrollees, always
applicants and enrollees, and never applicants and enrollees for the RSA 58.
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quasi-experimental research design that exploits variation in DI benefits from a large pension re-
form. Our approach follows Mullen and Staubli (2016) who estimate the elasticity of DI claiming
with respect to benefit generosity using variation in DI benefits in Austria from several reforms
between 1987 and 2010. We differ from their study in two aspects: First, we update their estimates
for a more recent time period (2004 to 2017). This period is characterized by lower replacement
rates and stricter disability screening compared to the 1980s and 1990s, which could affect the
responsiveness of DI claiming and applications to benefit levels. Second, we study the effect of
benefit generosity on a novel set of outcomes, including employment, other benefit receipt, and
fiscal costs, which are key for assessing the welfare effects of a change in benefit generosity.
3.5.1 The 2003 Pension Reform
In January 2004, the Austrian government implemented several changes to the calculation of
DI benefits as part of a larger reform (Pensionsreform 2003). These changes reduced the potential
benefit level for most individuals, although individuals with limited work history experienced an
increase in the potential benefit level. Before the reform they qualified for a special supplement
to their benefits if they were below age 56. The reform gradually increased the age limit for the
special supplement to age 60 between 2004 and 2010. Over the same time, the reform phased in
a reduction in the pension coefficient and an increase in the penalty for claiming benefits before
the normal retirement age (age 65 for men and age 60 for women).31 The reform also gradually
increased the length of the assessment basis from 16 years to 40 years by 2028. The large scale
reduction in benefits was heavily criticized by the public. In response to the backlash, the Austrian
government passed legislation in 2005, limiting the maximum benefit reduction to five percent of
the projected pre-reform benefits. The maximum benefit reduction was then increased by 0.25
percent each year; in 2017 it was equal to 8.25 percent of pre-reform benefits.
3.5.2 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we describe how we isolate the variation in benefit levels stemming from the
2003 pension reform to estimate the causal effect of benefit generosity. We are interested in
estimating the following regression:
yit = α+X
′
itβ + γbit(Zit) + λt + εit, (3.16)
where i denotes individual, t year, yit is the outcome variable of interest such as applying for
DI, Xit is a vector of demographic and labor market characteristics, bt(Zit) are log potential DI
benefits which are a function of labor market characteristics Zit ∈ Xit (e.g. age, insurance years,
and the assessment basis), λt are year fixed effects, and εit are any unobserved factors affecting
the outcome such as taste for work. The parameter of interest is γ which measures the average
effect of a change in benefit levels on the outcome variable.
As Mullen and Staubli (2016) discuss, if b is a linear function of Zit, we cannot separately
identify γ and β because no variation is left in b after controlling for Zit. If γ is a non-linear function
of Zit, we can identify γ as long as sufficient residual variation is left in b after controlling for Zit.
32
A drawback of this identification strategy is that it relies heavily on functional form (Bound (1989))
. This problem can be solved by exploiting the 2003 reform because it creates variation in b that is
independent from Zit. Intuitively, with the policy reform we observe individuals with similar Zit
but different benefits b. This approach is akin to a difference-in-differences estimation strategy,
31Before the reform each insurance year increased the pension coefficient by 2 percentage points, while each
year of claiming before the full retirement age reduced the pension coefficient by 3 percentage points (capped at
a maximum of 10.5 percentage points or 15 percent of the pre-penalty pension coefficient, whichever is lower).
The reform gradually reduced the pension coefficient adjustment for each insurance year from 2 to 1.78 percentage
points between 2004 and 2009 and changed the penalty for each year of early claiming to 4.2 percent of the pension
coefficient (capped at 15 percent of the full pension).
32For example, if we control for Zit in a very flexible way by including polynomials or other transformations of
Zit,γ may not be identified because potential benefits are collinear with Zit.
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where identification is obtained by relating individuals’ differential response to their differential
change in benefit levels stemming from the policy reform.33
Mullen and Staubli (2016) show that the policy-induced variation in b can be isolated by
including the individual-specific (log) hypothetical benefits under each policy regime as additional
controls in equation (3.16). Due to the phased-in nature of the 2004 policy reform, we have 14
different hypothetical benefits for each year from 2004 to 2017:
yit = α+X
′
itβ + γbit(Zit) +
14∑
r=2
δrbr(Zit) + λt + εit, (3.17)
where br(Zit) denotes hypothetical DI benefits under the policy regime r. By controlling for
hypothetical DI benefits, we guarantee that actual potential benefits are uncorrelated with any
unobservable factors affecting the outcome variable, so that γ identifies the causal effect of DI
benefits. We cluster standard errors at the year-month of birth.
3.5.3 Empirical Results
Our main results are summarized in Table 3.5 with Panel A providing estimates of equation
(3.17) for labor market outcomes and Panel B displaying analogous estimates for fiscal outcomes,
which serve as inputs for the fiscal multiplier. Panel A indicates that an increase in benefit levels
increases the propensity of applying for DI benefits. The additional DI inflow comes from outflow
of other welfare benefits and we find no employment effect. For the age group 30-55 the effects
are much smaller in absolute size but disability is also much less prevalent in this age group. In
relative terms, we find comparable effects. For the age group 30-55 the inflow effect is around one
third of the application effect, while it is around one half for the age group 56-59. This is likely
driven by the higher award rates for 56-59 agegroup because of the RSA at 57. Panel B shows the
corresponding fiscal effects.
3.6 Estimating the Fiscal Multiplier of DI Re-
forms
The purpose of this section is to estimate the quantitative magnitude of the fiscal multiplier
resulting from DI policy reforms. As we argued above, this is of crucial interest. The fiscal
multiplier gives us a critical benchmark for welfare analysis. If a DI reform (that tightens DI
eligibility rules or cuts DI benefits) generates a fiscal multiplier of 2, then taking away one dollar
from DI recipients (absent any behavioral responses) needs to generate an insurance loss of more
than 2 dollars to make the reform welfare-reducing. That is, one dollar in the hands of affected
DI recipients must have a social value of at least 2 dollars. In the following we estimate the fiscal
multiplier of stricter screening and reducing benefit generosity.
Fiscal Multiplier of Increasing RSA. Increasing the RSA by one year, from age 57 to 58,
corresponds to increasing the strictness of screening at age 57. To assess the welfare effect of this
policy change we need to implement inequality (3.13) and therefore identify the fiscal multiplier
(lhs) and the loss in insurance value (rhs). We focus here on the fiscal multiplier and discuss
in Appendix 3.D how we can put an number on the insurance value. For the fiscal multiplier
we need to decompose the fiscal cost effect into the mechanical and behavioral fiscal effect. For
this decomposition our strategy is to estimate the mechanical fiscal effect and then back out the
behavioral fiscal effect as the residual of the total fiscal cost effect, which we estimated in Section
3.4, and the mechanical fiscal effect.
33This approach has been used by Fevang et al. (2017) to estimate the effect of temporary disability insurance
benefits on the duration of temporary disability insurance spells using policy variation in Norway and Nielsen et al.
(2010) to estimate the response of college enrollment to changes in student aid using a Danish reform.
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Table 3.5: Average effect of benefit generosity
Ages 56-59 Ages 30-55
Estimate Mean Estimate Mean
A. Labor market effects (%)
DI application 0.171⋆⋆⋆ 26.71 0.014⋆⋆⋆ 1.66
(0.019) (0.003)
DI inflow 0.093⋆⋆⋆ 18.68 0.003⋆⋆⋆ 1.22
(0.015) (0.001)
Employment outflow -0.004 71.43 <0.001 89.24
(0.011) (0.001)
Other benefits outflow 0.097⋆⋆⋆ 9.89 0.003⋆⋆⋆ 9.54
(0.012) (0.001)
B. Fiscal effects (euro)
DI benefits 36.95⋆⋆⋆ 4,516 2.26⋆⋆⋆ 324
(A) (3.16) (0.26)
Payroll taxes -2.37⋆⋆⋆ 9,915 -0.19⋆⋆⋆ 10,322
(B) (1.12) (0.07)
Other benefits -20.62⋆⋆⋆ 1,944 -1.27⋆⋆⋆ 1,630
(C) (2.33) (0.24)
Behavioral fiscal effect 18.69⋆⋆⋆ -3,455 1.18⋆⋆⋆ -8,368
(D=A-B+C) (3.14) (0.18)
Observations 1,453,448 15,968,003
Notes: This Table presents the estimates of regression (3.17).
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Estimating the mechanical fiscal effect of stricter screening is not straightforward. As we
discussed in Section 3.2.2, the mechanical fiscal effect spreads over multiple periods and de-
pends on the mechanical change in the award rate and the labor market behavior of rejected
individuals. These are two counterfactuals we do not directly observe empirically. Theoreti-
cally, the mechanical fiscal effect is driven by always applicants.34 If we could directly classify
individuals as always-, marginal and never applicants, we would be able to apply our difference-
in-difference strategy in the subgroup of always applicants and directly identify the fiscal effect
in this group E [∆G|always applicants]. Rescaling this effect by the share of always applicants
πAA, which we estimated in Section 3.4, yields the mechanical fiscal effect in the population
E [M(θ∗57)] = π
AA
E [∆G|always applicants].35 However, we cannot directly classify individuals as
always-, marginal and never applicants.36 Therefore, we construct a counterfactual group for the
always applicants and apply our difference-in-difference strategy in this counterfactual group. Our
counterfactual group for the always applicants are individuals who apply to DI between age 50
and 56. In this age window both treatment and control cohorts face the strict screening standard
and hence are always applicants at that age. We refer to this group as the counterfactual always
applicants. Some of these counterfactual always applicants get on DI, some are rejected and reap-
ply at age 57. At age 57, the treatment cohort is still under the strict regime while the control
cohort faces the lenient standard which allows us to estimate the fiscal cost effect in this subgroup.
We use the same approach to estimate the mechanical effect of the RSA 59 change.
The key question is whether this subgroup provides a good counterfactual for the always
applicants. We think this is the case for two main reasons. First, always applicants should
not change their application behavior in response to stricter screening at age 57. Figure 3.9
plots the difference-in-difference estimates for DI applications and DI inflow for the counterfactual
always applicants. Panel (a) shows that there is no application response in our counterfactual
group at age 57. At age 58 there is an increased number of applications because at age 57
more applicants are rejected, as shown by the DI inflow effect in Panel (b), and the rejected
applicants reapply at age 58. For the RSA 58 cohort there is an increase in DI inflow, because
more individuals apply and screening is again lenient. For the RSA 59 group, the strong increase
in DI inflow is at age 59 when they again face the lenient rules. Hence, the application and
DI inflow patterns of the counterfactual always applicants look exactly as one would expect for
always applicants. Second, we can directly compare the outcomes after the application at age
57 of the counterfactual always applicants to the always applicants. Applicants at age 57 under
the strict rules are always applicants (Hence, applicants at age 57 in the treatment cohort are
always applicants). In Figure 3.10 panel (a) and (b) we compare DI benefit receipt and net fiscal
expenditures of always applicants (those from the treatment cohort who apply at age 57 for the
first time, blue line) to the counterfactual always applicants (those from the treatment cohort who
applied already between age 50-56 and reapply at age 57, red line). After date 0, the application
date at age 57, DI benefit receipt and net fiscal expenditures of the two groups are very similar and
3 quarters after the application the two lines are not statistically significantly different. Before date
0 the counterfactual always applicants and always applicants show very different patterns. This is
natural as the counterfactual always applicants already applied to DI before date 0 while the always
applicants have not. Figure 3.10 therefore shows that under the strict rules our counterfactual
34We make the explicit link between always applicants and the mechanical fiscal effect in the discussion of
non-marginal changes in Appendix 3.B.1 and 3.B.2.
35In the model’s notation: The estimate of the fiscal effect in the group
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36DI applicants at age 57 in the treatment group are always applicants as they face the strict rules. The
applicants at age 57 in the control group are a mix of always and marginal applicants. Based on this we can
determine the share of marginal and always applicants and their pre-treatment characteristics as in Section 3.4.
We cannot directly characterize how treatment (stricter screening) affects outcomes within these groups because
treatment affects the composition of treatment and control group as well as their (labor market) outcomes.
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group shows the same patterns as the always applicants after an application at age 57. This is
reassuring that our counterfactual group provides a good approximation of always applicants.
Figure 3.9: DI application and inflow effects for always applicants
(a) Applications
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for the RSA 58 and the RSA 59 counterfactual
group of always applicants for DI applications and DI inflow.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of Always Applicants (AA) and Counterfactual AA
(a) DI benefits
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(b) Net fiscal effect
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Notes: The figure compares the counterfactual always applicants (red line) to the always applicants (blue line) in the
treatment group. The overlap of the two lines after an application at age 57 (date 0) suggests that the counterfactual
always applicants are indeed comparable in outcomes to always applicants.
Within this group of counterfactual always applicants we exploit the difference-in-difference
strategy from section 3.4. Figure 3.11 plots the difference-in-difference estimates by age for labor
market outcomes and the net fiscal effect. Figure 3.11 provides empirical evidence on the persis-
tence of the mechanical effect (as theoretically discussed in Section 3.2.2). For the RSA 58 cohort,
DI benefit receipt significantly drops at age 57 and then steadily catches up and is at age 59/60
back to the level of the cohort with lenient screening at age 57. Interestingly, the always applicants
have a small employment effect at age 57 that vanishes afterwards. Most individuals substitute
to other welfare benefits. This implies that the permanent changes in employment and disability
receipt in the population in Figure 3.7 must be driven by behavioral changes and are not due to a
persistent mechanical effect. We see similar patterns for the RSA 59 cohort. There the mechanical
effect persists for 2 years and then starts to disappear, exactly as one would expect.
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Figure 3.11: Mechanical effects of RSA on labor market states and fiscal revenue
(a) DI benefit receipt
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(d) Net fiscal effect
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated βk-coefficients from equation (3.15) for the RSA 58 and the RSA 59 increases for
the counterfactual always applicants.
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Table 3.6: Fiscal multiplier for screening
2013 2015
Estimate Percent Estimate Percent
Total fiscal effect 976 1,686
Mechanical fiscal effect (M) 391 40% 823 49%
Behavioral fiscal effect (B) 585 60% 863 51%
Fiscal multiplier (1+B/M) 2.50 2.05
Notes: Tabe presents average effect of the RSA for the ages above the RSA and decomposes the total fiscal effect into the
behavioral and mechanical fiscal effect.
Table 3.6 presents the decomposition of the fiscal effect into behavioral and mechanical fiscal
effect. Table 3.6 shows that for a one year increase in the RSA the net fiscal effect of always
applicants is E [∆G|always applicants] =5,585 Euro.37 Multiplying this by the share of always
applicants from Table 3.4, πAA = 0.07, yields the mechanical fiscal effect of 391 Euros. The
behavioral fiscal effect is calculated as the difference between the fiscal cost effect from Table 3.3,
976 Euros, and the mechanical fiscal effect. This decomposition implies a fiscal multiplier of 2.5.
For the two year increase in the RSA from 57 to 59 we find a multiplier of 2.05.
The multiplier has to be compared to the insurance value to assess the welfare effect of the
reform. The insurance value measures the social value of one dollar in the hands of the mechanically
screened out DI applicants. Hence, increasing the RSA by one year (two years) is welfare increasing
if 1 dollar in the hands of affected DI recipients has a social value of less than 2.5 dollars (2.05
dollars). The fiscal multiplier therefore is the evaluation benchmark for the insurance value. The
major empirical innovation of this paper is to shed light on the fiscal multiplier of stricter screening.
Nevertheless, we also discuss in Appendix 3.D how we can put a number on the insurance value.
Using bounds and assuming CRRA utility we find that increasing the RSA by one or two years is
welfare improving if risk aversion is below 2.
Fiscal Multiplier of Reducing Benefit Generosity. In section 3.5, we estimate the behav-
ioral fiscal effect of increasing benefit generosity by one percent for different age windows (Table
3.5). To determine the fiscal multiplier in Table 3.7 we additionally need the mechanical fiscal
effect. For changes in benefit levels it is straightforward to calculate the mechanical fiscal effect.
The mechanical fiscal effect of a one percent reduction in DI benefits is simply one percent of
the pre-reform mean of DI benefit expenditures (0.01 · 4, 516 = 45.16 for 56-59 year olds and
0.01 · 324 = 3.24 for 30-55 year olds). The total fiscal effect in Table 3.7 is then the sum of be-
havioral and mechanical fiscal effect. For reducing the benefit generosity we find fiscal multipliers
of 1.41 and 1.36 for the age groups 56-59 and 30-55 respectively. For welfare evaluation the fiscal
multiplier has again to be compared against the insurance value. In Appendix 3.D we provide an
approach to estimate the insurance value. With this approach we find that DI benefits are optimal
for values of risk aversion around 1.
Screening vs. Benefit. The fiscal multiplier of stricter screening are sginificantly larger than
the fiscal multipliers of reducing DI benefits. For each mechanical one dollar reduction, stricter
screening at age 57 generates 1.1 dollar more cost savings (fiscal multiplier of screening = 2.5; fiscal
multiplier of benefit generosity = 1.41). This implies that by increasing strictness of screening the
37This effect is constructed as follows. We estimate the the net fiscal effect within our counterfac-
tual group E [∆G|counterfactual always applicants]. We estimate E [∆G|counterfactual always applicants]=1167
Euro. This effect is driven by individuals who reapply at age 57 and not all counterfactual always
applicants reapply at age 57. For the fiscal effect of always applicants we therefore rescale by the
probability to reapply at age 57: P (reapply at 57) = 0.209. This delivers E [∆G|always applicants] =
1
P (reapply at 57)
E [∆G|counterfactual always applicants] = 5585 in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.7: Fiscal multiplier for benefit generosity
Ages 56-59 Ages 30-55
Estimate Percent Estimate Percent
Total fiscal effect -63.85 -4.42
Mechanical fiscal effect (M) -45.16 71% -3.24 73%
Behavioral fiscal effect (B) -18.69 29% -1.18 27%
Fiscal multiplier (1+B/M) 1.41 1.36
Notes: Tabe presents the decomposition of the fiscal cost effect of a benefit reduction into the behavioral and mechanical
fiscal effect.
policy maker can induce larger behavioral changes and generate greater cost reductions compared
to reducing DI benefits. Hence, on the cost side stricter screening is more effective. The key
question for the relative comparison is how the insurance values of the two policy instruments
compare. It could be that reducing benefit generosity creates a much lower insurance loss than
stricter screening. If the insurance loss of reducing benefits was more than 1.1 dollars smaller, then
reducing benefits would still be prefereable to stricter screening despite the much lower multiplier.
The insurance loss is to some degree speculative and requires more structure and assumptions.
Our implementation in Appendix 3.D suggests that the insurance loss of stricter screening is not
substantially larger than the insurance loss of reducing benefit generosity and therefore stricter
screening is preferable.
Comparison to DI in the United States. The U.S. DI eligibility criteria are also subject
to vocational factors similar to the RSA in Austria. This medical-vocational grid introduces
sharp discontinuities in initial award rates by age. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) use these
discontinuities to estimate the labor supply effects of DI benefit receipt. We use their estimates
for our sufficient statistics formula to discuss the welfare effects of abolishing/shifting these age
cutoffs in the U.S. We find that in the U.S. abolishing/shifting these age cutoffs would be welfare
reducing.
In contrast to Austria the U.S. age cutoffs do not seem to affect application behavior. There
is no strategic bunching of applications at these ages, see Figure 6 in Chen and van der Klaauw
(2008). Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) argue that these rules are not well-known among DI
applicants and therefore there is no systematic sorting around the age cutoffs. This has two
implications. First, in absence of systematic selection around the age cutoffs, the RDD in Chen
and van der Klaauw (2008) is valid. Second, this suggests no behavioral response with respect to
these age cutoffs, i.e. we might expect B = 0. Therefore, making screening stricter at these age
cutoffs is welfare reducing if one dollar in the hands of DI recipients has a social value of at least
one dollar. This is the case if we think that a DI recipient is at least as deserving as the average
tax payer. Put differently, screening at ages below 55 is too strict.
To test the optimality of the benefit generosity we need an estimate of the DI take-up elas-
ticity wrt. benefits. According to Low and Pistaferri (2015) (Table 7) empirical estimates of the
application benefit elasticity range from 0.2 to 1.3. Low and Pistaferri (2015)’s model implies
an application benefit elasticity of 0.62. For our sufficient-statistics formula we need the take-up
elasticity. To obtain an upper bound of the take-up elasticity we multiply the application elasticity
with the average award rate. This gives an upper bounds since the individuals who actually react
to the benefits should have lower than average award rates. According to French and Song (2014)
the award rate after 10 years from the initial application is 0.67. Hence, we get a take-up elasticity
ξ = 0.41 and a fiscal multiplier of 1.41. Hence, with this back of the envelope calculation we find a
similar fiscal multiplier in the U.S. as in Austria. The DI replacement rates in the U.S. are lower
than in Austria and hence the insurance value in the U.S. should be higher than in Austria. This
implies that benefits in the U.S. might to be too low. Our findings are in line with the conclusions
in Low and Pistaferri (2015). They conduct the same policy experiments, that we study with
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our sufficient-statistics model, in their structural model. They (i) change the generosity of DI
benefits and (ii) make screening stricter. While they study the effects for the full population in
a life-cycle model, our analysis focuses on the local effect at age 55. Nevertheless, we reach the
same conclusions. Low and Pistaferri (2015) find that reforms, which increase benefit generosity
or relax screening stringency, are welfare improving.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a framework to analyze the welfare effects of stricter DI eligibility
criteria versus lower DI benefits by developing sufficient-statistics formulas. We show that the fiscal
multiplier is crucial for evaluation of the effectiveness of DI policies and estimate fiscal multipliers
of stricter screening and lower DI benefits in the context of Austria.
To estimate the effects of stricter disability screening, we exploit variation in DI eligibility
strictness that is generated by a policy reform. Prior to 2013 DI eligibility standards were signif-
icantly relaxed for workers above age 57 relative to those below age 57. A 2013 pension reform
increased the relaxed screening age (RSA) threshold from age 57 to age 58, followed by further in-
creases to age 59 in 2015 and age 60 in 2017. These step-wise increases generate quasi-experimental
variation in the strictness of DI eligibility at a certain age by date of birth. To examine the impacts
of changes in DI benefit levels, we exploit a large pension reform that reduced potential benefit
levels for most individuals, although pension levels increased for some individuals with limited
work experience.
We find that stricter screening creates fiscal multipliers of 2-2.5 and reducing benefit generosity
has fiscal multipliers of 1.3-1.4. This implies that by increasing strictness of screening the policy
maker can induce larger behavioral changes and generate greater cost reductions compared to
reducing DI benefits. Hence, on the cost side stricter screening is more effective. Reducing benefit
generosity is only preferable to stricter screening if the insurance loss of reducing benefits was
more than 1.1 dollars smaller than the insurance loss of stricter screening.
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3.A Additional Tables and Figures
3.A.1 Effect on employment and other benefits among non-
eligible men
Figure 3.12: Placebo employment and other benefit estimates using non-eligible men
(a) Employment
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3.A.2 Extending the effects up to age 62
The empirical results suggest that the RSA increases have long-term effect up to the last age,
we can observe treated cohorts in the data (age 61 for the RSA 58 cohort and age 60 for the RSA
59 cohort). A natural question is whether these effects would continue even beyond the last age,
we currently observe in the data? A simple way to shed light on this question is by looking at an
older cohort, men born in 1954, who we can track until age 63. We would expect that the effects
of the RSA increases disappear at age 62. At this age most men in Austria retire, because they
become eligible for retirement benefits. Indeed, if we plot age trends in labor market outcomes
and DI applications for men born in 1954 (Figure 3.13), at age 62 we observe sharp drops in the
precent of men receiving DI benefits, being employed, or receiving other benefits.
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We can estimate the effect of the RSA increases up to age 62 if we assume that the βk-coefficient
estimates in equation (3.15) are unchanged between the last age, we currently observe in the data,
and age 62. This assumption is reasonable because, as Figure 3.15 shows, the effects stabilize after
age 58. Table 3.8 reports the correpsonding average effects between age 57 and age 61, that is
∑61
k=57 βk/5. For the RSA 58 cohort, we can observe labor market outcomes up to age 61. Thus,
the only estimate that changes compared to Table 3.3 is the estimate on DI applications, which
we observe only until age 60. We find that the application rate declines by 1.17 percentage points
on average, which is almost identical to the estimate in Table 3.3 (-1.19 percentage points). We
find equally small differences when comparing the estimates for the RSA 59 cohort.
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Table 3.8: Average effect above RSA up to age 61, men
Eligible Non-eligible
2013 2015 2013 2015
Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean
A. Labor market effects (%)
DI -2.54⋆⋆⋆ 18.56 -4.94⋆⋆⋆ 17.3 -0.4 38.17 -0.96⋆⋆ 37.52
(0.44) (0.43) (0.38) (0.42)
Application ever -1.17⋆⋆⋆ 21.81 -2.86⋆⋆⋆ 20.29 -0.15 38.61 0.05 37.89
(0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.42)
Employment 1.85⋆⋆⋆ 68.36 3.18⋆⋆⋆ 71.59 0.32 14.34 0.19 14.73
(0.39) (0.43) (0.3) (0.35)
Other 0.94⋆⋆⋆ 7.55 2.20⋆⋆⋆ 7.3 -0.01 19.8 0.5 20.08
(0.25) (0.30) (0.38) (0.42)
B. Fiscal effects (euro)
DI benefits -884⋆⋆⋆ 6756 -1793⋆⋆⋆ 6245 -115 11012 -445⋆⋆⋆ 10721
(A) (161) (159) (120) (123)
Tax revenue 263⋆⋆⋆ 11185 427⋆⋆⋆ 11625 16 1582 -16 1608
(B) (56) (65) (33) (38)
Other benefits 172⋆⋆⋆ 1217 451⋆⋆⋆ 1182 -5 2233 92 2277
(C) (46) (63) (55) (67)
Net fiscal cost -976⋆⋆⋆ -3213 -1769⋆⋆⋆ -4199 -135 11663 -338⋆⋆⋆ 11389
(A-B+C) (185) (186) (115) (123)
No. Observations 2,444,975 2,176,311 916,207 806,100
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3.A.3 Effect on disability inflow
Figure 3.14: Effect on disability inflow

























Figure 3.15: Fiscal effects of RSA increase by age
(a) DI benefits
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(b)Pay roll taxes
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(c) Other benefits
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(d) Total fiscal effect
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3.A.5 Effect of screening benefit generosity application im-
pairments
Figure 3.17: Application impairment, eligible men
(a) RSA 58
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Table 3.9: Effect of benefit generosity on application impairment
Ages 56-59 Ages 50-55 Ages 30-49
Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean
Mental disorders 0.002 0.38 -0.001 0.26 <0.001 0.02
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Musculoskeletal system 0.051⋆⋆⋆ 1.62 -0.004⋆⋆ 0.48 -0.001 0.06
(0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Other disorders 0.087⋆⋆⋆ 3.42 0.078⋆⋆⋆ 1.4 0.009⋆⋆⋆ 0.27
(0.022) (0.008) (0.002)

































































(∂p(θ; θ∗)/∂θ∗) dF (θ), MZ ≡ −
´∞
θR
(∂p(θ; θ∗)/∂θ∗) dF (θ) and M(θ∗) ≡ MW b+MZ(b− z),
we can rewrite −∂τ/∂θ∗ = B(θ∗) + M(θ∗). Plugging these terms into the above equation for
∂W/∂θ∗ yields condition (3.5) in the main text.
Welfare Effect Strictness of Screening: Non-marginal Change. Condition (3.5) in the
main text holds for a marginal change in θ∗. Here we consider the welfare effect of a discrete
change. Suppose strictness of screening increase from θL to θH > θL. This implies that the award




L denotes the marginal
applicant with the lenient strictness of screening θL and θAH denotes the marginal applicant with
the high strictness of screening θH). Note θR is still independent of the strictness of screening.
Figure 3.18 illustrates the effects of a non-marginal change in strictness of screening. If screen-
ing becomes stricter, the award probability curve shifts down from p(θ; θL) to p(θ; θH). As a
response fewer individuals apply. Individuals with θ < θAH no longer apply under the stricter






are therefore “marginal applicants” as they only apply un-
der the lenient rules. The share of these marginal applicants is πMA = F (θAH) − F (θ
A
L ). The
behavioral effect is the area under the old award curve of these marginal applicants. Individuals
with a disability level above θAH continue to apply. These are always applicants and their share is
πAA = 1−F (θAH). The difference between the old and new award curve for these always applicants
corresponds to the mechanical effect. Some of these mechanically screened out individuals return
to work (grey area) and some substitute to welfare benefits (blue area). Hence, we have the same
effects as in the marginal case but these effects are slightly differently defined.
Let WH and WL denote welfare in the two screening regimes. Welfare in the two regimes
S ∈ {H,L} is
WS = u(w − τ) +
´ θAS
0









p(θ; θS)v(b)dF (θ) +
´∞
θR







Figure 3.18: Illustration Non-Marginal Change
Note: This figure illustrates the effects of a non-marginal change in strictness of screening.
The welfare effect of this discrete change ∆W ≡ WH −WL is given by







p(θ; θL)− p(θ; θH)
]




p(θ; θL)− p(θ; θH)
]






p(θ; θL) [v(b)− (u(w)− θ)]− ψdF (θ).
The first line of (3.21) captures the gain for the taxpayer (the fiscal cost reduction), the sec-
ond line is the loss in insurance value for the always applicants (mechanically screened out).
The third line is the insurance loss that marginal applicants experience and is the key difference
to the marginal case. The Envelope theorem does not apply for a non-marginal change in θ∗
and behavioral responses have a first order welfare effect. Note that for the limiting case of a










v(b)− (u(w)− θAL )
]
− ψ = 0 by the definition of the marginal applicant θAL .
Using the government budget constraint we can rewrite the fiscal effect again as the behavioral
fiscal effect BΔ plus the mechanical fiscal effect MΔ:















p(θ; θL)− p(θ; θH)
]
















= λ (BΔ +MΔ), where λ = u
′(w − τΔ) with τΔ such that this equality holds.
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p(θ; θL)− p(θ; θH)
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p(θ; θL)− p(θ; θH)
]







p(θ; θL) [v(b)− (u(w)− θ)]− ψdF (θ). (3.26)
In summary, the fiscal mutliplier is still key to evaluate the welfare effects and as we will see
later on our empirical method to estimate the multiplier is robust to non-marginal changes. The
insurance value is the discrete analog of the marginal change with an additional term LMA.
Welfare Effect DI Benefit Level. Starting from equation (3.3) we get
∂W
∂b


















=0 by definition of θA







p(θ; θ∗)dF (θ) = B(b)+M(b) is the change in taxes
necessary to fund a DI system with a marginally higher DI benefit b. (3.7) then immediately
follows from (3.27).
3.B.2 General Model
DI Applications and Labor Supply. We proceed in a similar way as the discussion of static
model in the main text. The setup mirrors the static model but extends it in two important
dimensions. First, we extend the model to T periods, so agents need to make inter-temporal
decisions. Second, we allow θ (and as well as other state variables such w) evolve stochastically
over the agent’s relevant time horizon. Let Xi,t = {θi,t, Ai,t, χi,t} denote the vector of state
variables where θi,t denotes agent i’s disability level in period t, Ai,t denotes the asset level and
χi,t is a vector of other state variables (which allows for heterogeneity across agents such as
differences in wages etc.). The state vector Xi,t summarizes all the information relevant for agent
i’s choices in period t. The laws of motion of assets in the disability, employment and welfare
38Later on in the general model λ will denote the multiplier of the government budget constraint and therefore
measures the social value of public funds.
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benefit state are
Ai,t+1 = (1 + rt)Ai,t + bi,t(Xi,t)− c
D
i,t(Xi,t) (3.28)
Ai,t+1 = (1 + rt)Ai,t + wi,t(Xi,t)− τi,t(Xi,t)− c
E
i,t(Xi,t) (3.29)
Ai,t+1 = (1 + rt)Ai,t + zi,t(Xi,t)− c
Z
i,t(Xi,t). (3.30)
bi,t(Xi,t) denotes DI benefits of individual i in period t and can depend on the agent’s state Xi,t.
Analogously, wi,t(Xi,t) denotes labor income, τi,t(Xi,t) are taxes and zi,t(Xi,t) denotes social









, whether they apply to DI benefits αi,t(Xi,t) ∈ {0, 1}
and, if not, on DI whether they work or claim social welfare benefits ωi,t(Xi,t) ∈ {0, 1}.
The within-period sequence of events and choices is identical to the one of the static model in
Section 2.1. At the beginning of the period, the shocks θi,t and χi,t are revealed. Having learned
Xi,t, she decides whether to file a DI application and, if accepted, becomes a DI beneficiary for the
rest of her life. 39 If her application is rejected, she either resumes work or claims social welfare,
whatever yields higher utility.
Denote by Di,t,Wi,t and Zi,t, respectively, the probability that, in period t, agent i is a DI





























The probability agent i transitions to DI in period k is αi,k(Xi,k)·p (θi,k, θ
∗
k). Hence, the probability
that an agent is not yet on DI in period t is
[
∏t





pool, ωi,t(Xi,t) of the non DI individuals work and 1− ωi,t(Xi,t) are on social welfare benefits.
40
We assume that the first application bears a fix cost ψ and follow-up applications are costless.
Λi,t = αi,t(Xi,t)
∏t−1
k=0 (1− αi,k(Xi,k)) ∈ 0, 1 indicates whether agent i applies for the first time
in period t. The other state variables, disutility of work θi,t and χi,t, follow stochastic processes
that can, in principle, depend on agents’ choices. The expectation operator E [·] below captures
the evolution of the state variables and encompasses aggregation across individuals and time. 41
The agent’s problem is then given by
39The assumption that DI is an absorbing state, is supported by the empirically observed negligibly low outflow
rates, particularly among older workers.
40We assume that social welfare, unlike DI, is not an absorbing state. This implies that an agent who has not
yet entered DI is “at risk” of being employed or being on social welfare in period k, see equations (5) and (6) below.
41The expectation is with respect to the distribution of state variables, i.e. E [Y ] =
´ ´
Y (Xi,t)dF (Xi,t)di
where F (·) is the distribution of state variables X(i, t). This is a flexible formulation. The only restriction we
impose on this distribution of state variables is that it does not directly depend on the planner’s policy instruments
P = {θ∗t , bt}
T−1
t=0 . The evolution of X(i, t), however, can depend on agent i
′s choices which themselves depend on
the policy instruments P .
Note that the operator E [Y ] =
´
Y (Xi,t)dF (Xi,t) simply denotes the expectation wrt. the state variables but
does not integrate over individuals.
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v(cDi,t) ·Di,t + v(c
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Welfare Effect of DI Reforms. We proceed in the same way as we did in the static framework.
We first set up the utilitarian planner’s problem and study the impact of more stringent DI
eligibility rules. The social planner maximizes social welfare by choosing the strictness of screening





The planner therefore solves
max
P


















(Wi,t · τi,t −Di,t · bi,t − Zi,t · zi,t)
]
di (3.36)
is the planners net revenue, Ḡ is an exogenous revenue constraint and λ denotes the Lagrange
multiplier on the planner’s budget constraint.
More Stringent DI Eligibility Rules. The following proposition characterizes the optimal
DI policy P = {θ∗s , bs}
T−1
s=0 .
Proposition 1. Assume the planner’s budget constraint is differentiable in θ∗s for all periods s.



















is the mechanical fiscal effect and E [B(θ∗s)] ≡ ∂G(P )/∂θ
∗
s−M is the behavioral fiscal effect. MWi,t













and MZi,t is the mechanical benefit substitution effect













E [LW ] and E [LZ ] denote the insurance losses for individuals who return to work and substitute
to welfare benefits respectively and are defined by



































Welfare Effect of Changing DI Benefits.
Proposition 2. Assume the planner’s budget constraint is differentiable in bs for all periods s.









λ · E [M(bs)]
(3.43)






is the mechanical fiscal effect of adjusting DI benefits and
E [B(bs)] ≡ −∂G(P )/∂bs − E [M(bs)] denotes the behavioral fiscal effect.
Proof. See below.
Optimal Policy Mix: Gradient. From before we know
∂W
∂θ∗s
= γ ∗ E [M(θ∗s)] ∗ λ (3.44)
where










= σ ∗ E [M(bs)] ∗ λ (3.46)
where








λ · E [M(bs)]
. (3.47)










σ ∗ E [M(bs)]
γ ∗ E [M(θ∗s)]
⎞
⎠λ (3.48)















Comparing Static and Dynamic Models Observe the similarity between the dynamic,
general solution and the one of the static model. In the static model, we had
∂W
∂θ∗




[v(b)− (u(w)− θ̃)]MW + [v(b)− v(z)]MZ
u′(w − τ)M(θ∗)
and in the dynamic model we have
∂W
∂θ∗s

































The proof is a direct application of the Envelope Theorem. To derive conditions (3.37) and
(3.43) we apply the differentiable sandwich lemma from ?. ? establish that if a function F (c)
is sandwiched at some point c between two differentiable functions (upper and lower support
functions U(c) and L(c)), then this function F is differentiable at this point c. Moreover, the
derivative of the sandwiched function F equals the derivative of the upper and lower support
functions at this point, i.e. F ′(c) = U ′(c) = L′(c). Figure 3.19 illustrates this idea nicely. The
proof here therefore identifies differentiable upper and lower support functions of the welfare
function W (P ).
Figure 3.19: Illustration Differentiable Sandwich Lemma
Notes: This Figure illustrates the differentiable sandwich lemma of ?, which is the key argument in the proof of
Proposition 1 and 2.
Source:?.
Let P denote the optimal policy, i.e. the P = {θ∗s , bs}
T−1
s=0 that maximizes welfare. By definition
W (P ) ≥ W (P ) ∀P and therefore the constant function U(P ) = W (P ) is a natural upper support
function. We have U ′(P ) = 0.
For the lower support function we use the idea of the “lazy” decision maker who does not
take into account agents’ behavioral responses to the policy change. Let V̄i(P ) denote the agents
indirect utility if she sticks to her behavior that is optimal for policy P̄ even when the policy
is changed to another P . That is, for all potential policies P the agent does not adjust her






























i,t) · (1− ωi,t) . . .










We can decompose the total fiscal effect ∂G(P )/∂θ∗s into the mechanical and behavioral fiscal
effect. The mechanical effect is



























differentiable sandwich lemma then implies that ∂W (P )/∂θ∗s = ∂L(P )/∂θ
∗
s = ∂U(P )/∂θ
∗
s = 0 at
the optimal policy. It is then straightforward to rearrange (3.50) to (3.37).
Proof. Proposition 2.



















. Define the mechanical fiscal






and the behavioral fiscal effect is again defined as
the difference between total fiscal effect and mechanical fiscal effect E [B(bs)] = −∂G(P )/∂bs −
E [M(bs)]. We again have ∂W (P )/∂bs = ∂L(P )/∂bs = ∂U(P )/∂bs = 0. It is then straightforward
to rearrange (3.51) to obtain (3.43).
Welfare Effect Strictness of Screening: Non-marginal Change. Analogous to the discus-
sion in the static model, consider a discrete change in strictness of screening in period s from θLs to
θHs > θ
L
s . To resemble our empirical setup assume that strictness of screening is high, θ
∗ = θH , un-








T−1; b0, . . . , bT−1).
The reform we study empirically increased the age of relaxed screening from s to s+1. This corre-








T−1; b0, . . . , bT−1). Let a
H
i,t denote the application
decision of individual i in period t if the policy is PH and aLi,t denote the application decision
under policy PL. The discrete welfare effect is










assuming that λ is the same under both policies. We can again decompose the fiscal effect G(PH)−





























and MΔZi,t is the mechanical benefit substitution effect















The mechanical fiscal effect is, as in the static model, driven by always applicants, αHi,s = 1 (those
















42The behavioral fiscal effect contains the fiscal effect of all changes in behavior by agents. For instance, changes
in DI application behavior.

























The behavioral fiscal effect is driven by changes in the application behavior and potential other
changes in behavior (which might affect the whole state distribution F (Xi,t)). Writing out the
behavioral fiscal effect is cumbersome because many margins can change. Empirically, we follow
the same strategy by estimating the total fiscal effect and the mechanical fiscal effect and then
calculate the behavioral fiscal effect as the residual.





L)di = E [LΔW ] + E [LΔZ ] + E [LMA] (3.56)
where







































L)di − E [LΔW ] − E [LΔZ ] > 0 is the utility loss associated with













3.C Further Evidence from Complier Analysis
3.C.1 Framework for complier analysis
In this section, we describe the complier analysis for difference-in-differences settings, as out-
lined in De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018); Jäger et al. (2019), to study the character-
istics of marginal, always, and never applicants and enrollees. For the RSA 58 change, we focus
on the ages 56 and 57 and compare the RSA 58 cohort to the RSA 57 cohort. Both cohorts face
strict screening at age 56, but the RSA 57 cohort faces relaxed screening at age 57. For the RSA
59 increase, we focus on the ages 55 to 59 and compare the RSA 59 cohort to the RSA 57 cohort.
The RSA 57 cohort faces relaxed screening at ages 57 and 58, while screening is strict for the RSA
59 cohort.
We denote by a = A57, B57 the age window where A57 is the age window above 67 and B57
is the age window below 57. We denote by c = T,C the cohort where T is the RSA 57 cohort
and C is the RSA 58 cohort (the RSA 59 cohort when we study the RSA 59 change). AP is
an indicator whether an individual applies for DI benefits and DI is an indicator whether an
individual is awarded DI benefits. We have a binary instrument Z, which is one if screening is
relaxed and zero otherwise, that is Z = 1 for (T,A57) and Z = 0 for (T,B57), (C,A57), and
(C,B57). AP0 and AP1denote the potential values of AP for Z = 0 and Z = 1. Similarly, DI0
and DI1denote the potential values of DI for Z = 0 and Z = 1. Based on the potential outcomes,
we distinguish between three groups of applicants : always applicants (AP0 = AP1 = 1), never
applicants (AP0 = AP1 = 0), and marginal applicants who only apply when screening is relaxed
(AP0 = 0 and AP1 = 1). We define the different groups of enrollees in the same way.
It is straightforward to estimate the expected value of a characteristic X for never applicants.
If we assume AP1 − AP0 ≥ 0 (the standard monotonicity assumption the instrumental variable
literature), then all individuals in (T,A57) who do not apply for DI are never applicants.44 We
can estimate the conditional value of a never applicant characteristic E(X|AP1 = 0, T, A57) by the
44The monotonicity assumption rules out defying applicants who would apply when screening is strict but not






iǫ(T,A57) Xi· I(APi = 0),where N
na
T,A57 is the number of people in (T,A57)
who do not apply for DI and I(APi = 0) is an indicator that is one if an individual has not applied
for DI. We can use the same logic to estimate the expectecd value of a characteristic for a never
enrollee.
Estimating the expected value of a characteristic for marginal applicants and always applicants
is more challenging and requires additional assumptions. Jäger et al. (2019) describe the steps in
detail in the appendix. The idea is that the expected value of a characteristic X for all applicants
is a weighted average of the expected value for marginal and always applicants, where the weights
represent the share of marginal applicants and always applicants among all applicants in (T,A57).
We can rearrange the weighted average to get an expression for the conditional value of a marginal
applicant characteristic:
E(X|AP0 = 0, AP1 = 1, T, A57) =
πma + πaa
πma
·E(X|AP1 = 1, T, A57)−
πaa
πma
·E(X|AP0 = 1, AP1 = 1, T, A57)
(3.60)
where πma and πaa are the shares of marginal and always applicants.
We can estimate each term of the right-hand side of equation 3.60 empirically. We estimate
the shares of each group of applicants with the following regression:
APiac = α+ βa + γc + δ Zac + εiac, (3.61)
where i is individual, βa is a fixed effect for the age a = A57, and c is a fixed effect for the cohort
c = T . If Z is independent from AP and application trends are the same across cohorts in the
absence of relaxed screening, thenπaa = α+ β+ γ is the share of always applicants in the RSA 57
cohort, πma = δ is the share of marginal applicants, and πna = 1−πaa−πma is the share of never
applicants (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018); Jäger et al. (2019)).45 To estimate the
share of always enrollees (πae), marginal enrollees (πme) and never enrollees (πne) , we replace
applications AP with awards DI in equation (3.61). We estimate the conditional value of an





iǫ(T,A57) Xi· I(APi =
1),where NaT.A57 is the number of applicants in (T,A57) and I(APi = 1) is an indicator that is one
if an individual has applied for DI.
Calculating E(X|AP0 = 1, AP1 = 1, T, A57) is challenging, because we never get to see whether
applicants in (T,A57) would have applied if screening was strict, that is the potential outcome AP0
is not observable. Because of montonicity we know that all applicants who apply when screening is
relaxed also apply when screening is strict, allowing us to write E(X|AP0 = 1, AP1 = 1, T, A57) =
E(X|AP0 = 1, T, A57). If in X are the same across cohorts in the absence of relaxed screening
trends and Z is independent from AP and X, we can estimate E(X|AP0 = 1, T, A57) using the
change in applications at age 57 for cohort C, that is E(X|AP0 = 1, T, A57) = E(X|AP0 =
1, T, B57) + E(X|AP0 = 1, C,A57) − E(X|AP0 = 1, C,B57). We can estimate each element














iǫ(C,B57) Xi· I(APi = 1).
3.C.2 Complier analysis for the RSA 59 increase
3.C.3 Comparison of applicants and enrollees
45Formaly, the independence assumption is equal to AP0, AP1 ⊥ Z | a, c and the common trend assumption is
equal to E(AP0|A57, T )-E(AP0|B57, T ) = E(AP0|A57, C)− E(AP0|B57, C).
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Table 3.10: Applicant and enrollee characteristics, RSA 59
Marginal- Always- Difference Never- Difference
Applicants Applicants MA-AA Applicants MA-NA
A. Applicants
Share in population 3.26⋆⋆⋆ 10.18⋆⋆⋆ -6.93⋆⋆⋆ 86.56⋆⋆⋆ -83.30⋆⋆⋆
(0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.05) (0.13)
Sick Leave at age 56 -0.86 8.38⋆⋆⋆ -9.24⋆⋆⋆ 0.92⋆⋆⋆ -1.77⋆⋆
(0.77) (0.21) (0.96) (0.01) (0.77)
Unemployed at age 56 10.61⋆⋆⋆ 25.53⋆⋆⋆ -14.92⋆⋆⋆ 4.25⋆⋆⋆ 6.36⋆⋆⋆
(1.52) (0.42) (1.90) (0.03) (1.52)
Employed at age 56 84.87⋆⋆⋆ 62.80⋆⋆⋆ 22.07⋆⋆⋆ 87.15⋆⋆⋆ -2.28
(1.89) (0.52) (2.36) (0.05) (1.90)
Blue-collar 85.87⋆⋆⋆ 80.34⋆⋆⋆ 5.53⋆⋆ 53.89⋆⋆⋆ 31.98⋆⋆⋆
(1.76) (0.49) (2.22) (0.09) (1.77)
Musculoskeletal 74.93⋆⋆⋆ 36.37⋆⋆⋆ 38.57⋆⋆⋆
(2.26) (0.56) (2.71)
Mental 4.55⋆⋆⋆ 17.83⋆⋆⋆ -13.27⋆⋆⋆
(1.66) (0.49) (2.10)
Other 20.51⋆⋆⋆ 45.80⋆⋆⋆ -25.29⋆⋆⋆
(2.11) (0.57) (2.61)
B.Enrollees
Share in population 8.00⋆⋆⋆ 3.82⋆⋆⋆ 4.19⋆⋆⋆ 88.18⋆⋆⋆ -80.17⋆⋆⋆
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05) (0.12)
Sick Leave at age 56 6.41⋆⋆⋆ 9.90⋆⋆⋆ -3.50⋆⋆⋆ 0.83⋆⋆⋆ 5.58⋆⋆⋆
(0.19) (0.27) (0.43) (0.01) (0.19)
Unemployed at age 56 23.21⋆⋆⋆ 16.92⋆⋆⋆ 6.29⋆⋆⋆ 4.67⋆⋆⋆ 18.54⋆⋆⋆
(0.32) (0.44) (0.70) (0.03) (0.32)
Employed at age 56 70.07⋆⋆⋆ 64.31⋆⋆⋆ 5.77⋆⋆⋆ 86.79⋆⋆⋆ -16.72⋆⋆⋆
(0.40) (0.65) (0.98) (0.05) (0.40)
Blue-collar 87.69⋆⋆⋆ 72.73⋆⋆⋆ 14.96⋆⋆⋆ 54.24⋆⋆⋆ 33.45⋆⋆⋆
(0.47) (0.68) (1.08) (0.09) (0.47)
Musculoskeletal 57.28⋆⋆⋆ 24.91⋆⋆⋆ 32.37⋆⋆⋆
(0.54) (0.71) (1.11)
Mental 7.43⋆⋆⋆ 25.18⋆⋆⋆ -17.76⋆⋆⋆
(0.41) (0.66) (1.00)
Other 30.57⋆⋆⋆ 55.02⋆⋆⋆ -24.45⋆⋆⋆
(0.55) (0.77) (1.21)
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Figure 3.20: Comparison of Applicant and Entrant Compliers, RSA 58
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Figure 3.21: Comparison of Applicant and Entrant Compliers, RSA 59
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3.D Welfare Implications
3.D.1 Strictness of Screening
Implementing the insurance value (the rhs of (3.13)) is associated with several challenges. In
contrast to the sufficient statistics literature on UI, the utility loss is expressed in differences in
utility levels rather than in marginal utilities. Moreover, the insurance value also depends on the
abstract quantity θ. We tackle this challenges by deriving bounds of the insurance value that do not
depend on the unobserved disability level θ. Furthermore, we assume utility is state-independent
and CRRA, i.e. v(c) = u(c) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ , and that we have hand-to-mouth consumers.
46 In the
following we discuss the derivation of the bounds and the implications of our assumptions. For
46We only observe transfers and incomes in our data and cannot measure consumption.
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In the following we derive lower and upper bounds on this insurance value ∆V .
Upper Bound Insurance Value. The social welfare benefits act as safety net. An agent cannot



















This bound assumes that individuals who are screened out are all on social welfare benefits.
Individuals who decide to work at some points can only do better than being on social welfare
benefits in all periods and hence experience a lower insurance loss than assumed by this bound.
























This lower bound simply assumes that individuals who are screened out and then return to work
have no loss in insurance value, i.e. they are indifferent between working and receiving DI benefits.
Implementation. To implement (3.63) we make four assumptions. First, we measure the insur-






where ci,W is the consumption level of working individuals). This is the standard to measure the
insurance value in the UI literature. Second, we assume utility is state-independent and CRRA,
i.e. v(c) = u(c) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ . Third, we assume individuals are hand-to-mouth and set consumption
equal to current income (cDi,t = bi,t, c
Z
i,t = zi,t, c
W
i,t = wi,t). We assume this because we cannot
observe consumption in our data. This assumption provides an upper bound on the insurance
value. If individuals can self-insure through savings the insurance loss is smaller than if they were
hand-to-mouth and simply consumed their income. Hence, in our implementation we tend to
overestimate the insurance loss. Fourth, we assume no discounting β = (1+ r) = 1. All effects are
within a 5 years horizon and hence discounting does not play a major role.























































for a given value of risk aversion from the data and we















in (3.65) only depends on the mechanical effect. We therefore use the same counterfactual always
applicants strategy as in the main text to estimate the mechanical fiscal effect. Here we just apply
this strategy to a different outcome. For each individual we create a variable qi,t which is equal to
the DI benefits bi,t if this individual is on DI benefits and equal to the individuals (hypothetical)
social welfare benefits zi,t if this individual is not on DI benefits. This ensures that an individual
who returns to work experiences a utility loss as if she was on social welfare benefits. We then
calculate for a given risk aversion γ the utility vi,t =
1
1−γ (qi,t)
1−γ and run our DiD strategy on this



























in (3.66) we create a variable li,t which
is equal to the (hypothetical) DI benefits bi,t if this individual is on DI benefits or employed and
equal to the individual social welfare benefits zi,t if this individual is on social welfare benefits. This
ensures that an individual experiences no utility loss if she returns to work after being screened
out (i.e. there is only a insurance loss if MZi,t = 1). We then calculate for a given risk aversion γ
the utility ui,t =
1
1−γ (li,t)
1−γ and run our DiD strategy on this outcome variable ui,t.
Using this approach we estimate the upper and lower bound of the insurance loss for different
values of risk aversion and plot the two bounds in Figure 3.22. We find that shifting the RSA
by one year is welfare-improving if risk aversion γ < 2 and it is welfare-reducing if γ > 2.3.
Increasing the RSA by two years is welfare-improving if risk aversion γ < 1.95. Estimates from
the literature suggest that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is below 2, Chetty (2006b) finds
an upper bound of γ ≤ 1.78. Hence, our implementation implies that the increase in the RSA was
welfare-improving for reasonable values of risk aversion.
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Notes: Figure plots the LHS and the upper and lower bounds of the RHS of inequality (3.13) for the one year
increase in the RSA from 57 to 58 in panel (a) and two year increase in RSA in panel (b) against different levels of
risk aversion. If risk aversion is lower than the point where the solid grey line crosses the red line, then it is welfare
improving to increase screening stringency. If risk aversion is higher than the point where the dashed grey line
crosses the red line, then it is welfare improving to reduce screening stringency. For levels of risk aversion between
these two points our sufficient statistics condition do not allow for a welfare statement.
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3.D.2 Benefit Generosity
The effect we estimate empirically is a benefit reduction from age s to the end of life. For the
welfare effect this simply implies that we need to sum up the welfare effects of changing benefits
in each period. To implement the welfare effects we impose the same four assumptions as above













We can directly calculate this for different values of risk aversion based on the pre-reform benefit
levels. Figure 3.23 plots the fiscal multiplier and the insurance value for different values of risk
aversion. We find that for risk aversion around γ = 1 the benefit levels are optimal for the
age group 56-59. Younger individuals have lower multipliers with similar insurance values and
hence a lower critical risk aversion level of around γ = 0.6.Hence, benefit generosity is optimal for
reasonable values of risk aversion.
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Notes: Figure plots the LHS and RHS of inequality (3.7) for men aged 56-59 in panel (a) and 30-55 in panel (b)
against different levels of risk aversion. If risk aversion is higher than the point where the grey line crosses the red
line, then it is welfare improving to increase benefit generosity. If risk aversion is lower than this point, it is welfare
improving to reduce benefit generosity.
3.D.3 Gradient: Optimal Policy Mix
For the gradient we can use the implementation from above to express γ and σ as a function
of risk aversion. For γ we use the upper and lower bounds and therefore get a range of optimal
directions for a given level of risk aversion. The optimal direction γ
σ
measures the direction in
units of mechanical cost reductions. Intuitively, the gradient says that for a one dollar mechanical
reduction in fiscal costs due to lower benefits screening should be stricter such that γ
σ
dollars are
saved mechanically. Figure 3.24 plots the Gradient for different values of risk aversion.
Figure 3.24 Panel (a) plots the optimal combination of changing benefit generosity and strict-
ness of screening at age 57. For risk aversion below 1 benefits should be reduced and screening
should be stricter. For instance with risk aversion of 0.5 the optimal combination reduces spending
through stricter screening by 5 dollars for a one dollar reduction in spending due to lower benefits.
Hence, at this level of risk aversion screening is optimally tightened more than benefits. For levels
of risk aversion above 2, benefits should be increased and screening should be less strict. In this






Figure 3.24: Optimal Policy Mix: Gradient
(a) RSA 58
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Offsetting the Cliff? A Sufficient Statistics Approach to
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Work Incentives in Dis-
ability Insurance
joint with Giacomin Favre and Stefan Staubli
Abstract. Most disability insurance (DI) programs feature strong work disincentives, so called
“cash cliffs”. If DI beneficiaries have labor earnings beyond a certain income threshold, they loose
their entire cash benefits. Instead, a benefit offset program reduces DI cash benefits gradually
for individuals with an income above the threshold. Replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset
scheme has two opposing effects. On the one hand, the most able DI beneficiaries are incentivized
to increase their labor supply (labor supply effect). This reduces program costs without reducing
the insurance value of DI. On the other hand, DI becomes more attractive for potential applicants,
which might cause more DI take-up (induced entry effect) and increased program costs. This paper
develops robust sufficient-statistics formulas to evaluate the welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff
with a benefit offset scheme. We show that the welfare effects crucially depend on two sufficient
statistics: (i) the earnings elasticity of DI recipients and (ii) the DI benefit take-up elasticity.
The earnings elasticity captures the labor supply effect, and the DI benefit take-up elasticity is
a sufficient statistic for induced entry in a broad class of models. In an empirical application of
our model, we plan to estimate these two sufficient statistics using two policy reforms in Canada
with difference-in-differences and bunching estimators. Our preliminary analysis, using existing
estimates from previous studies, finds that, for the U.S., it is unlikely that the introduction of a
benefit offset reduces program expenditures. However, replacing the cash cliff with an offset can
still be welfare improving for reasonable values of risk aversion.
135
4.1 Introduction
In many countries, the share of individuals receiving disability insurance (DI) has increased
significantly over the past few decades. Autor et al. (2017) line out that in the United States
the number of DI recipients has quintupled over five decades from 1 to over 5 percent and that
European countries such as Norway exhibit an even stronger increase. The rapid expansion of
the beneficiary population has generated substantial interest by policy makers and economists in
measures that reduce growth in program caseloads and expenditures. Autor and Duggan (2006)
discuss three ways to limit the expansion of DI programs: (i) provide incentives to return to work,
(ii) reduce incentives to seek DI benefits, and (iii) adopt more rigorous eligibility standards. This
paper focuses on (i), the optimal financial work incentives in DI.
DI programs are known for their strong work disincentives (Autor and Duggan, 2003, Bound
et al., 2010). Most DI programs feature so called “cash cliffs”: If DI beneficiaries supply work
above a certain income threshold (the earnings disregard), they loose their entire cash benefits.
Instead, a benefit offset program reduces DI cash benefits gradually for individuals with an income
above the earnings disregard. Figure 4.1 illustrates a stylized budget set of DI beneficiaries under
the cash cliff and the benefit offset regime. Intuitively, the introduction of a benefit offset scheme
has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it can mitigate the inclusion error in DI. The most able
DI beneficiaries are incentivized to increase their labor supply (labor supply effect). This reduces
program costs without reducing the insurance value of DI. Empirical evidence on substantial
remaining work capacity of some DI recipients1 underlines the potential importance of this effect.
On the other hand, the introduction of a benefit offset scheme makes DI more attractive for
potential applicants. This might cause more DI take-up (induced entry effect), which increases
program costs.
This paper formalizes the trade-off between labor supply and induced entry effect in a sufficient
statistics model. For welfare analyses, we develop robust sufficient statistics formulas that capture
the insurance value and incentive costs of benefit offset schemes. These formulas are functions
of high-level elasticities that can be estimated using design-based empirical methods. We show
that the welfare effects of moving from a cash cliff to a benefit offset regime crucially depend on
two sufficient statistics: (i) the earnings elasticity of DI recipients and (ii) the DI benefit take-
up elasticity.2 The earnings elasticity captures the labor supply effect. The DI benefit take-up
elasticity is a sufficient statistic for induced entry in a broad class of models. The contribution of
our theoretical analysis is twofold. First, it provides simple yet robust sufficient statistics formulas
to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a benefit offset. Second, it sheds light on the potential
size of the induced entry effect based on credible reduced form estimates. Estimating the induced
entry effect is a key challenge. While the labor supply effect of a $1 for $2 benefit offset has been
tested recently in the large benefit offset national demonstration (BOND) field experiment, the
induced entry effect cannot be studied in a randomized controlled trial. The size of the induced
entry is usually estimated by structural models (e.g. Hoynes and Moffitt, 1999 or Benitez-Silva
et al., 2010). Our approach shows that in a broad class of models the DI benefit take-up elasticity
is informative on the size of the induced entry effect.
We currently work on estimating both the benefit take-up elasticity and the earnings elasticity
for Canada with data from the Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD). Canada operates
distinct DI programs for Quebec and the Rest of Canada (RoC). We exploit two policy reforms
that provide exogenous variation in the DI benefit level and the earnings disregard in RoC but not
in Quebec. This allows us to estimate the causal effects of the two reforms employing a difference-
in-differences (DiD) identification strategy. Further, the earnings disregard allows us to estimate
the earnings elasticity with a bunching estimator. This is work in progress. For the time being, we
use estimates from previous studies to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a benefit offset
scheme. For the U.S., we find that it is unlikely that the introduction of a benefit offset scheme
1See for instance Maestas et al. (2013) and Autor et al. (2015).
2The DI benefit take-up elasticity denotes the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity, i.e.
by how many percent DI claiming increases if DI benefits increase by one percent.
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reduces program expenditures. However, replacing the cash cliff with an offset can be welfare
improving for reasonable values of risk aversion depending on the benefit take-up elasticity. The
estimates for the benefit take-up elasticity in the literature range from 0.1 to 0.9. For the smallest
value, our sufficient statistic formula suggests that the introduction of a benefit offset is welfare
improving. For the largest reported elasticity, it is better to keep the cash cliff, which acts as
guard against undesirable DI applications. We hope to provide credible estimates of the benefit
take-up elasticity with the empirical approach described above.
There is a growing empirical literature studying the effects of DI on labor market outcomes (e.g.
Autor and Duggan 2003; de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw 2011; Staubli 2011; Maestas,
Mullen, and Strand 2013; Moore 2015; Gelber, Moore, and Strand 2017; French and Song 2014;
Deshpande, Gross, and Su 2019) but empirical evidence on benefit offset schemes is scarce. A few
countries test the effects of benefit offset schemes on the labor supply of DI beneficiaries. In the
United States, the Social Security Administration recently ran a field experiment to test a benefit
offset policy that reduces benefits by $1 for every $2 of earnings above the earnings disregard (in
the U.S.: substantial gainful activity (SGA)). Gubits et al. 2018 document the final evaluation
of this field experiment. They report that the probability of employment increased by 2 percent
(0.4 percentage points) in the entire DI population and DI benefit payments increased by roughly
1 percent ($12 per month). They conclude that the very small estimated increases in earnings
(not statistically significant) were not sufficient to offset the deadweight loss from increases in
taxes needed to fund larger DI benefit payments. Switzerland also conducted a field experiment
on the introduction of a conditional cash program that incentivizes work but exhibited a very low
take-up rate of 0.5 percent (Bütler et al., 2015). Campolieti and Riddell (2012) evaluate a shift in
the earnings disregard in Canada. They report an increase in the extensive labor supply margin
but no effect on program entry or exit. Kostol and Mogstad (2014) estimate the labor supply
effects of a benefit offset scheme in Norway. In 2005, Norway introduced a benefit offset program
that allowed DI beneficiaries to keep $0.4 of every $1 earned above an earning threshold. Because
only DI beneficiaries who were already on DI before January 1 of 2004 became eligible for this
benefit offset, they can use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the labor supply effects.
They find substantial positive impacts on labor supply. Three years after implementation, this
benefit offset increased labor force participation by 8.5 percentage points for DI recipients under
age 50. Ruh and Staubli 2019 exploit bunching at the earnings disregard to identify the earnings
elasticity of DI recipients in Austria and report an elasticity of 0.27. Gelber et al. (2017) study
how differences in benefit levels reduce labor supply through an income effect of DI recipients
in the United States documenting that this income effect accounts for a majority of DI-induced
reductions in earnings. However, these studies and experiments can only identify the labor supply
effect of individuals already on DI. The induced entry effect of benefit offset schemes is difficult
to estimate with reduced form methods. Therefore, structural models are used to estimate the
induced entry effect. Hoynes and Moffitt (1999) simulate the potential effects of a benefit offset
for the U.S. in a calibrated model. More recently, Benitez-Silva et al. (2010) simulate the effect of
the U.S. $1 for $2 offset in a structural model.
To our knowledge, there is very little theoretical research on work incentives in DI. Parsons
(1996) shows that in a model with two-sided classification errors and two ability types, it is
desirable to provide work incentives if there are no application fees. With application fees, a
system without work incentives can be more efficient. Inderbitzin and Wallimann (2013) study
the optimal work incentives with a distribution of ability types and an extensive margin labor
supply choice. They find that the efficiency of work incentives depends on the relative size of
labor supply and induced entry effects. In this sense, we generalize their model to include the
intensive margin, which is the main target of work incentives in DI, and derive implementable
sufficient statistics formulas.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes our theoretical
model. Section 4.3 discusses the welfare implications of our model employing existing estimates
from the literature. Section 4.4 previews our empirical approach to estimating the labor supply
and the benefit take-up elasticity for Canada. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Model
In this section, we present a simple model of disability insurance (DI) based on the seminal work
of Diamond and Sheshinski (1995). This model allows us to derive optimality conditions in terms
of behavioral parameters that serve as sufficient statistics to evaluate the (local) optimality of
work incentives in DI. Importantly, these behavioral parameters can be estimated empirically. We
employ this model to study two questions: (1) Given a benefit offset scheme, what is the optimal
offset rate r, i.e. what share of income above the earnings disregard should DI beneficiaries be
allowed to keep? And (2) what are the fiscal and the welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff regime
with a benefit offset scheme?
One key finding is that the answers to these two questions are closely related. We show that
a cash cliff system can be modeled as a specific form of a benefit offset regime. Hence, shifting
from a cash cliff to a benefit offset program is a special case of adjusting the offset rate. In section
4.2.1, we describe the model setup. Section 4.2.2 discusses the optimal offset rate, and section
4.2.3 discusses the welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset.
4.2.1 Setup
We expand the seminal DI model of Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) by introducing an intensive
labor supply choice and a two period structure. In the first period, the agent works, earns a wage
w, and pays lump-sum taxes τ to finance the DI program. She does not save, does not make any
other choices in the first period, and yields utility u(w−τ). In the second period, the agent suffers
a disability shock θ, drawn from a continuous distribution F (θ).3 After the agent observes the
disability shock, she can choose whether to apply to DI and how much to work in either case.4




u(c(z))− h(z, θ), (4.1)
where h(z, θ) denotes the disutility of labor of type θ when earning z, and c(z) denotes disposable
income. The wage rate is normalized to one for simplicity. We assume that uz > 0, uzz < 0,
hz > 0, hzz > 0, hθ > 0, hzθ > 0, and u(0) = h(0, θ) = 0 such that u is concave and h is convex.
This implies a unique optimal labor supply, z(θ), for every θ, declining optimal labor supply in θ
(z′(θ) ≤ 0), and convex indifference curves in consumption and labor income.5
Disposable Income For simplicity, we assume there are no taxes in the second period for non-
DI recipients. Thus, their disposable labor income is given by c(z) = z. DI recipients face labor
income taxes. We consider two tax regimes. A cash cliff scheme and a benefit offset regime.
A benefit offset scheme consists of three parameters (b, r, SGA). b are the base DI benefits,
i.e. the benefits an individual receives if she works less than the threshold SGA. r is the marginal
tax rate of labor income above SGA. Hence, r is the rate at which benefits are reduced for every
dollar worked above SGA. An individual who earns labor income zB(θ) has disposable income
cB(θ) =
{
b+ zB(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA
b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θ)− SGA), if zB(θ) > SGA
(4.2)
3We consider θ ∈ [0,∞) as disability or “disutility of work”. Thus, a higher θ corresponds to a more severe
disability/higher disutility of work.
4For ease of exposition, we present the simplest possible model in the main text. In section 4.2.4 and the
Appendix, we discuss various extensions, including the availability of other social insurance benefits (like unem-
ployment insurance benefits), and show that our results hold in a broad class of models.
5Moreover, individuals with higher θ have steeper indifference curves, i.e. we have single crossing of indifference
curves. Our theoretical insights do not rely on this specification with separability between consumption and
disutility of work. Our insights apply for all specifications with convex preferences and single crossing of indifference
curves for different θ-types. We chose this specification for notational simplicity.
138
under a benefit offset scheme. With r = 1, benefits would be reduced one by one with labor income
above SGA. With r = 0 benefits are independent of earnings. A lower r, therefore, corresponds
to higher work incentives and lower benefit offset.
DI with a cash cliff is characterized by two parameters (b, SGA), where b are the DI benefits an
individual receives as long as she earns a labor income below the earnings disregard SGA. If she
earns above SGA she looses all her benefits. Hence, under a cash cliff an individual with optimal
labor supply zC(θ) has disposable income
cC(θ) =
{
b+ zC(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA
zC(θ), if zC(θ) > SGA.
(4.3)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the budget set of individuals under the cash cliff vs. the benefit offset
scheme. The black dotted line represents the budget set of non-DI recipients.
Figure 4.1: Budget Sets under Cash Cliff vs. Benefit Offset Scheme
(a) Cash Cliff (b) Benefit Offset
Note: b denotes the base DI benefits, SGA the earnings disregard, and r the offset rate.
DI Application Decision There exists a unique marginal DI applicant θA. Individuals with
a smaller disutility of work than the marginal applicant (θ < θA) do not apply for DI benefits,
work according to their optimal labor supply choice z(θ), and receive utility u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ).
Individuals with larger disutility of work than the marginal applicant (θ ≥ θA) apply for DI
benefits. As in Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), a DI application is accepted with probability
p(θ), where p increases in θ. An accepted applicant chooses her optimal labor supply zi(θ),
yielding second-period utility u(ci(θ))−h(zi(θ), θ) where i ∈ {B,C}, depending on whether there
is a benefit offset (B) or cash cliff (C) regime in place. A rejected applicant goes back to work
and gets second-period utility u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ).
4.2.2 Optimal Benefit Offset r
Under a benefit offset regime with parameters (b, r, SGA), social welfare is given by
W =u(w − τ) +
ˆ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
ˆ ∞
θA




[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ).
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p(θ)(b− ry(θ))dF (θ), (4.5)
where y is defined as income above the earnings disregard, i.e.
y(θ) =
{
zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.
(4.6)
The marginal applicant θA is unique and determined by6
u(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA), (4.7)
where zB(θA) solves





Moreover, we have SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK , where zK is the intersection of the Benefit Offset
and the regular budget set, and zB(θA) < z(θA).7
A marginal change in the offset rate r has a welfare effect of
∂W
∂r






































Intuitively, lowering the offset rate r increases the insurance value for DI recipients, who
earn above SGA, i.e. have y(θ) > 0. All behavioral responses such as more labor supply and
more applications do not have first order welfare effects because of the envelope theorem. The
behavioral responses only enter through the fiscal effects ∂τ/∂r. The fiscal effects consist of three
components. First, a lower benefit offset increases expenditures mechanically through lower taxes
on labor incomes above the earnings disregard. Second, the labor supply incentives change, which
causes a behavioral response of DI recipients’ labor supply. Third, DI becomes more attractive
for individuals with disutility of work just below the previous marginal applicant, which leads to
more entry into DI.
From equation (4.10), it follows immediately that providing more work incentives, i.e. reducing
r, is always welfare improving if this reduces program expenditures, i.e. ∂τ/∂r > 0. In this case,
6Note that this is an interior solution in the sense that the marginal applicant supplies more labor than SGA.
In case the marginal applicant would actually want to work less than or at SGA, the benefit offset would not be
effective. Hence, the scenario would correspond to the one discussed in section 4.2.3. Thus, we only consider benefit





7For proof of this see Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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decreasing the benefit offset, r, is a Pareto improvement. However, ∂τ/∂r > 0 is rather unlikely








labor supply effect would have to compensate the mechanical costs in order to reduce program
expenditures (if there is induced entry, the labor supply effect needs to be even stronger). This













where ε is the earnings elasticity of DI recipients who earn above the earnings disregard. Hence, for
an expenditure reduction, we need, at least, an earnings elasticity above one. If there is a positive







< 0), the earnings elasticity needs
to be even larger. Earnings elasticities are estimated to be rather low, especially for DI recipients
ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 (Kostol and Mogstad (2014); Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017); Ruh
and Staubli (2019)). Therefore, it appears unlikely that higher work incentives reduce program
expenditures.
Nevertheless, decreasing r can still have positive welfare effects even with increasing expen-
ditures (since the insurance value increases in 1 − r). To obtain a money metric of the welfare

































As long as individuals are not fully insured already (i.e. w − τ > cB(θA), we have u′(w −




if the labor supply effect compensates for the induced entry effect.























































8Note that the sign of the inequality switches. That is ∂W̃/∂r < 0 if the left-hand side (LHS) of (4.15) is larger
than the right-hand side (RHS).
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The LHS of (4.15) captures the consumption smoothing benefit of higher work incentives. To
implement the LHS, we need to parameterize the utility function or use a Taylor approximation
to obtain an expression only depending on the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The RHS of (4.15) captures the fiscal effects. In principle, the RHS consists of estimable
quantities. The only challenge is the DI take-up semi-elasticity ν. Implicit differentiation of

















































Therefore, the benefit take-up elasticity μ is a sufficient statistic for the induced entry effect.
This elasticity is easier to estimate with reduced form methods since one does not rely on policies
that change the benefit offset but only the DI benefit level. Consequently, increasing (decreasing)
the offset rate increases welfare if the LHS of equation (4.20) is larger (smaller) than the RHS.
4.2.3 Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
Section 4.2.2 developed a sufficient statistic formula to evaluate the local optimality of the
offset rate r. However, most DI programs feature cash cliffs and not benefit offset schemes. The
relevant policy discussion, therefore, is whether a cash cliff should be replaced by a benefit offset.
The key idea to our approach is that a cash cliff can be modeled as a benefit offset.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how we construct a hypothetical benefit offset that mirrors a cash cliff.
The black line represents the budget set of a DI recipient. The black dotted line marks the budget
set of non-recipients. The red line is the indifference curve of the marginal DI applicant in the cash
cliff regime with disability θAC . Every individual with a lower θ does not apply for DI. Everyone
with a higher θ works at or below the earnings exempt SGA. The blue line marks the budget set
of a hypothetical benefit offset regime. The hypothetical benefit offset has an offset rate 1 − rm,
which is equivalent to the slope of the indifference curve of the marginal applicant at the cash
cliff. Hence, this hypothetical benefit offset system has the same marginal applicant as the cash
cliff regime (i.e. θAm = θ
A
C). For types with higher disability degree θ than the marginal applicant,
the incentives to work and apply to DI are exactly the same. For types with lower θ than the
marginal applicant, there is no difference between the two DI programs either.
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Figure 4.2: Equivalence between Cash Cliff and Benefit Offset
Note: This figure illustrates the benefit offset scheme which is equivalent to the cash cliff. The benefit offset is determined





. C denotes disposable income and z is labor income.
Replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset is, therefore, equivalent to increasing labor supply
incentives starting from this hypothetical benefit offset. To evaluate the welfare effects of a benefit
offset introduction, we conduct the opposite thought experiment of moving from a benefit offset
to cash cliff scheme, i.e. moving from a benefit offset with work incentives r < rm closer to rm.
This way we can start with r = rm − ε (with ε > 0) and consider the limiting case ε → 0. For all
ε > 0, we have an interior marginal applicant supplying more labor than SGA and can use the
analysis from section 4.2.2. That is, we need to evaluate (4.20) for r → rm. This yields a much
simpler sufficient statistic formula. Condition (4.20) becomes
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
 −ε+ μ. (4.22)
This is a powerful result. First, equation (4.22) implies that welfare increases with the intro-
duction of a benefit offset regime with minimal labor incentives whenever the LHS is larger than
the RHS. Second, this test might even be informative on whether there exists a welfare-improving
benefit offset at all if the welfare function were concave in r. The derivation of (4.22) is in Appendix
4.A.
4.2.4 Extensions
Our insights presented above are derived in a stylized model. In Appendix 4.B, we show that
our results generally hold for: (1) any convex preferences with single crossing (as compared to
separability of utility from consumption and disutility of work), (2) the presence of application
costs to the DI program, (3) benefit substitution (i.e. the presence of other welfare programs), (4)
labor adjustment costs, (5) other sources of heterogeneity (e.g. skill heterogeneity causing wage
heterogeneity), and (6) one-period structure with taxes. The intuition for the robustness of our
results is that we exploit envelope conditions to derive the welfare effects in terms of elasticities.
The exact model specifications make some behavioral responses more and less elastic. Since, we
estimate the elasticities with reduced form techniques, we do not need to know the exact model
specifications. For instance, the presence of DI application costs could make the application




As the empirical analysis is in process, we provide a first rough implementation of our sufficient
statistic formulas for the United States. Thus, this section is merely for illustration purpose.
Section 4.4 describes the planned empirical implementation for Canada.
The result of the theoretical model in section 4.2.3 has shown that evaluating how abolishing
a cash cliff in favor of a benefit offset affects welfare can be achieved by estimating the quantities
in the following equation
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
 −ε+ μ, (4.23)
where b denotes the DI benefit level, SGA the earnings disregard (location of the cash cliff), w
labor income in the first period (without disability), τ the lump sum taxes levied in the first
period, ε the earnings elasticity, and μ the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b.
Implementation of the LHS For the LHS, we use a quadratic approximation of the utility
function to get9
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
≈ γ









where γ = −u
′′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) (w−τ) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion evaluated at w−τ. Hence, we
need an estimate of the replacement rate for the marginal DI applicant (i.e. (b+ SGA)/(w− τ)).
In the model, we rule out savings resulting in consumption being equal to income. However, the
LHS should capture the consumption drop and not the income drop. Meyer and Mok (2018) study
the income and consumption patterns of individuals reporting disabilities in the United States.
They find that individuals reporting a chronic and severe disability face an after-tax post-transfer
income drop of 30 percent ten years after onset of the condition. Consumption reacts less. Hence,
focusing on income can be seen as an upper bound. Ideally, we would know the consumption
drop of the marginal applicant. We want to exploit this more in the empirical implementation for
Canada, where we might look at financial well-being and distress. For the time being, we use the
income drop of 30 percent from Meyer and Mok (2018), i.e. 1− b+SGA
w−τ = 1− 0.7 = 0.3.
10
Implementation of the RHS For the RHS, we need estimates for the DI take-up elasticity
with respect to benefits μ and the earnings elasticity of DI recipients ε.
The take-up elasticity has not been directly estimated in the literature. Thus, we have to
employ estimates of the application elasticity with respect to benefits and take award rates into
account. To obtain an upper bound of the take-up elasticity, we multiply the application elasticity
with the average award rate. This gives an upper bound since the individuals who actually react
to the benefits (marginal applicants) should have lower than average award rates. First, Low
and Pistaferri (2015) (Table 7) reports empirical estimates of the application benefit elasticity
that range from 0.2 to 1.3 in the United States. Low and Pistaferri (2015)’s model implies an
application benefit elasticity of 0.62. Second, French and Song (2014) find an award rate after 10
years from the initial application of 0.67 for the United States. Hence, we get a take-up elasticity
μ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.
We are not aware of a direct estimate of the earnings elasticity of the marginal DI applicant for
the United States. Ruh and Staubli 2019 exploit bunching at the cash cliff in Austria and estimate
an earnings elasticity of 0.27. Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017) report an elasticity of 0.12 for the
Netherlands. Kostol and Mogstad (2014) find elasticity estimates between 0.1 and 0.3 for Norway.
9This is a standard approach, see Chetty and Finkelstein (2013).
10Autor and Duggan (2003) (Table 1) report lower DI replacement rates. However, this replacement rate is
before additional labor income from working up to the SGA (i.e. b/(w − τ) rather than (b+ SGA)/(w − τ)).
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Evidence from the benefit field experiment in the United States indicates that the labor supply
elasticity might be rather low (Weathers and Hemmeter (2011); Gubits et al. (2018)). Therefore,
we use ε = 0.1.
Results Figure 4.3 illustrates the fiscal (RHS) and consumption smoothing effect (LHS) of
introducing a benefit offset as a function of risk aversion. If the consumption smoothing benefits
(red line) exceed the fiscal costs (gray lines), replacing the cash cliff with a benefit offset is welfare
improving. We plot the fiscal effect for the largest (μ = 0.9, dashed gray line) and smallest
(μ = 0.1, solid gray line) benefit take-up elasticity reported in the literature. For the smallest
μ, introducing a benefit offset is welfare improving for all levels of risk aversion. For the highest
μ, introducing a benefit offset is only welfare improving if risk aversion is rather large (γ > 2.6).
Hence, for reasonable values of risk aversion it is better to keep a cash cliff regime.
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risk aversion γ
Cons. Smoothing (LHS) Budget Effect (RHS, µ=0.9)
Budget Effect (RHS, µ=0.1)
Note: If the consumption smoothing effect (Cons. Smoothing) exceeds the fiscal costs (Budget Effect), introducing a
benefit offset is welfare improving.
4.4 Empirical Implementation with Canadian Data
In this section, we report our empirical approach to implementing our sufficient statistics
formula for Canada. We cannot show results yet as this is still work in progress and the results
are not authorized for publication yet.
Framework In this empirical analysis, we estimate the effects of changes in the level of DI
benefits and the earnings disregard on program entry/exit, labor supply, and financial well-being
in Canada. This allows us to infer the earnings elasticity and benefit take-up elasticity with respect
to the benefit level, which are the crucial parameters to implementing our sufficient statistics
formula.
Canada operates two distinct DI programs for Quebec and the Rest of Canada (RoC). We
can exploit exogenous variation in program parameters that is generated by two reforms to the
Canadian Pension Plan DI program (CPP-D) that left the Quebec Pension Plan DI program
(QPP-D) unchanged. The first reform took place in 1987 and increased the replacement rate of
DI benefits by about 36 percent in RoC (Gruber, 2000). The second reform was implemented in
2001 and increased the earnings disregard in the CPP-D to CAD 3,800 per year (Campolieti and
Riddell, 2012). These reforms were not implemented in Quebec enabling us to use the population
of Quebec as a control group in this quasi-experiment.
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Data We work with the Canadian Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD). The LAD
contains detailed information of 20 percent of individuals (and their spouse and children) filing an
income tax return between 1982 and 2016. Importantly for our context, the LAD also contains
information on the receipt of DI benefits, demographics, earnings, income, other government
transfers, savings, taxes, and housing. Due to the detailed information on income and savings
flows, we can study how changes in DI generosity not only affect labor supply and DI claiming,
but also the social insurance provided by taxes and transfers.
Methods We will exploit exogenous variation in DI benefit levels and the earnings disregard
caused by two policy reforms to the CPP-D in 1987 and 2001.
The 1987 CPP-D reform: Prior to 1987, the CPP-D pension was substantially less generous
than the QPP-D pension. In an effort to align the two programs, the government increased the
CPP-D pension in 1987 to the level of the QPP-D pension. This change increased the CPP-D
pension by almost CAD 2,000 per year, corresponding to an average increase in the replacement
rate of 36 percent (Gruber, 2000). We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy
to estimate the causal effects of this reform. Specifically, we compare the change in an outcome
variable, for example earnings, in RoC with the change in the same outcome variable in Quebec
before and after the reform. This comparison can be implemented with the following regression
yijt = α+ βTijt + θj + πt +X
′
ijtδ + εijt, (4.25)
where yijt is an outcome variable of individual i living in province j in year t, Tijt is a dummy
that is equal to 1 if an individual lives in RoC after the reform, θj are province fixed effects, πt
are year fixed effects, and Xijt is a vector of demographic and labor market characteristics (e.g.
socioeconomic status, age, experience, or previous earnings). The coefficient of interest is β, which
identifies the effect of the 1987 benefit increase on yijt under the assumption that trends in yijt
would have been the same in RoC and Quebec in the absence of the reform. Using program entry
and exit as outcome variables allows us to estimate the benefit take-up elasticity with respect
to the benefit level. Analyzing the effect on earnings provides insights on the earnings elasticity.
Apart from the implementation of our sufficient statistics formula, we will also contribute to the
literature in analyzing the effects of the 1987 CPP-D reform in detail. Gruber (2000) studies the
effect of the same reform on labor force non-participation, while we provide novel evidence on the
effects on DI exit/entry, government transfers, and other financial outcomes such as savings and
housing. Additionally, we will carefully investigate the validity of the “parallel trends” assumption.
Lastly, we can zoom in to the border of Quebec and RoC similar to Campolieti and Riddell (2012)
to have a more homogeneous sample in which the concern about non-parallel trends is likely to
be less prevalent.
The 2001 CPP-D reform: In June 2001, the CPP-D introduced an annual earnings exemption
allowing beneficiaries to earn up to CAD 3,800 without having their benefits suspended. The
purpose of this policy was to encourage work among CPP-D beneficiaries. We apply two estimation
strategies to examine the effect of the earnings exemption. The first strategy is a bunching
estimator, which exploits the discontinuity in the implicit tax on work at the exempt threshold of
CAD 3,800 (cash cliff). Specifically, the exempt amount causes a notch in the budget constraint
in a static labor supply model, defined as a discrete increase in the (implicit) tax liability. This
notch displayed in figure 4.4 creates a strong incentive for DI beneficiaries to keep their earnings
just below the exempt threshold. This type of behavior is coined “bunching” and, as (Saez, 2010)
shows, the amount of bunching can be used to estimate an earnings elasticity with respect to the
net-of-tax rate. This parameter is crucial to assess the effectiveness of return-to-work programs
(Ruh and Staubli, 2019) and to implement our sufficient statistics model. The second strategy is
a DiD approach similar to the one shown in equation (4.25). Specifically, we compare the change
in an outcome variable in RoC with the change in the same outcome variable in Quebec before
and after the introduction of the earnings exemption in 2001. Campolieti and Riddell (2012) also
study the 2001 reform, but they do not examine effects on beneficiaries’ earnings, government
transfers, and other financial outcomes.
146
Figure 4.4: Budget Constraint under CPP-D after the 2001 Reform
Note: This illustration corresponds to figure 4.1a in the theoretical part in section 2.2. H∗ marks the
earnings exemption (exempt amount) corresponding to SGA in the theoretical part. CPP-D benefits
is the level of flat DI benefits labeled by b in section 2.2.
4.5 Conclusion
Most DI programs feature strong work disincentives for DI recipients. Usually DI recipients lose
their entire DI cash benefits if their earnings surpass the earnings disregard (so called cash cliff).
As an alternative, a benefit offset program reduces DI cash benefits gradually for individuals with
an income above the earnings disregard. Offsetting the cash cliff causes two behavioral responses.
First, DI recipients with substantial remaining work capacity are incentivized to increase labor
supply (labor supply effect). This reduces program costs without reducing the insurance value of
DI. Second, the more generous DI program is more attractive for potential applicants. This might
cause more DI take-up (induced entry effect) and increase program costs.
In this paper, we formalize this trade-off between labor supply and induced entry effect. We
develop robust sufficient statistics formulas that capture the insurance value and incentive costs
of benefit offset schemes to analyze welfare effects. These formulas are functions of high-level
elasticities that can be estimated empirically. We show that the welfare effects of moving from a
cash cliff to a benefit offset regime crucially depend on two sufficient statistics: (i) the earnings
elasticity of DI recipients and (ii) the DI benefit take-up elasticity with respect to the DI benefit
level. The earnings elasticity captures the labor supply effect, and the DI benefit take-up elasticity
is a sufficient statistic for induced entry in a broad class of models. Our theoretical analysis’
contribution is twofold. First, it provides simple yet robust sufficient statistics formulas to evaluate
the welfare effects of introducing a benefit offset. Second, it sheds light on the potential size of
the induced entry effect based on credible reduced form estimates.
In an empirical application of our model, we plan to estimate these two sufficient statistics
exploiting two policy reforms in Canada changing the level of DI benefits and the earnings exempt
with difference-in-differences and bunching estimators. This is work in progress. For the time
being, we use estimates from previous studies to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a
benefit offset scheme. For the U.S., we find that it is unlikely that the introduction of a benefit
offset scheme reduces program expenditures if the benefit take-up elasticity is high. If the benefit
take-up elasticity is very low, our sufficient statistics formula suggests that the introduction of a
benefit offset is welfare improving. This shows the crucial importance of credibly estimating the




We outlined the key idea and result of the equivalence between a cash cliff and benefit offset in
the main text. Here we derive these insights formally. Before showing the equivalence we establish
in Proposition 3 that there is no benefit offset that incentivizes labor supply but does not have
an entry effect. Lemma 1 then establishes the equivalence between a cash cliff and a hypothetical
benefit offset. Lemma 2 characterizes the marginal applicants under both regimes and afterwards
we derive equation (4.22).
Welfare under a Cash Cliff system is given by
WC =u(w − τC) +
ˆ θAC
0













[1− p(θ)] [u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)] dF (θ).










Consumption is given by
cC(θ) =
{
b+ zC(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA
zC(θ), if zC(θ) > SGA.
(4.28)
The marginal applicant θAC is unique and determined by













Proposition 3. The introduction of a benefit offset scheme with offset r either i) has no effect
at all or ii) incentivizes more labor supply of DI recipients but also induces more entry into DI.
Hence, a benefit offset scheme with a positive labor supply effect always induces entry.
(i) If 1−r ≤ ĪK where ĪK is the slope of the indifference curve of the marginal applicant under the




u′(b+SGA) , then there is no labor supply effect and no induced
entry effect of introducing a benefit offset scheme.
(ii) If 1−r > ĪK, then there is a positive labor supply effect but also a positive induced entry effect.
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Figure 4.5: Induced Entry and Labor Supply Effects
(a) Cash Cliff (b) Benefit Offset without Entry
(c) Benefit Offset with Entry – Induced Entry Effect (d) Benefit Offset with Entry – Labor Supply Effect
Note: This figure illustrates Proposition 3. Panel 4.5c depicts the induced entry effect by showing that the marginal
applicant changes. Panel 4.5d depicts the labor supply effect of the previous marginal applicant.
Proof. Proposition 3
Note that if the marginal applicant of the cash cliff scheme does not adjust her labor supply
under the benefit offset scheme, then all θ-types receiving DI benefits do not adjust their labor
supply either. Hence, to determine whether there is a positive labor supply effect it is sufficient
to only look at the labor supply response of the marginal applicant θAC .
Under the cash cliff system (b, SGA), the marginal applicant θAC is determined by







and thus it has to hold that
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ), ∀θ > θAC . (4.32)
After the benefit offset scheme(b, r, SGA) is introduced, the marginal applicant under the cash









b+ zB(θAC), if z
B(θAC) ≤ SGA
b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θAC)− SGA), if z
B(θAC) > SGA.
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Hence, an interior solution with more labor supply by the marginal applicant θAC solves










⇔ zB(θAC) > SGA.




u′(b+SGA) . If there is no
labor supply effect, then the application decision is still the same as in the cash cliff regime and
therefore there is no entry effect. Contrary, if there is a labor supply effect then there is a positive
entry effect as well. Let us denote the marginal applicant under the benefit offset system θA.
Suppose, zB(θAC) > SGA but z
B(θAC) > z
B(θA) ⇔ z(θAC) > z(θ
A) ⇔ θAC < θ
A. Then, we have
u(b + SGA) − h(SGA, θA) > u(z(θA)) − h(z(θA), θA) by (4.32).  Suppose zB(θAC) > SGA and
zB(θAC) = z
B(θA) ⇔ z(θAC) = z(θ
A) ⇔ θAC = θ









C) but this only holds for
zB(θAC) = SGA.  Hence, a positive labor supply effect z
B(θAC) > SGA implies a positive entry
effect θAC > θ
A.
Lemma 1. Equivalence between benefit offset and cash cliff




u′(b+SGA) , which is equivalent
to the cash cliff regime (b, SGA), i.e. θA = θAC and z
B(θ) = zC(θ) ∀θ.
(ii) To evaluate the marginal welfare effect of a benefit offset policy, we can study a marginal
change in r starting from rm.
Proof. Lemma 1
i) The marginal applicant θA of the benefit offset scheme with (b, rm, SGA) is determined by




))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA). (4.33)
where zB(θA) solves
(1− rm)u
′(b+ SGA+ (1− rm)(z









u′(b+SGA) , (4.34) holds if θ
A = θAC and z
B(θA) = SGA. Uniqueness of the marginal
applicant implies that this is the only solution.
Proof. zB(θ) = zC(θ) ∀θ holds, because for all individuals with zC(θ) < SGA nothing changes.
Moreover, all individuals that bunch at the earnings disregard under the cash cliff system (i.e.
θ > θA(= θAC) and z
C(θ) = SGA) still bunch at SGA under the benefit offset regime as (1 −
rm)u
′(b+ SGA+ (1− rm)y(θ)) < hz(z
B(θ), θ).
ii) Follows immediately from i). As all outcomes are the same, welfare is the same.
Lemma 2. Marginal Applicants: (i) θAC is unique and determined by











(ii) θA is unique and determined by
u(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA). (4.37)
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where zB(θA) solves





Moreover, we have SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK , where zK is the intersection of the benefit offset and the





C(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)}.

















C(θ̄) < SGA. Hence, zC(θ̄) is the interior solution to maxz≥0 u(b+z)−h(z, θ̄).
Therefore, θ̄ ∈ {θ|u(cC(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)} but θ̄ < θAC . 
Proof. Therefore, we must have zC(θAC) = SGA and θ
A
C is determined by







Moreover, θAC is unique because of single crossing of indifference curves of different θ-types (this
is due to hθz > 0).
(ii) In case that zB(θA) < SGA, the proof is analogous to i). Hence, this proof is for interior
marginal applicants (i.e. zB(θA) ≥ SGA) only. First, we show that SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK . For
SGA ≤ zB(θA), the same argument applies as in i). If we had zB(θA) ≥ zK , individuals could
reduce labor supply and increase earnings by leaving DI.
Therefore, θA is determined by
u(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θAB))− h(z(θ
A), θA) (4.40)
where zB(θA) solves





Now suppose θ1 and θ2 satisfy equations (4.40)-(4.42). Then, (4.42) immediately implies θ1 = θ2.
Hence, θA is unique.
Derivation of Equation (4.22). We now study the effect of moving from a cash cliff to a
benefit offset program. To do so, we analyze the opposite change, i.e. moving from a benefit offset
with work incentives r < rm closer to rm being equivalent to a cash cliff scheme. This way, we
can start with r = rm − ε with ε > 0 and let ε → 0. For all ε > 0, we have an interior marginal


















zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.
(4.44)
For r → rm, we have θ
A → θAC , y(θ
A) → 0.
We can bound the numerator on the LHS with
u′(cB(θA))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
E[y(θ)|DI] ≤ E[y(θ)




u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
E[y(θ)|DI], (4.45)




















































εmarginal > εaverage. (4.51)
Therefore, y(θ
A)








} = 1. (4.52)
All together, we have
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
 −ε+ μ (4.53)
for the marginal introduction of a benefit offset.
4.B Model Extensions
Our results from the baseline model discussed in the main part of this paper generally hold
for several extensions: (1) convex preferences with single crossing (as compared to separability
of consumption and disutility of work), (2) presence of application costs to the DI program,
152
(3) benefit substitution (presence of other welfare programs), (4) adjustment costs to changing
labor supply, (5) other sources of heterogeneity, and (6) one-period structure with taxes. With
exemptions, every extension discussed in this Appendix follows the same structure. First, we
point out the difference between the standard case and the extension. Second, we show that the
sufficient statistics formula to find the optimal offset rate r still holds. Third, we show that the
sufficient statistics formula regarding an introduction of a benefit offset scheme instead of a cash
cliff system still applies.
4.B.1 Convex Preferences (Non-Separability of Consump-
tion and Disutility of Work)
All derivations for the optimal benefit offset r do not rely on the separability of consumption and
disutility of work. All formulas are generally valid for any convex preferences with single crossing
of indifference curves for different θ-types. A generic utility function fulfilling these conditions
could be U(θ) = U(c(z(θ)), z(θ), θ). All results from the main part still hold, but the notation
becomes slightly more cumbersome (i.e. u′(c) becomes Uc(c, z, θ), hz(z, θ) becomes Uz(c, z, θ),
and hθ(z, θ) becomes Uθ(c, z, θ)). The intuition for the robustness to non-separability is that our
results rely on envelope conditions, i.e. that behavioral responses of individuals do not have first
order welfare effects. Our results do not exploit the functional form of the utility function.
4.B.2 Application Costs
Setup
In this extension, we consider disability application costs ψ > 0. We only consider application
costs that are low enough such that at least some individuals still apply for disability insurance
(i.e. ∃θmax ≤ ∞ s.t. ψ = u(cB(θmax)) − h(zB(θmax), θmax) − u(z(θmax)) − h(z(θmax), θmax)).




where c(z) = z. Under a benefit offset scheme (b, r, SGA), individuals with disutility of labor θ







b+ zB(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA,
b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θ)− SGA), if zB(θ) > SGA.
These are exactly the same as in the standard model. The only difference to the standard case is
that individuals choose to apply for DI if




Note that the single crossing condition is still fulfilled as the LHS of inequality (4.54) decreases
in θ while the right-hand side increases in θ. Particularly, the “relative application costs” ψ/p(θ)
decrease in θ. Consequently, the unique marginal applicant is now determined by





A), θA), and (4.56)
(1− r)u′(cB(θA)) = hz(z(θ
A), θA). (4.57)
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Optimal Benefit Offset r
Welfare is given by
W =u(w − τ) +
ˆ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
ˆ ∞
θA




[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)− ψ]dF (θ).





where y is defined as income above SGA, i.e.
y(θ) =
{
zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.





































This is equivalent to the standard case. In fact, the only difference to the standard model is






































































Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
All calculations from the main part of the paper still apply.
4.B.3 Benefit Substitution
In this subsection, we assume that all individuals have access to an unconditional welfare
program (W) apart from DI. Everyone receiving benefits bW is not allowed to supply any labor.
Optimal Benefit Offset r
There are three possible scenarios for this unconditional welfare program to interact with
DI depicted in figure 4.6: (1) the unconditional benefit paid is low bW ≤ b (panel 4.6a), (2) the
unconditional benefit is intermediate bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ] (panels 4.6b and 4.6c), and (3) the unconditional
benefit is very high bW > ˜bW (panel 4.6d). ˜bW is the level of unconditional income that would
set the marginal applicant θA indifferent between working, applying to DI, and dropping out of
the labor force to receive ˜bW and is given by u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θA)) − h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA)) −
h(z(θA), θA). In scenario (2), there are again two possible cases. Either the agent indifferent
between W and DI with disutility of work θO supplies less labor than SGA/exactly SGA (y(θO) =
0, panel 4.6b) or she supplies more (y(θO) > 0, panel 4.6c). The scenarios and their implications
for the model will be discussed in greater detail below.
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Figure 4.6: Benefit Substitution Scenarios
(a) bW ≤ b (b) bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ] and y(θO) = 0
(c) bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ] and y(θO) > 0 (d) bW ∈ ( ˜bW ,∞)
Note: Panel 4.6a corresponds to scenario 1, panels 4.6b and 4.6c correspond to scenario 2, and panel 4.6d corresponds
to scenario 3.
Scenario 1 bW ≤ b: First, let us assume that bW ≤ b. This is the empirically most relevant
case. With bW ≤ b, individuals that have the most severe disability (high θ) have an incentive
to apply for disability insurance instead of not applying to DI and receiving the benefits of W.
Phrased differently, if we assume that b < bW the policy maker could increase b up to bW without
changing individuals’ behavior.
Every individual with θ ≥ θW chooses to receive unconditional benefits bW instead of working,
where θW is determined by
u(bW ) = u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW ).
Everything else remains as in the baseline model. By concavity of the utility function, we further
know that everyone that does not supply labor, i.e. θ ≥ θW , applies to DI. This means that
θA ≤ θ̃ ≤ θW , where
u(b) = u(z(θ̃))− h(z(θ̃), θ̃)
u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA).
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Consequently, welfare is given by
WW1 =u(w − τ) +
ˆ θA
0












(1− p(θ))u(bW )dF (θ).




p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ) +
ˆ ∞
θW
(1− p(θ))bW dF (θ).
The partial derivative of welfare with respect to the offset r is
∂WW1
∂r























Hence, the optimality conditions are the same as in the baseline model. The only difference is
that apart from b, SGA, and r the policy maker has to choose the optimal level of unconditional
welfare benefits bW . This is, however, orthogonal to the optimal benefit offset program.
Scenario 2 bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]: Second, let us assume that bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]. In this scenario, we have to
consider three marginal agents. The first agent with θA is indifferent between being applying to
DI with labor supply zB(θA) and supplying z(θA) without assistance. The second agent with θO
is indifferent between receiving unconditional welfare and being on DI with labor supply zB(θO).
The third agent with θW is indifferent between receiving unconditional welfare and supplying
z(θW ) without assistance. They are determined by the following equations
u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA), (4.58)
u(cB(θO))− h(zB(θO), θO) = u(bW ), and (4.59)
u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ). (4.60)
By bW ≤ ˜bW and the definition of ˜bW , it follows that u(bW ) ≤ u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θA)) −
h(zB(θA), θA). Together with equations (4.58)-(4.60), we get θW ≥ θA and θO ≥ θA. Hence,
both θW - and θO-individuals would prefer applying to DI rather than working. Hence, we know
that
u(z(θO))− h(z(θO), θO) ≤ u(cB(θO))− h(zB(θO), θO) = u(bW )
= u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW )
≤ u(cB(θW ))− h(zB(θW ), θW ),
which implies that θO ≥ θW ≥ θA. We can distinguish between four types of agents: (1) agents
that drop out of the labor force to receive unconditional benefits θ ∈ [θO,∞), (2) agents that
apply to DI and drop out of the labor force if they are rejected θ ∈ [θW , θO), (3) agents that apply
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to DI and work without assistance if rejected θ ∈ [θA, θW ), and (4) agents that do not apply to
DI and work without assistance θ ∈ [0, θA). Welfare is given by
WW2 =u(w − τ) +
ˆ θA
0








(1− p(θ))[u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ) +
ˆ θO
θW









p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ) +
ˆ θO
θW




A marginal change in the offset rate r causes welfare to change according to
∂WW2
∂r






























Note that the program substitution effect is zero if ∂θ
O
∂r
= 0. This condition holds if y(θO) = 0
which is equivalent to (1 − r)u′(b + SGA) ≤ hz(SGA, θ
O). Otherwise, the program substitution
effect is negative. A smaller benefit offset makes DI more attractive as compared to the uncondi-
tional welfare program inducing DI entry and W exit. As the costs of W are higher than those of
DI, taxes can be reduced to balance the government budget.
















































u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
dF (θ).




















































































P (W ) :=
ˆ θO
θW



















































































Scenario 3 bW > ˜bW : Third, let us assume that bW > ˜bW . Consequently, we have u(bW ) >
u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θA)) − h(zB(θA), θA). This means that even the agent that is indifferent between
applying to disability insurance and working prefers dropping out of the labor force over DI. In
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this scenario, the benefit offset does not affect welfare. Phrased differently, if the government
would want to induce DI entry the offset rate r would have to be very low. Welfare is given by
WW3 =u(w − τ) +
ˆ θW
0










Consequently, it is not possible to calculate the optimal offset rate in this scenario. The limit case
of this scenario would be to decrease r until we arrive at scenario 2.
Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
Again there are three possible scenarios for the unconditional welfare program to interact
with DI moving from a cash cliff system to a benefit offset system. The three scenarios are
depicted in figure 4.7. Note the differential definition of ˜bW . It is the level of unconditional
income that would set the marginal applicant under the cash cliff system θAC indifferent between
working, applying to DI, and dropping out of the labor force to receive ˜bW and is given by








C). Scenario 1 in this section corresponds
to scenario 1 of section 4.B.3, scenario 2 corresponds to scenario 2 with y(θO) = 0 in 4.B.3, and
scenario 3 corresponds to scenario 2 with y(θO) > 0 and scenario 3 in 4.B.3. θO still denotes
the level of disutility of work of the individual that is indifferent between applying to DI and W.
Below, the scenarios are described in detail.
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Figure 4.7: Benefit Substitution – Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset Scenarios
(a) bW ≤ b (b) bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]
(c) bW > ˜bW
Note: Panel 4.7a corresponds to scenario 1, panel 4.7b corresponds to scenario 2, and panel 4.7c corresponds to scenario
3. rw is the maximum offset rate leaving the cash cliff and the benefit offset system equivalent. In scenarios 1 and 2, it





. In scenario 3, it is determined by u(cB(θW ))− h(zB(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ) with
cB(θW ) = b+ SGA+ (1− rw)(zB(θW )− SGA).
Scenario 1 bW ≤ b: From the results in section 4.B.3, it follows that moving from a cash cliff to
a benefit offset system in this scenario is analogous to the baseline case without the unconditional
welfare program W.
Scenario 2 bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]: As in section 4.B.3, we have three marginal agents to consider. The
agent with θAC is indifferent between being applying to DI with labor supply SGA and supplying
z(θAC) without assistance. The agent with θ
O is indifferent between receiving unconditional wel-
fare and being on DI with labor supply zC(θO). The last agent with θW is indifferent between











u(cC(θO))− h(zC(θO), θO) = u(bW ), and (4.64)





b+ zC(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA,
zC(θ), if zB(θ) > SGA.
By bW ≤ ˜bW and the definition of ˜bW , it follows that u(bW ) ≤ u( ˜bW ) = u(cC(θAC)) −
h(SGA, θAC). Together with equations (4.63)-(4.65), we get θ
W ≥ θAC and θ
O ≥ θAC . Hence,
both θW - and θO-individuals would prefer applying to DI rather than working. Hence, we know
that
u(z(θO))− h(z(θO), θO) ≤ u(cC(θO))− h(zC(θO), θO) = u(bW )
= u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW )
≤ u(cC(θW ))− h(zC(θW ), θW ),
which implies that θO ≥ θW ≥ θA. We can distinguish between four types of agents: (1) agents
that drop out of the labor force to receive unconditional benefits θ ∈ [θO,∞), (2) agents that
apply to DI and drop out of the labor force if they are rejected θ ∈ [θW , θO), (3) agents that apply
to DI and work without assistance if rejected θ ∈ [θA, θW ), and (4) agents that do not apply to
DI and work without assistance θ ∈ [0, θA). Welfare under the cash cliff system is given by
WCW2 =u(w − τC) +
ˆ θAC
0










(1− p(θ))[u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ) +
ˆ θO
θW





We now study the effect of moving from a cash cliff to a benefit offset program. To do so,
we analyze the opposite change, i.e. moving from a benefit offset with work incentives r < rw
closer to rw being equivalent to a cash cliff scheme. This way, we can start with r = rw − ε with
ε > 0 and let ε → 0. For all ε > 0, we have an interior marginal applicant. Note that for r = rw,
y(θ) = 0∀ θ ∈ [θAC , θ
O). Further, we know that limr→rw θ
A = θAC and thus limr→rw y(θ
A) = y(θAC).
Let us now consider the limit case of equation 4.62. First, let us calculate the limit of the LHS of
equation 4.62. We know that
u′(cB(θA))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
E[y(θ)|DI] ≤ E[y(θ)




u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
E[y(θ)|DI].




u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)
|DI] =






E[y(θ)|DI] ≥ 1 and y(θ




























































u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)




The last term might seem counter-intuitive at first. Panel 4.7b nicely shows that the θO will
not react to the introduction of the benefit offset system. The term’s origin lies in the definition
of μ, which is the DI benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b. It comprises both the reaction of
the lower marginal applicant to DI θA and the upper marginal applicant to DI θO. As θO increases
in b (more individuals prefer DI over W), we have to correct for this effect. This correction is
captured by the new term ω P (DI)
C
P (W )C
, which is the unconditional welfare benefit take-up elasticity
with respect to b weighted by the fraction of individuals on DI relative to the fraction of individuals
on unconditional welfare W.
Scenario 3 bW > ˜bW : This is not an empirically relevant case as no individual will apply to
DI. Thus, the hypothetical marginal applicant to the cash cliff system no longer is the marginal
applicant under the maximum benefit offset system (b, rw, SGA). Instead the marginal W receiver
has to be set indifferent between DI, W, and working to arrive at the maximum offset rw. The
maximum offset is defined by u(cB(θW )) − h(zB(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ) with cB(θW ) = b + SGA +
(1− rw)(zB(θW )− SGA). Rather than introducing a benefit offset scheme to the DI program in
that scenario, the government could instead introduce a benefit offset or earnings exempt to the
unconditional welfare program to improve labor incentives in this economy.
4.B.4 Frictions: Adjustment Costs
This extension is still work in progress. In general, one can always think of adjustment costs
when changing labor supply as a particular form of heterogeneity as extensively discussed in
section 4.B.5. There might be a distribution across adjustment costs in the population with some
individuals that need strong incentives to change labor supply and others that have adjustment
costs close to zero – the latter would correspond to individuals treated in the baseline model.
Consequently, the reaction caused by changes to the DI program would just be focused in one
particular part of the population. The parameters one would have to estimate, however, would
still be the same. Other possibilities to incorporate adjustment costs when changing labor supply
are presented in Gelber et al. (2013) or Kleven (2018a). They require non-marginal policy changes,
which we did not yet include into the model.
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4.B.5 Other Sources of Heterogeneity
Setup
Let us assume that there is some other source of heterogeneity affecting an individual’s choice
of labor supply apart from the level of disability θ. Let us call this heterogeneity a ∈ (−∞,∞)
and assume that there is some joint smooth distribution of θ and a denoted by G(θ, a). Let us
assume that what we denoted before by F (θ) is actually the conditional distribution of θ given a
corresponding to F (θ|a). Let us denote the unconditional distribution of a by H(a). Hence, the
choices of optimal labor supply without DI benefits and with DI benefits are given by
z(θ, a) : = argmax
z≥0
u(z)− h(z, θ, a),
zB(θ, a) : = arg max
zB≥0
u(cB(θ, a))− h(zB , θ, a),
with
cB(θ, a) : =
{
b+ zB(θ, a), if zB(θ, a) ≤ SGA,
b+ SGA+ (1− r)y(θ, a), if zB(θ, a) > SGA,
and
y(θ, a) : =
{
0, if zB(θ, a) ≤ SGA,
zB(θ, a)− SGA, if zB(θ, a) > SGA.
Moreover, let us assume that the wage rate in the first period also potentially depends on the
heterogeneity parameter a such that utility in the first period is given by u(w(a)− τ). There is a
marginal DI applicant θA(a) for every value of the heterogeneity parameter a given by
u[cB(θA(a), a)]− h[zB(θA(a), a), θA(a), a] = u[z(θA(a), a)]− h[z(θA(a), a), θA(a), a].















[1− p(θ, a)][u(z(θ, a))− h(z(θ, a), θ, a)]dF (θ|a)}dH(a).







p(θ, a)[b− ry(θ, a)]dF (θ|a)}dH(a).
Optimal Benefit Offset r
































p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a).
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Note that ∂τ/∂r and E[u′(a) − τ ] :=
´∞
−∞

















p(θ, a)E[u′(a)− τ ]y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)























u′(cB(θ, a))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)]










































p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)
,
the benefit take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r by





























































the expected excess labor supply of DI recipients beyond SGA by














and the consumption smoothing effect of changing work incentives
E[E[


































































































where amin (amax) is the level of a that yields the minimum (maximum) optimal excess labor
supply beyond SGA of the marginal DI applicant. Consequently, we can define a sufficient and a
necessary condition for ∂W
∂r
≤ 0, which are given by
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]






























































































































Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
Figure 4.8: Heterogeneity – Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
(a) Introduction of maximum benefit offset rh.
Note: This figure illustrates the benefit offset scheme which is equivalent to the cash cliff system. The benefit offset rh










Let us denote the characteristic of the marginal applicant in a cash cliff system with the flattest




min) is the disability level of the marginal
applicant with the lowest counterfactual labor supply if working. Figure 4.8 depicts the indifference
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curve of this limit marginal applicant together with indifference curves of two marginal applicants
with random heterogeneity characteristics ag and at. Again, we can show equivalence between a
cash cliff system and a limit benefit offset system. Figure 4.8 features a sketch of the maximum
benefit offset rate rh that does not affect individuals’ optimal behavior as compared to the cash
cliff system. The offset rate is given by the slope of the indifference curve of the limit marginal
applicant θAC(a
C
min) at SGA. This poses as a limit case of subsection 4.B.5. For r → r
h, we get
θA(a) → θAC(a)∀a, y(θ(a), a) → 0∀a, and thus c
B(θA(a), a) → b+SGA∀a. The numerator on the



























E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
=
u′(b+ SGA)− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
.

















Consequently, the sufficient and the necessary condition converge to the same limit for r → rh.
Hence, we get that ∂W
∂r
≤ 0 if
u′(b+ SGA)− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
≥ −ε̃+ μ̃,
where the elasticities ε̃ and μ̃ can be estimated, as they represent the elasticities in the total
population, aggregated over all heterogeneity characteristics a.
4.B.6 One Period Model with Taxes
Setup
In this addition, we show how contemporaneous taxation affects our results. Instead of a two-
period model, we have a one-period model where disability hits at the beginning of the period
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and every individual not receiving DI benefits has to pay taxes. This means that every individual
working without benefits chooses optimal labor supply z(θ) according to11
z(θ) := argmax
z≥0
u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z, θ),
where τ is a lump sum per capita tax rate. Every individual on DI chooses optimal labor supply
zB(θ) according to
zB(θ) := arg max
zB≥0




b+ zB(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA,




zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.
Moreover, everyone with disability θ ≥ θA applies to DI, where θA is given by
u(z(θA)− τ)− h(z(θA), θA) = u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA),
u′(z(θA)− τ) = hz(z(θ
A), θA), and
(1− r)u′(cB(θA)) = hz(z
B(θA), θA).




u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
ˆ ∞
θA




[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ)


























where Ω denotes the sum of payments to all DI recipients and χ denotes the fraction of tax-payers
in the economy (i.e. non-DI recipients).
Optimal Benefit Offset r













u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ) +
ˆ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)]u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ)]
11Note that we require one of two conditions to hold for this extension: either (1) u(z(θ)− τ)−h(z(θ), θ) ≥ 0∀θ
such that everyone paying taxes gets non-negative utility, or (2) there exists some unconditional welfare program

































dF (θ) + ∂θ
A
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA) + τ ]]
χ
.


























































































b− ry(θA) + τ
E[y(θ)|DI]
, (4.69)













ν is the benefit take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r
































u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ) +
´∞
θA


















The condition in equation (4.69) is equivalent to the standard model apart from the tax term
ν τ
E[y(θ)|DI] on the RHS. The expected difference of relative marginal utility changes of DI individ-
uals and non-DI individuals divided by the expected excess labor supply of DI individuals are on
the LHS, and the earnings elasticity and the take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r are on the
RHS. The difference on the RHS stems from the changed cost effect of DI entry: the government
has to pay b− ry(θ)A to the marginal DI entrant and loses taxes τ .
From the first order condition of the marginal applicant one can derive the optimality condition
0
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u′(cB(θA)) + u′(z(θA)− τ)∂τ
∂b













































































































































































































p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) ≤ y(θA)
´∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ) as y(θA) ≥ y(θ) ∀θ ≥ θA, Fb ≥ 0, and














































































































































































































































, we learn that μE[y(θ)|DI]
b
≤ ν ≤ μy(θ
A)
b
, where μ is













































Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset














b P (DI)1−P (DI) . Let us define r
O as the maximum offset rate that makes the cash cliff and the benefit




u′(b+SGA) . For r → r
O, it holds that
θA → θAC and y(θ
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